An attorney should not submit inadmissible evidence to the jury in the form of argument or otherwise. See People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver, 25 Ill. App. 3d 66, 76-77 (1975); Rowley v. Rousseau, 81 Ill. App. 3d 193, 196 (1980). Counsel's improper attempts to communicate with the jury constitute contemptuous behavior punishable by the trial court.
It is a long standing rule in Illinois that acts which constitute contempt of court are those which are calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute. ( In re Estate of Melody (1969), 42 Ill.2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104.) Direct contempt takes place in the presence of the court and all elements of the offense are matters within the court's personal observation and knowledge. ( People v. McNeil (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 1036, 356 N.E.2d 1073.) It is recognized that the contempt power is an extraordinary power of the court and accordingly should be exercised only in extreme situations. ( People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 927, 46 L.Ed.2d 255, 96 S.Ct. 275.) A stand taken by counsel in good faith and in the interests of his client should not ordinarily serve as a basis of a charge for contempt. ( In re McConnell (1962), 370 U.S. 230, 8 L.Ed.2d 434, 82 S.Ct. 1288; People v. Kuelper (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 420, 361 N.E.2d 29.) A distinction is to be made, however, between contempt based on words of counsel as opposed to contempt based upon the acts or manner of counsel. In the former situation the court must act with great forebearance before punishing counsel, but in the latter less restraint is required.
) Nevertheless, there are limitations to impose contempt. The power to impose contempt is an extraordinary one and, thus, should be exercised only in extreme situations. ( People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66.) It should not be used when other adequate remedies are available. People v. Mowery (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 695.
People v. Miller (1972), 51 Ill.2d 76, 78, 281 N.E.2d 292. In People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240, an attorney disobeyed a court order not to discuss the trial court's evidentiary ruling during final argument. Because of this, the trial court found that attorney in direct contempt.
Our trial courts have the duty and the power to control the course and conduct of trials in such a manner as will inspire respect for the law and the administration of justice, to ensure orderly, expeditious and fair trial proceedings, and to protect its processes from prejudicial influences. Kemner v. Norfolk Western Ry. Co. (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 597, 602, rev'd on other grounds (1986), 112 Ill.2d 223; People v. Ray (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 656, 664; People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 76. There are a variety of practical considerations which militate against permitting the trial court to be deceived, even temporarily, concerning the identity of persons at counsel table.
The record indicates that the trial court did not hold a high opinion of contemnor's behavior or strategy. Nevertheless, a finding of direct criminal contempt cannot rest upon mere opinion or the presumptions of the trial court. ( People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240.) Thus, even if the contempt order had been sufficiently specific, the record indicates that the State has failed to prove contemnor in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although it is preferable to set forth the specific facts constituting the basis for the contempt ruling in the order itself, this court is not precluded from reviewing the record on appeal, together with the order, to determine the correctness of a contempt order. ( People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 75-76, 322 N.E.2d 240.) We find that the court's order when read with the rule to show cause indicates that the court held contemnor in contempt for failing to honor the JDP.
• 1-2 It is well settled that a judgment order of direct criminal contempt must: (1) be in writing; (2) set forth the grounds upon which the contempt is based; and (3) contain not merely opinion or conclusions of the trial judge, but facts showing the basis of the contempt. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263, 118 N.E.2d 310; People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 75, 322 N.E.2d 240, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 927, 46 L.Ed.2d 255, 96 S.Ct. 275.) The reason for this rule lies in the fact that the accused has a right of appeal. ( People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263, 118 N.E.2d 310.) Although a written order may not be necessary where the report of proceedings fully and clearly sets forth the facts out of which the contempt citation arose ( People v. Wilson (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 86, 87-88, 341 N.E.2d 34; People v. Miller (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 637, 645, 265 N.E.2d 175), where a purported adjudication of direct criminal contempt is supported by neither an order of contempt nor an adequate record, the conviction for contempt is void and without force ( People v. Tomashevsky (1971), 48 Ill.2d 559, 564-66, 273 N.E.2d 398).
Portions of the prosecutor's closing argument were improper and deliberate indeed, and the prosecutor could have been held in contempt for continuing his line of argument. However, the court properly sustained defendant's objections thereto and cautioned the jury to disregard them (see People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (2d Dist. 1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 927, 46 L.Ed.2d 255, 96 S.Ct. 275). Such remarks do not constitute reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused.
The parties acknowledged that a person charged with a crime is entitled to a public trial by virtue of article I, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (See Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 86 S.Ct. 1507.) They also acknowledge that certain types of matters may be heard in camera over defendant's objections. Obviously, as done in People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 927, 46 L.Ed.2d 255, 96 S.Ct. 275, and in People v. Jackson (1968), 98 Ill. App.2d 97, 240 N.E.2d 364, a court may proceed to chambers to hear objections to offered evidence or argument. In People v. Latimore (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 812, 342 N.E.2d 209, a restriction upon those permitted to be present during the cross-examination of a rape victim was upheld.