We have not formulated a litmus test for determining whether a matter is of local, state-wide, or mixed concern; instead, we have weighed various factors on a case-by-case basis. For example, in People ex rel. Public Utilities Commission v. Mountain States Telephone Telegraph Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), we characterized a matter as state-wide because, in our view, the municipal ordinance would have a substantial impact on persons living outside the municipal limits. In People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941), we found that matters are likely to be characterized as of state-wide concern where uniformity of regulation is desirable.

[12] The business of supplying the people with telephone service is not a municipal affair; it is a matter of statewide concern. (See Oro Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Com., 169 Cal. 466, 475-476 [ 147 P. 118]; San Francisco v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co., 166 Cal. 244, 250-251 [ 135 P. 971]; City of SanDiego v. Southern Calif. Tel. Co., 92 Cal.App.2d 793, 800-801 [ 208 P.2d 27]; People ex rel. Public Utilities Com. v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167 [ 243 P.2d 397, 401].) [13] Therefore, any delegation from the state to the city of authority to control the right of Pacific to do a telephone business should be clearly expressed, and any doubt as to whether there has been such a delegation must be resolved in favor of the state.

The Colorado court in the Manor Vail opinion assumed that the rate regulation of cable TV was a matter of local concern in the home rule context. See also People v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397. The Supreme Court in TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556, 90 S.Ct. 749, 24 L.Ed.2d 746, affirmed a three-judge court decision ( 304 F. Supp. 459, D.Nev.) holding that the regulation of the community antenna system was a local business and did not constitute an interference with interstate commerce.

U S WEST urges us to analyze the controversy here as a matter involving mixed local and state concern. In arguing that a mixed local and state concern analysis applies, U S WEST points to our decisions in People ex rel. Public Utilities Commission v. Mountain States Telephone Telegraph Co., 125 Colo. 167, 178, 243 P.2d 397, 402 (1952), where we held that the P.U.C. is the sole agency authorized to regulate the business and rates of telecommunications companies, and Moffat v. City County of Denver, 57 Colo. 473, 477-78, 143 P. 577, 578-79 (1914), where we explained that objects in and under the public right of way have traditionally been recognized as a matter of local concern. Although U S WEST recognizes that the Ordinance regulates objects in and under the public right of way, U S WEST argues that the Ordinance also affects its business and rates in two respects.

could be interpreted as in conflict with section 40-4-106, the regulation of public utilities in the interest of public safety and convenience is a matter of state-wide concern. See Century Electric Service v. Stone, supra (legitimate state interest in licensing electricians overrides local licensing provisions); PUC v. Mountain States Telephone, 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952) (the regulation of the telephone company's local rates and services is a matter of state-wide concern within the jurisdiction of the PUC). The addition of Article XXV to the Colorado Constitution

The "nothing herein" had to do with the granting of power to the P.U.C. to regulate public utilities within the corporate boundaries of home rule cities, but it did not take away the power of home rule cities to regulate (their own) municipal utilities within the corporate boundaries of the home rule municipality. The first paragraph very clearly grants to the General Assembly the power to regulate public utilities within home rule cities, a power which, since the adoption of Article XX, had belonged exclusively to home rule cities where the utility was local in use and extent. It was not local in nature and extent but state-wide in People ex rel. P.U.C. v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), Where we held that the P.U.C. had jurisdiction to set rates within the municipality. This overruled Denver v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 P. 604 (1919).

"Whether a particular business activity is a matter of municipal concern to a city under Article XX depends upon the inherent nature of activity and the impact or effect which it may have or may not have upon areas outside of the municipality. People v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., [ 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952)]. It has long been acknowledged that a municipal ordinance of a home rule city which is in clear opposition to the provisions of a general state law is invalid.

38 (1968).See 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §§ 3.36, 5.35, 5.38 (1968); 50 Calif. L.Rev. 740, 741-42 (1962); Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 737, 744-45 (1959); Chavez v. Sargent, 329 P.2d 579, 584 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1958); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn.2d 545, 108 P.2d 348, 352 (1940); People ex rel. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397, 399 (1952). Potter telephoned appellant from the police station at Tannenbaum's request.

" On June 16, 1953, following the decision of this court in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. City and County of Denver, 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397, the people of the City and County of Denver adopted a charter amendment which provided, inter alia, that the power to regulate public utilities within the City and County of Denver should thereafter reside in the General Assembly of the State of Colorado or such commission or authority as should be designated by it. On November 2, 1954, Article XXV of the Colorado as the General Assembly shall by law designate.

See McPhee McGinnity v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra at p. 12. A statewide telephone system, however, with its need for coordinated intra and interstate communications is also a matter of statewide concern heavily outweighing any possible municipal interest. See People ex rel. Public Utilities Comm. et al. v. Mountain States T. T. Co. et al., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952) and Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 51 Cal.2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959). It is not like a city gas or electric company operation whose predominant epicenter usually is limited to a local focus.