iggs v. State Road Commissioner, 120 W. Va. 298, 197 S.E. 813. Although from the facts and circumstances of this case we can assume that the Board has refused to grant relator's application to take an examination, no hearing was held and no decision made from which to apply for review to the Circuit Court of Cabell County under the provisions of Code, 30-1-9, which does not provide for a hearing de novo but gives the person who has been refused a license or registration, for any reason other than the failure to pass the examination, the right to have such decision, based on the record of the hearing before the Board, reviewed and determined by the circuit court. Mingo County Medical Society v. Simon, 124 W. Va. 493, 20 S.E.2d 807; State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 136 W. Va. 80, 65 S.E.2d 649. The relator therefore does not have an adequate remedy as contended by the respondents and it has been specifically held that mandamus will lie in such cases. State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, supra; People v. Thompson (Ill.), 59 N.E.2d 494; Thomas v. State Board of Health, 72 W. Va. 776, 79 S.E. 725, 49 LRA (NS) 150. Both the relator and the respondents rely on the "Rules and Regulations for Certification of Specialists in West Virginia" to support their respective contentions.

( People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill.2d 534, 349 N.E.2d 31.) The predominant purpose in licensing professions is to prevent injury to the public by assuring professional competence, as well as honesty and integrity. ( Ranquist v. Stackler (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198; Kaplan v. Department of Registration Education (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 968, 361 N.E.2d 626.) In asserting want of fault, plaintiff presumes that license revocation is necessarily punitive; however, in construing successive acts regulating the practice of medicine the courts have regarded revocation provisions not as punishment for any offense, but for the protection of public health through the police power of the State. ( Ramsay v. Shelton (1928), 329 Ill. 432, 160 N.E. 769; People ex rel. State Board of Health v. Apfelbaum (1911), 251 Ill. 18, 95 N.E. 995; Kaplan; People ex rel. Schutz v. Thompson (1945), 325 Ill. App. 95, 59 N.E.2d 494.) A revocation proceeding under the Act thus does not require culpability by the respondent in every case. • 4 In Torriente v. Stackler (7th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 498, the Seventh Circuit, construing the 1975 Act, held that a complaint charging an applicant with having received a letter advising her she had passed the examination and would receive a medical license "`* * * through accident, artifice, or some other means * * *'" ( 529 F.2d 498, 499) stated grounds for which her license could be revoked.

Inasmuch as the Department urges that its Rules V-A and V-B are reasonable, necessary and constitutional, we must first address ourselves to this point. [1] All parties to this litigation agree that the courts have the power and the duty to determine whether the rules of the Department are reasonable and impartial or are arbitrary and unreasonable. Kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221, 231-32, 77 N.E. 472, 475 (1906); People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 313, 131 N.E. 809, 812 (1921); People ex rel. Schutz v. Thompson, 325 Ill. App. 95, 99, 59 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1945). The defendants contend that Rules V-A and V-B represent no delegation of any kind by the Department to two outside agencies but rather are a practical interpretation and guide as to what constitutes a reputable dental school.

[1] Section 7 of the Medical Practice Act [ch. 91, par. 7, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 79.07] permits the Department to prescribe rules and regulations for all examinations. Our courts have repeatedly held that the rules of the Department may be reviewed to determine whether they are fair, reasonable, and impartial. See Schleifer v. Department of Registration, 326 Ill. App. 259; People v. Frank G. Thompson, 325 Ill. App. 95. [2] As we read the pleadings, defendants admit that the relator has complied with all the conditions prescribed by the Medical Practice Act, Illinois Statutes, State Bar Edition, chapter 91, paragraph 14, but insist that relator is barred from obtaining a license because he voluntarily submitted to examinations and failed to secure a passing grade, after he had complied with all the requirements of paragraph 14. Under the circumstances shown by the pleadings it would seem to us that application of the regulation relied on by the defendants imposes additional conditions upon the relator not provided for in paragraph 14 or elsewhere in the Medical Practice Act.

If the claim that a well established scientific fact such as the constituent parts of water is not true, or that one hundred years from now it may be refuted, would be sufficient reason for preventing a court from taking judicial notice of that scientific fact, then a court could never take judicial notice of a scientific fact. There are innumerable cases in which courts have taken judicial notice of scientific facts. See Fligelman v. City of Chicago, 348 Ill. 294, 200; National Ice Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 387 Ill. 31; People ex rel. Schutz v. Thompson, 325 Ill. App. 95, 102; Pearcey v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 163 Va. 928, 177 S.E. 843; Matter of Madura v. City of New York, 238 N.Y. 214, 144 N.E. 505; Tonkovich v. Department of Labor (Wash.), 195 P.2d 638; and VanPelt v. United States, 134 F.2d 735. That the court will apply the doctrine of judicial notice to pleadings, has long been settled.

We recently decided in two cases where State boards had refused examination admission to physicians who desired to practice medicine in the State of Illinois that if their ruling was arbitrary or an abuse of discretion, the court could control their action by mandamus, and the numerous cases cited and reviewed in those decisions amply support the conclusions there reached. People ex rel. Schutz v. Thompson, 325 Ill. App. 95; and Schleifer v. Department of Registration and Education of Illinois, 326 Ill. App. 259 (Abst.). The plain facts of this case clearly indicate that instead of permitting the names of all candidates duly nominated to appear on the ballot so that the voters could decide who their village officers should be, the purported electoral board, which was held by the order of the circuit court and the statutory chairman of the board to be illegal, entered into an undertaking which was in the nature of a conspiracy to keep the Regular People's Political Party candidates off the ballot in order to insure the election of the candidates of the Progressive Political Party with which respondents were affiliated.