The argument proceeds in two parts. Relying heavily on People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co., 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 448 N.E.2d 950 (1983), HMK first asserts that a company facing liquidation proceedings must have the opportunity to contest seizure. Schacht stands for the proposition that a corporation has both the right and the duty to defend itself when its very existence is attacked.

Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of the petition for payment of attorney fees. • 1 In People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 448 N.E.2d 950, the court stated as follows: "It is well established that as a general rule where an application has been made for the appointment of a receiver for a corporation, attorney fees and expenses, if incurred in good faith, may become a valid claim against the receiver, such claim being addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."

As a general rule, where application has been made for the appointment of a receiver for a corporation, attorney fees and expenses in resisting such application, if made in good faith and upon reasonable grounds, may become a valid claim against the receiver, such claim being addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ( Assets Realization Co. v. DeFrees, Brace Ritter (1907), 225 Ill. 508, 513, 80 N.E. 263; People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 338, 448 N.E.2d 950; 2 Clark on Receivers sec. 642(b), at 1107 (3d ed. 1959).) This is based on the idea that where the very existence of the corporation is attacked, it is the corporation's right and duty of its officers to protect the interest of the corporation and its creditors.

We agree with the appellate court that Congress was entitled to recover enough of its own assets to pay the expenses of its defense. In People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 334, one of the issues addressed was whether a trial court has the power to award attorney fees incurred in good faith to contest the appointment of a receiver. The court held:

The credibility of a business record depends on the regular, prompt, and systematic nature of the entry and the fact that it is relied on in the operation of the business. ( People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 344, 448 N.E.2d 950, 957.) Since the purpose of business records "is to aid in the proper transaction of business and they are useless for that purpose unless accurate, motive for following a routine of accuracy is great and the motive for falsifying nonexistent."

Plaintiff contends that the summary was properly admitted as a business record as is permitted by Supreme Court Rule 236(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 236(a)). We do not agree. As stated by the court in People exrel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 448 N.E.2d 950: "The business records rule simply recognizes that records of an act, occurrence or event routinely made at the time of the transaction, or within a reasonable time thereafter are normally sufficiently reliable in nature to be admissible in evidence despite their hearsay character.

If a corporation wishes to seek redress in an Illinois court, the proceeding must be brought by an attorney acting on its behalf. Edwards v. City of Henry, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1036 (2008); see People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 334, 340 (1983) (corporation may only appear by attorney); Tom Edwards Chevrolet, Inc. v. Air-Cel, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 378, 379-80 (1973) (same); Nispel v. Western Union R.R. Co., 64 Ill. 311, 313-14 (1872). An action filed on behalf of a corporation without an attorney is null and void ab initio.

Whether fee reimbursement is appropriate in a given situation is a question committed to the discretion of the trial court. Roddis v. Strong, 250 Cal.App.2d 304, 309-10, 58 Cal.Rptr. 530, 533 (1967); People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co., 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 338, 448 N.E.2d 950, 956 (1983); Sims v. Homeseekers Fire Insurance Co., 120 W. Va. 459, 463, 199 S.E. 69, 71 (1938). In order to establish an abuse of discretion in this context, appellants must demonstrate both that there was no substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding of a lack of good faith and that there was substantial evidence from which it could have found good faith.

; Offset Revolution, supra , at 451 n.3 (" ‘Rehabilitation’ has been defined as ‘the preservation, whenever possible, of the business of an insurance company threatened with insolvency.’ " (quoting People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Ins. Co. , 114 Ill.App.3d 334, 70 Ill.Dec. 72, 448 N.E.2d 950, 952 (1983) )); Semaya & Broudy, supra , at 28 ("The rehabilitator manages the insurer's affairs for an indefinite time period, until the company can be returned to its prior management, or perhaps new management, or it is placed in liquidation.

SSLIC argues it was entitled to have its attorney fees paid out of the receivership estate because it acted in good faith in resisting Commissioner's application. SSLIC contends "[i]t is well established that where an application has been made for appointment of a receiver for an insurance corporation, attorney fees and expenses, if incurred in good faith, become valid claims against the receiver," citing People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Company, 114 Ill. App.3d 334, 70 Ill.Dec. 72, 448 N.E.2d 950 (1983); McConnell v. All-Coverage Insurance Exchange Automobile and Fire, 229 Cal.App.2d 735, 40 Cal.Rptr. 587 (1964); and Anderson v. Great Republic Life Insurance Company, 41 Cal.App.2d 181, 106 P.2d 75 (1940). SSLIC has cited no Oklahoma authority for this rule, and we have discovered none.