Opinion
23CA2237
05-23-2024
The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of R.J.T., a Child, and Concerning S.R.T., Appellant.
Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Jordan Lewis, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV51 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge
Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Jordan Lewis, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
Welling and Hawthorne [*] , JJ., concur.
OPINION
SCHOCK, JUDGE
¶ 1 S.R.T. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent child legal relationship with R.J.T. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the
Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect after the child tested positive at birth for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and fentanyl. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The Department later moved to terminate mother's parental rights. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 3 A juvenile court may terminate a parent-child legal relationship if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied with an appropriate court-approved treatment plan, or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent's conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023.
¶ 4 In determining whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court must consider whether a department has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. § 19-3-604(2)(h). "Reasonable efforts" means "the exercise of diligence and care." § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2023. That standard is satisfied through the provision of services as provided in section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2023. § 19-1-103(114). The court may consider a parent's unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶ 5 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court's factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether the Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
III. Analysis
¶ 6 Mother asserts that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her because it did not facilitate referrals to services near her residence. But the caseworker testified, and the juvenile court found, that mother refused to tell the caseworker where she lived. We therefore reject mother's contention.
¶ 7 The caseworker testified that, at the time of the child's birth, mother reported that she lived in Arapahoe County. Over the course of the case, the caseworker made extensive efforts to contact mother, texting her at least twice a month, calling her twice a month, and emailing her at least twice a month. But the caseworker was only successful in contacting mother once. In that phone call, mother refused to tell the caseworker where she lived.
¶ 8 The caseworker testified that she could not make referrals for mental health or substance abuse treatment because mother refused to divulge her address. She also testified that if mother had provided her address, she would have made those referrals. Moreover, the caseworker testified that she did make a referral for family time, but mother did not engage with that referral.
¶ 9 The juvenile court found the caseworker "very credible." It found, consistent with her testimony, that the caseworker "ha[d] sent multiple emails, ha[d] texted [mother], ha[d] called her, all to no avail, and that mother, over the entirety of the case . . . ha[d] not disclosed to any of the professionals, but to the caseworker specifically, where she lived." It also found that when mother asked for a family time referral, the caseworker "immediately put in a referral," but that mother did not follow up and the referral was closed. Mother does not challenge any of these factual findings.
¶ 10 The court also found more generally that mother had "failed to engage in any meaningful way whatsoever despite the Department's continual . . . requests and . . . repeated contact." It found that mother "ha[d] not done anything on the treatment plan, ha[d] not complied in any way, shape, or form, and ha[d] made zero effort to engage with any of the professionals in the case." And it noted that the one time the caseworker was able to reach mother by phone, mother told her that "she didn't need referrals or any treatment."
¶ 11 The record supports these findings as well. The caseworker testified that the case was opened after mother refused to engage in a safety plan instituted after the child's birth. During the pendency of the case, mother (1) did not respond to the caseworker's repeated attempts to contact her, with the exception of a single phone call; (2) failed to provide any documentation to verify her employment status; (3) failed to complete a substance use evaluation or engage in treatment; (4) failed to complete urinalysis tests; (5) said she was unwilling to participate in mental health treatment; (6) never visited the child; and (7) did not show "any kind of engagement" to indicate that she was "even interested in being [the child's] parent."
¶ 12 The caseworker opined that mother's conduct or condition rendered her unable or unwilling to care for the child and that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable period of time because "there's been such a lack of engagement that [the caseworker] wouldn't know at what point she might be able to."
¶ 13 Mother asserts that the caseworker was aware that mother did not live in Arapahoe County. But the caseworker testified that she was never able to determine where mother lived. Mother said only that she was living "[s]omewhere in the mountains," but she would not give the caseworker any more information than that. And although the caseworker acknowledged that there were court documents in unrelated cases listing mother's address as Rifle, Colorado, she did not know if mother was living at that address.
¶ 14 The caseworker also explained that, even if she had known mother lived in Rifle, she "would have had to talk to [mother] in order to know if she wanted the referrals made, because [she] wouldn't make a referral if [she] didn't have contact with the client." But she was generally unable to contact mother, and the one time she did, mother said she was "not interested" in any referrals.
¶ 15 On this record, we agree with the juvenile court that the Department fulfilled its obligation to make reasonable efforts but that those efforts were thwarted by, among other things, mother's refusal to disclose where she lived, failure to maintain contact with the caseworker, and unwillingness to accept referrals. See People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo.App. 2011) (noting that it is the parent's responsibility to use the provided services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan).
IV. Disposition
¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.
[*] Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.