See, e.g., Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal.App.3d 870, 97 Cal.Rptr. 920 (1971); Cartee v. Carswell, 425 So.2d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); People ex rel. Reeder v. Reeder, 131 Ill. App.3d 841, 86 Ill.Dec. 874, 476 N.E.2d 50 (1985); Howell v. Brummell, 293 Md. 646, 446 A.2d 1149 (1982); M.A.D. v. P.R., 277 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. 1979); McNulty v. Heitman, 600 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)(superseded by statute on attorney fee question); State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Davis, 99 N.M. 138, 654 P.2d 1038 (1982); Williams County Soc. Serv. Bd. v. Falcon, 367 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1985); Roboski v. Fink, 447 Pa. Super. 520, 669 A.2d 1017, 1017 (1996); Shell v. Law, 935 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. App. 1996); Prejean v. Prejean, 592 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wn. App. 606, 648 P.2d 508 (1982); Ellison v. Walter, 834 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1992).
We also note that this court rejected a related contention prior to the effective date of the act, that a paternity action brought 14 years after the child's birth should have been dismissed under the equitable doctrine of laches, because there was no indication in the prior act that this doctrine should be applicable and because application of the doctrine of laches could adversely affect the statutory purpose of providing for support of illegitimate children. ( People ex rel. Reeder v. Reeder (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 841, 845, 476 N.E.2d 50, 52; accord People ex rel. McCoy v. Sherman (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 444, 462 N.E.2d 817.) The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, as amended by Public Act 84-848, section 1, also shows no legislative intent that this equitable doctrine may apply, and we similarly believe that application of the doctrine of laches would thwart the stated public policy of the act, to recognize the right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional, and monetary support of his or her parent.
• 8 The Director responds that laches cannot apply to this case because it is not an equitable action. Although many cases hold that laches is a purely equitable defense which is not available as a bar to an action at law ( e.g., Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Dickman (1988), 167 Ill. App.3d 113, 520 N.E.2d 1184; People ex rel. Reeder v. Reeder (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 841, 476 N.E.2d 50; Mother Earth, Ltd. v.Strawberry Camel, Ltd. (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 37, 390 N.E.2d 393), there also is authority to the contrary. (See Bays v. Matthews (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 1112, 440 N.E.2d 142; People ex rel. Kennedy v. Hurley (1952), 348 Ill. App. 265, 108 N.E.2d 808.) Laches has been held to be a valid defense to actions of ejectment (see Miller v. Siwicki (1956), 8 Ill.2d 362, 134 N.E.2d 321) and actions at law based upon section 255 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 736).
Thus, this is clearly an action at law. (See People ex rel.Reeder v. Reeder (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 841, 476 N.E.2d 50.) Moreover, the record indicates no showing of prejudice caused by the delay to defendants, an element necessary in order to apply the doctrine of laches instead of the appropriate statute of limitations.
Following the decision in Pickett, the two-year time limit in the Illinois paternity statute was held to be unconstitutional under a similar analysis in Jude v. Morrissey (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 782, 454 N.E.2d 24. There the court stated that the two-year limitation period violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. As a result of this decision, there is no limitation period for the filing of a paternity complaint during the minority of the child at issue. People ex rel. Reeder v. Reeder (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 841, 476 N.E.2d 50. We find in the case at bar that the subsequent refiling of the complaint in 1984 was not barred by the previous dismissal without prejudice in 1980.