Opinion
23CA1553
05-23-2024
The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of M.H., a Child, and Concerning S.H., Appellant, and D.H., Appellee.
Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee People of the State of Colorado Jennifer Walters, Counsel for Youth, Lakewood, Colorado for M.H. Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee D.H.
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Jefferson County District Court No. 22JV30146 Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge.
Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee People of the State of Colorado
Jennifer Walters, Counsel for Youth, Lakewood, Colorado for M.H.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee D.H.
OPINION
PAWAR JUDGE.
¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect case, S.H. (father) appeals the juvenile court's judgment allocating parental responsibilities for M.H. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In August 2022, when M.H. was fourteen years old and living with father, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families (the Division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect for M.H. and moved for temporary legal custody. The juvenile court granted the motion for temporary legal custody, finding that there was drug paraphernalia and credible reports of domestic violence in father's house. D.H. (mother) also admitted to using methamphetamine with father. Father admitted the petition and the juvenile court entered an adjudication as to him.
¶ 3 The following month, September 2022, the court adopted treatment plans for mother and father. Father's plan required him to address his substance abuse, provide random urinalyses, and participate in anger management evaluation and comply with any treatment recommendations of that evaluation. Mother's treatment plan focused on addressing her substance abuse and mental health issues. The court also added maternal grandparents as special respondents and granted them temporary legal custody of M.H.
¶ 4 The following spring, in April 2023, mother moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between maternal grandparents and her that would limit contact between father and M.H. The court held contested APR hearings in July and August 2023, about ten months after the treatment plans were adopted. The court expressed concerns about father's ability to regulate himself and found that he had not engaged in treatment. In contrast, the court found that mother had at least partially engaged in treatment.
¶ 5 Ultimately, the court allocated decision-making responsibility to maternal grandparents. And it allocated physical custody to maternal grandparents and mother, as mother had moved in with maternal grandparents after she moved for an APR.
¶ 6 Mother was allocated reasonable unsupervised parenting time as agreed between her and maternal grandparents. Father was allocated one text or phone call per week with M.H. and in-person parenting time only as approved by M.H. and maternal grandmother.
¶ 7 Father appeals, challenging the limited parenting time he was allocated. We address and reject his arguments below.
II. Appeal
¶ 8 In a dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the Children's Code and the child's best interests. See L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). Such an allocation is within the juvenile court's discretion. See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo.App. 2003). It is the juvenile court's role, not ours, to determine the probative effect and weight of the evidence, including the credibility of witnesses. See People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). Accordingly, we will not disturb an APR if it is supported by competent evidence in the record. See People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo.App. 2011); A.M.K., 68 P.3d at 565.
¶ 9 Father argues that his parenting time allocation was not in M.H.'s best interests because it (1) placed his parenting time wholly within M.H.'s discretion; (2) made it impossible for him to demonstrate to M.H. that he was a healthy parent with whom she could have a good relationship; and (3) failed to require M.H. to work on healing the father-child relationship. Despite these arguments, father does not challenge the propriety of the juvenile court's factual findings that supported his parenting time allocation. And we conclude that these findings supported his allocation.
¶ 10 The court credited M.H.'s testimony that she did not want inperson parenting time with father because, in M.H.'s view, he could not put her needs ahead of his own. The court expressed concern that father "substituted his judgment for the court-ordered treatment plan." And the court said it had "significant concerns based on [father's] demeanor and conduct during this [APR] hearing about his ability to regulate himself and respond appropriately." This led the court to conclude that it was not "appropriate to force [M.H.] to have face-to-face visits with her father."
¶ 11 Instead of challenging these findings, father argues that he has not been convicted of abuse, there were "no other allegations of impropriety towards M.H.," and any previous allegations of domestic violence against mother had been recanted. Although these facts may be true, they do not call into question the juvenile court's findings described above. And those factual findings support father's parenting time allocation, including the restrictions. Therefore, we will not disturb the allocation.
¶ 12 Father also argues that we should reverse the APR because mother received far more parenting time than he did despite having her own issues with substance abuse, mental health, and engaging with treatment. Insofar as father argues that his allocation of parenting time was error because mother's was not similarly restricted, we reject this argument. As explained above, the court's unchallenged factual findings support his allocation of parenting time — whatever parenting time mother was allocated is irrelevant to this conclusion.
¶ 13 To the extent that father challenges mother's allocation of parenting time — irrespective of his allocation — we reject this challenge as well. Father is correct that mother's sobriety was imperfect and she only partially engaged in treatment. Indeed, the juvenile court expressed concern about her history of unsafe relationships and lack of long-term demonstrated sobriety. But the caseworker testified that M.H. and mother were "very bonded" and that M.H. "really trust[ed]" mother. And maternal grandmother testified that if mother acted contrary to M.H.'s best interests by failing to keep sober, maternal grandparents would kick mother out of the house for M.H.'s sake. The juvenile court found the caseworker's and maternal grandmother's testimony credible. We therefore conclude that there was competent evidence in the record supporting mother's parenting time allocation.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE RICHMAN [*] concur.
[*]Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.