People ex Rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk

2 Citing cases

  1. D'Acquisto v. Washington

    640 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1986)   Cited 70 times
    Holding that claims brought by Chicago police officers against the City of Chicago and other city officials were not preempted by the LMRA even though they involved the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements because “municipal governments, as arms of the state, are not employers under the Labor Management Relations Act and so are not covered by it”

    When a Chicago police officer was suspended for a "minimum of 30 days" without a hearing, the court held that the suspension was void because it violated the statute and ordered that the officer be paid for the entire period during which he was suspended. Maxwell v. Conlisk, 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377 (1975). That suggests that the Illinois Supreme Court would apply the same reasoning to void any suspension that ran for more than 30 days without granting the officer a hearing.

  2. First Federal Savings Loan v. Elbert

    337 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 2 times

    From this language we conclude that the Board took the position that it had no authority to enter a suspension order, the terms of which would irrevocably bar a reinstated officer from compensation. Although construction of statutes by administrative agencies charged with the enforcement of the statute is not binding, such construction should be and is persuasive. ( Hardway v. Board of Education, 1 Ill. App.3d 298, 301, 274 N.E.2d 213.) While no case precisely in point has been cited to us, analogous authority exists in those civil service cases which have held an employee wrongfully discharged or suspended to be entitled to back pay, even though the statute does not so provide. People ex rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk, 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377; City of Chicago v. Luthardt, 191 Ill. 516, 61 N.E. 410. • 3 For these reasons we judge that the statute does not empower the Board to suspend an officer without compensation and that, therefore, the association was not obliged to honor the "request" by the Board that the defendant not be compensated.