When a Chicago police officer was suspended for a "minimum of 30 days" without a hearing, the court held that the suspension was void because it violated the statute and ordered that the officer be paid for the entire period during which he was suspended. Maxwell v. Conlisk, 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377 (1975). That suggests that the Illinois Supreme Court would apply the same reasoning to void any suspension that ran for more than 30 days without granting the officer a hearing.
We believe the statute clearly provides for two possible separate 30-day suspension periods. Plaintiff's citation of People ex rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377, is inapposite. The current statute was enacted in 1965.
• 6 Plaintiff's second contention is that his suspension was for more than 30 days and thus should have been preceded by a hearing on the charges. We agree that the suspension "for a minimum of 30 days" which continued until charges were heard was for more than 30 days. ( People ex rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377.) But we do not agree that section 10-1-18.1 required a hearing before the initial suspension.
But where the charges are not sustained or are dropped, then the Superintendent has no such power and the officer is entitled to back pay from the very date of his suspension for more than 30 days. People ex rel. Petlock v. McDonough (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 469, 268 N.E.2d 267; People ex rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 563, 306 N.E.2d 640, aff'd (1975), 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377. • 7 Since, therefore, in the instant case (where plaintiff was a probationary officer at the date of his suspension for more than 30 days) the Superintendent's request for approval of plaintiff's discharge was duly made within the minimum 30-day period of the suspension and was thereafter granted by the Commission and plaintiff was then discharged, we conclude that (1) the Superintendent did have the power to suspend for more than 30 days pending the Commission's approval, at the request of the Superintendent for a reason given to the Commission, of the Superintendent's decision to discharge the probationary officer, and that (2) the specified procedural rights are not required owing to plaintiff's probationary status at the date of his suspension.
From this language we conclude that the Board took the position that it had no authority to enter a suspension order, the terms of which would irrevocably bar a reinstated officer from compensation. Although construction of statutes by administrative agencies charged with the enforcement of the statute is not binding, such construction should be and is persuasive. ( Hardway v. Board of Education, 1 Ill. App.3d 298, 301, 274 N.E.2d 213.) While no case precisely in point has been cited to us, analogous authority exists in those civil service cases which have held an employee wrongfully discharged or suspended to be entitled to back pay, even though the statute does not so provide. People ex rel. Maxwell v. Conlisk, 60 Ill.2d 243, 326 N.E.2d 377; City of Chicago v. Luthardt, 191 Ill. 516, 61 N.E. 410. • 3 For these reasons we judge that the statute does not empower the Board to suspend an officer without compensation and that, therefore, the association was not obliged to honor the "request" by the Board that the defendant not be compensated.