Opinion
0462/2018
04-04-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX REL. Ronald L. KUBY on behalf of Christina Sanabria, Petitioner, v. Adrian "Butch" ANDERSON, Dutchess County Sheriff, Respondent.
RONALD L. KUBY, ESQ. and RHIDAYA TRIVEDI, ESQ., LAW OFFICE OF RONALD L. KUBY, 119 West 23rd Street, Suite 900, New York, New York 10011, Attorneys for Petitioner GREGORY NIEBERG, ESQ. and JORDAN JOACHIM, ESQ., COVINGTON AND BURLING, LLP, 620 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York 10018, Attorneys for Petitioner BRIDGET RAHILLY STELLER, ESQ., Chief Assistant District Attorney, Dutchess County District Attorney's Office, 236 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601, Attorneys for Respondent
RONALD L. KUBY, ESQ. and RHIDAYA TRIVEDI, ESQ., LAW OFFICE OF RONALD L. KUBY, 119 West 23rd Street, Suite 900, New York, New York 10011, Attorneys for Petitioner
GREGORY NIEBERG, ESQ. and JORDAN JOACHIM, ESQ., COVINGTON AND BURLING, LLP, 620 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York 10018, Attorneys for Petitioner
BRIDGET RAHILLY STELLER, ESQ., Chief Assistant District Attorney, Dutchess County District Attorney's Office, 236 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601, Attorneys for Respondent
James D. Pagones, J.
Petitioner seeks an order, pursuant to CPL § 510.30, releasing the relator upon an unsecured surety bond executed by her three sisters, her eldest sister's fiancé and her own execution of a personal recognizance bond.
The following papers were considered:
Order to Show Cause–Verified Petition 1–2
Memorandum of Law–Exhibits 1–5 3–8
Verified Answer–Affidavits of Service (2) 9–11
Memorandum of Law–Exhibits A–G 12–19
By way of background, this is an action for habeas corpus relief by a prisoner detained by the respondent in lieu of posting a pre-trial bail or bond. The relator is awaiting trial on Dutchess County Superceding Indictment No.5/07. This indictment charges Ms. Sanabria with one Class B Violent Felony of Assault in the First Degree, five counts of the Class D Felony of Assault in the Second Degree and one count of the Class A Misdemeanor of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The charges stem from an arrest occurring on December 11, 2006, wherein Ms. Sanabria was alleged to have abused her then eight (8) month old daughter. This Court will spare the reader the alleged details of this abuse. Relevant to this application, on May 1, 2007, as jury selection began, the Court (Hon. Thomas J. Dolan), conducted an in chambers discussion in the presence of the defendant. After said conference, Ms. Sanabria entered a plea of guilty to the top charge in exchange for a twenty-three (23) year sentence. She also entered a plea to two of the second-degree assault charges, with sentences of seven (7) years each running concurrently with her twenty-three (23) year sentence. After the sentence was imposed, the relator filed multiple motions including an appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department. After a number of unsuccessful applications, the Appellate Division granted relator's motion for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis , vacated its Order of June 17, 2008 which affirmed the judgment of conviction, vacated the guilty plea and remitted the matter for further proceedings on the indictment. On February 15, 2018, the relator appeared in County Court before the Hon. Peter M. Forman. After hearing argument, Judge Forman set Ms. Sanabria's bail at Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) cash or a Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00) surety bond. The relator remains incarcerated to date in lieu of bail or bond.
The scope of collateral review upon a habeas corpus petition challenging a bail decision by a nisi prius court is narrow. It is limited to consideration of whether the denial of bail was an abuse of statutory discretion or a violation of the constitutional prohibition against excessive bail or its arbitrary refusal (see People ex rel. Brown v. Bednosky , 190 AD2d 836 [2nd Dept 1993] ; People ex rel. Hunt v. Warden, Rikers Island Correctional Facility , 161 AD2d 475 [2nd Dept 1990] appeal denied by 76 NY2d 703 ). The habeas corpus court may not substitute its discretion for that of the nisi prius court if the bail decision was the product of the exercise of discretion resting on a rational basis (see People ex rel. Brown v. Bednosky , 190 AD2d 836 [2nd Dept 1993] ). The habeas court exercises collateral review of an exercise of discretion by the bail setting court (see People ex rel. Mordkofsky v. Stancari , 93 AD2d 826 [2nd Dept 1983] ). This court's function is not to decide if it would have made the same decision (see People ex rel. Rosenthal on Behalf of Kolman v. Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230 [1979] ), nor to exercise independent discretion as to bail (see People ex rel Schreiber v. Warden of Queens House of Detention for Men , 282 AD2d 555 [2nd Dept 2001] ). The habeas court may review the action of the denial of bail or the fixing of an amount of bail if it appears that the constitutional or statutory standards inhibiting excessive bail or the arbitrary refusal of bail are violated (see People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger , 25 NY2d 497 [1969] ). The determination of the bail-fixing court will not be overturned unless there is the invasion of a constitutional right and not a difference of opinion (id. ).
The habeas court "sits not as a reviewing appellate court", it "may not review the action of the ... court as if it could examine the bail question afresh" (id. ). The limited function of the court entertaining the Writ of Habeas Corpus is to inquire whether the bail setting court abused its discretion by either denying bail without reason or for reasons insufficient in law, or by setting excessive bail (see People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison , 290 NY 393 [1943] ). The bail setting judge's determination cannot be upset absent a showing that he acted arbitrarily and improvidently or that he abused his discretion (see People ex rel. Klein , supra ).
Here, the relevant portions of the proceeding are as follows:
"THE COURT: Let's talk about bail.
MS. WHELAN: The Court, obviously, has received our answer—
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. WHELAN:—and response to the defendant's notice of motion for bail.
THE COURT: Right.
MS WHELAN: Most significantly, we would point out that the defendant's proposed residence is outside of county. She has absolutely no ties to Dutchess County.
Obviously, Judge, she at this point faces a B violent felony as well as several D violent felonies for which she could be sentenced consecutively. The B violent felony carries a period of up to twenty-five years in prison. Each D carries a period of up to seven years in prison. Obviously they would aggregate at twenty at some point—I'm sorry, at thirty. But, most significantly, this is a very serious case. She is facing significant time in prison again.
She has no means of independent financial resources. I am told that her sister is here or was going to be here to address the Court as supporting her, but we have no way to supervise her if released here in Dutchess County.
Given the allegations, obviously we differ on the strength of the People's evidence, but the defendant back in 2006 made statements to the State Police, some of which are audiotaped, some of which are videotaped, in which on the videotape she actually demonstrated with a doll how she injured her infant daughter by slamming her against the wall, on the table, shaking her upside down, scalding her.
We would ask that bail be set in a significant amount given the severity of the crime.
THE COURT: Do you have a number?
MS. WHELAN: We would ask for $250,000 bail over $500,000 bail.
THE COURT: Mr. Kuby?
MR. KUBY: Yeah, I guess I shouldn't be surprised. I'm not going to reargue everything I put in my papers.
THE COURT: I have read your papers.
MR. KUBY: Right. I assumed that you did.
THE COURT: I read the District Attorney's response.
MR. KUBY: I am not here primarily to put on a show.
I will note that the original bail was set at $200,000 is my understanding.
THE COURT: Twelve years ago.
MR. KUBY: Right. And now after she served over eleven years in prison, and after all this has happened, they're asking for an even higher bail, and I see no justification for that imaginable except the general notion that hey, if you ask for something really, really high, maybe the Court will come in at something like a hundred thousand, which is also prohibitive.
I just want to note a couple things briefly in response.
One is, of course, she's done eleven years in prison. That is significant amount of time as against any future sentence.
Number two, it is true she is without independent financial resources: If she had independent financial resources, then, of course she would be a risk of flight because she could use her money to go buy a ticket to someplace she's never been in her life. I mean that would be the counter argument. So that's kind of damned if you do, damned if you don't, argument.
If you want to talk about what ADA Whelan said was the most significant issue here, those are ties. What kind of emotional and physical ties does she have.
Well, we have brought a number of people into court today...[counsel then introduced the individuals and testified himself as to their willingness to sign a surety bond]...
THE COURT: Right. The Court is—first of all, I want to note for the record that I have reviewed not only the papers submitted by Mr. Kuby and the papers submitted by Ms. Whelan on this issue, I have also reviewed the statutory factors set forth in CPL Section 510.30, Subdivision 2(a), and I have reviewed those statutory factors in conjunction with the facts in this case. I have had a chance to review the indictment; I have reviewed the evidence that has been submitted in connection with this case to date.
And in considering all these relevant statutory factors, I'm going to conclude that the appropriate bail should be the same bail that was set by Judge Dolan back in 2007, which was $200,000 cash over $400,000 surety bond."
As stated above, the function of a habeas court is to review the action of the bail-fixing court to determine whether the constitutional or statutory standards inhibiting excessive bail or the arbitrary refusal of bail are violated (see People ex rel. Schreiber v. Warden of Queens House of Detention for Men , 282 AD2d 555 [2nd Dept 2001] ). The habeas corpus court is not to examine the bail question afresh or to make a de novo determination of bail (id. ). When the determination of the bail-fixing court was the product of an exercise of discretion resting on a rational basis, the habeas corpus court may not substitute its discretion for that of the bail fixing court (id. ).
Here, this Court finds that the trial Court did not fix bail arbitrarily and, contrary to the relator's position, provided a rational basis for its bail determination. The Court specifically considered CPL § 510.30(2)(a) in conjunction with the facts of the underlying proceeding. The papers submitted in the underlying proceeding, and reviewed by the Court, provided contrasting viewpoints of the CPL § 510.30 factors and their direct correlation to the appropriateness of the relator being released upon her own recognizance or held subject to the bail conditions previously imposed. This Court will not expand its review of this proceeding beyond the record made in the County Court (see People ex rel. Gamble v. Romano , 172 AD2d 575 [2nd Dept 1991] leave to appeal denied by 78 NY2d 854 ). Nor will this Court substitute its discretion for that of the nisi prius court as the bail decision was the product of an exercise of discretion resting on a rational basis (see People ex rel. Brown v. Bednosky , 190 AD2d 836 [2nd Dept 1993] ).
Accordingly, the petitioner's writ is dismissed. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.