Rather, the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings to determine the validity of extradition is limited to the following areas: (1) whether the extradition documents on their face are regular in form; (2) whether petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding State; (3) whether petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (4) whether petitioner is a fugitive. People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 403 N.E.2d 750; Beauchamp v. Elrod (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 208, 484 N.E.2d 817. โข 2, 3 Since the only purpose of extradition is the return of the fugitive to the place of the alleged offense, his constitutional rights, other than the present right to personal liberty, are not involved. ( People ex rel. Hackler v. Lohman (1959), 17 Ill.2d 78, 160 N.E.2d 792, cert. denied (1960), 361 U.S. 963, 4 L.Ed.2d 544, 80 S.Ct. 591.) During habeas corpus proceedings initiated to test the validity of an extradition order, the judicial branch of government will not interfere with a governor's grant of extradition, unless that order is so palpably and conclusively shown to be wrong as to warrant an inference of fraud or inadvertence.
( People ex rel. Hernandez v. Elrod (1981), 86 Ill.2d 453, 456, 427 N.E.2d 1209, 1210.) However, States can surrender fugitives on terms less exacting than those imposed by Federal law. ( People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 154, 403 N.E.2d 750, 752.) In Illinois, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 60, pars. 18 through 49) governs the extradition of fugitives.
The issues presented are whether the Michigan complaints against Evans are defective for failure to clearly indicate that they were made before a magistrate and whether the affidavits were sufficiently authenticated to justify issuance of the rendition warrant. โข 1-3 Consistent with the purpose of extradition to summarily return a fugitive to the place of the alleged offense ( People v. Cheek (1982), 93 Ill.2d 82, 90), courts generally will not interfere with the Governor's grant of extradition unless the order is so palpably erroneous as to warrant an inference of fraud or inadvertence. ( People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 157.) However, as the asylum State has a substantial interest in protecting people from unjustifiable extradition ( People v. Cheek (1982), 93 Ill.2d 82, 90), habeas corpus proceedings may be initiated to test the validity of extradition.
Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1974); Hill v. Roberts, 359 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill.App.3d 150, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Prettyman v. Karnopp, 192 Neb. 451, 455, 222 N.W.2d 362 (1974). Section two of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides, in part:
Proceedings for the interstate extradition of prisoners are controlled by the federal Constitution and federal law. Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Roberts, 359 So. 2d 911, 912 (Fla. Dist. App. 1978); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill. App. 3d 150, 152, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Prettyman v. Karnopp, 192 Neb. 451, 455, 222 N.W.2d 362 (1974). More specifically, extraditions are controlled by Article IV, ยง 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides in part:
In the context of extradition proceedings, in which considerable deference is afforded to the proceedings of the demanding state, we should not superimpose general Connecticut authentication requirements upon the specific provisions for authentication contained in the extradition statute itself. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a demanding governor's certification of authentication is binding upon the courts of an asylum state. See Clark v. Leach, 200 Colo. 151, 153, 612 P.2d 1130 (1980); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 155, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Austin v. Brumbaugh, 186 Neb. 815, 818-19, 186 N.W.2d 723 (1971); Ex Parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 472-73, 124 P.2d 297 (1942); Ex Parte Posey, 453 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); State ex rel. Clayton v. Wolke, 69 Wis.2d 363, 368-69, 230 N.W.2d 869 (1975); see also 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (12th Ed. Torcia 1974) 116. Unless there is a defect on the face of extradition papers other than a lack of individualized authentication, the certificate of the demanding governor forecloses further judicial scrutiny. Our resolution of the question of authentication against the petitioner requires us to conclude that the trial court also erred in finding that the petitioner had not been "substantially charged" with the crime of larceny.
This article, and Federal legislation ( 18 U.S.C. ยง 3182 (1976)) have been held to govern interstate extradition, but States may supplement Federal regulation as long as there is no attempt to impose more stringent requirements for extradition. (See State ex rel. Sieloff v. Golz (1977), 80 Wis.2d 225, 258 N.W.2d 700; People ex rel. Matochik v. Baker (1953), 306 N.Y. 32, 114 N.E.2d 194; People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 150.) To facilitate interstate extradition procedures, most States, including Illinois, have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
In fact, a state may, if it so chooses, "provide for the surrender of fugitives on terms less exacting than those imposed by Federal law." People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154 (1980). Similarly, defendant's citation to the Act ( 725 ILCS 225/1 et seq. (West 2002)) is of no avail.
Id. See also Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 133-35, 36 S.Ct. 290, 292, 60 L.Ed. 562 (1916); Glover v. State, 257 Ark. 241, 515 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1974); Application of Morgan, 244 Cal. App.2d 903, 53 Cal.Rptr. 642, 647 (1966); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill.App.3d 150, 38 Ill.Dec. 519, 403 N.E.2d 750, 752 (1980); In re Austin, 186 Neb. 815, 186 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1971); State ex rel. Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis.2d 225, 258 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (1977).Hanson, 651 P.2d at 546.
Application of Williams, 76 Idaho 173, 176, 279 P.2d 882 (1955); State ex rel. Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis.2d 225, 240, 258 N.W.2d 700 (1977). Although the federal statute prescribes the terms for extradition by states; DeGenna v. Grasso, 413 F. Sup. 427, 430 (D. Conn. 1976); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 152, 405 N.E.2d 750 (1980); the states may establish ancillary provisions as long as they are consistent with the command of the statute. Giardino v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 116, 121 n. 7, 475 A.2d 298 (1984).