In order to give meaning to the DPA, the Legislature enacted a statutory scheme ( Gov. Code, § 4450 et seq. ; Health & Saf. Code, § 19955 et seq. ) providing for the establishment of building standards designed to ensure accessibility by the handicapped. ( Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 520-521, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ( Hankins ); People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 133, 197 Cal.Rptr. 484 ( CHE ).) Under the statutory scheme, buildings are subject to the standards set forth in Title 24 of the California regulatory code, known as the California Building Standards Code (CBSC).
The California Health and Safety Code requires public accommodations constructed with private funds to conform to the accessibility requirements in Chapter 7 of the California Government Code, §§ 4450 et seq. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19956; see Yates v. Bacco, No. C-11-01573 DMR, 2014 WL 1089101, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014). As originally enacted in 1968, the California Government Code adopted by incorporation the accessibility standards set forth by the American Standards Associations Specifications A117.1/1961 (the "1961 ASA Standards"). Cal. Gov. Code § 4450 (1968) (available at ECF 75-1); see generally People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 133 (Ct. App. 1983). The 1961 ASA Standards were temporary standards, serving as a stopgap until regulations could be developed.
In 1968, the Legislature enacted sections 54, 54.1 and 54.3 as one of two statutory schemes that were specifically designed to prevent discrimination against the physically disabled. ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 131-134 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484].)
The court finds as a matter of law that the placement of the trash receptacle was an isolated and temporary hindrance. "The case at bar is distinguishable from [ People ex rel.] Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484], where the court found that the locked entrance which was uninviting and required disabled individuals to travel through the kitchen area was not a `primary entrance.'" Thereafter, Madden voluntarily dismissed the remaining causes of action of his complaint and judgment was entered against him.
(2) Our primary task is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE,Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 132 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484], and cases there cited.) Toward this end we must accord a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the Legislature's purpose.
From December 31, 1981 until the present, the standards have been set forth in Title 24 of the California regulatory code (the "California Standards"). People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 134 (1983). In addition to setting forth design and construction standards, the California Standards require public accommodations to maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.
A year later, the Legislature expanded these requirements to facilities constructed with private funds ([Government Code,] § 19955 et seq.) and, with certain limited exceptions, required conformance with the same standards set forth within Government Code section 4450 et seq." ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 133 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484] ( CHE).) To clarify the parties' contentions and our conclusions, we refer to these statutory provisions and related regulations as California's "structural access standards."
Rosebud's denied equal access to handicapped persons, in violation of Civil Code section 54.1, subdivision (a), by operating the restaurant in violation of those requirements. (See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 133 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484].) As a practical matter, it is hard to see what Rosebud's hoped to gain at this stage of litigation by showing no violation of the Civil Code.
Relying on subsection 2–105(b)(11)(B)(4) of the 1984 version of Title 24, plaintiff argues that the exception provided in section 19956 is limited to facilities that were “existing” when the section became operative in 1970. Not only is this severely limiting interpretation of section 19956 inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and cases applying the section to facilities that were constructed after 1970, see, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc., 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 197 Cal.Rptr. 484 (4th Dist.1983), it is also based on an incorrect reading of the 1984 version of Title 24. Subsection 2–105(b)(11)(B) identifies the various structures governed by Title 24 and subsection 2–105(b)(11)(B)(4) extends application to “existing privately funded public accommodations when alterations, structural repairs, or additions are made” to them.
Code Regs., tit. 24]." ( Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., supra, 220 F.R.D. at p. 607, fns. omitted; see People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 134 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 484] [explaining evolution of state building standards].) A violation of a California Code of Regulations, title 24 (title 24) building standard that denies access to a disabled individual has been found to constitute a violation of both the Act and the DPA. ( Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 521 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 684] [DPA]; Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., supra, at p. 607 [the Act and the DPA]; cf. Wilson v. PFS, LLC (S.D.Cal. 2007) 493 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1125-1126 [questioning the extent to which the Act requires intentional discrimination].)