People ex Rel. Carey v. Pincham

14 Citing cases

  1. People v. Palmer

    104 Ill. 2d 340 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 50 times
    In Palmer, the court relied partially on prior decisions in People v. Edwards (1976), 63 Ill.2d 134, 138 (holding in an unlawful-use-of-weapons case that it was error to instruct the jury only to consider a defendant's prior felony conviction as bearing on his credibility) and People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478, 480 (holding in an unlawful-use-of-weapons case that it was error to hold a bifurcated trial, with the jury only being informed of the prior conviction during the second phase).

    63 Ill.2d 134, 140-41. Thereafter, in People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478, this court was called upon to consider whether the circuit court had authority to order a bifurcated trial in a prosecution for felonious unlawful use of weapons. In that case, as in the case at bar, counsel for the defendant objected to the jury being informed as to defendant's prior conviction and incarceration, as well as to the admission of any evidence on these matters.

  2. People v. Allen

    382 Ill. App. 3d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Finding constitutional the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and rejecting defendant's claim that due process required a bifurcated proceeding

    As previously stated, the legislature has chosen to make a prior felony conviction an element of the offense of UUW by a felon ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2004)), and therefore a bifurcated trial in this case is unnecessary. Further support for our conclusion is found in People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478, 479 (1979). In Pincham, the defendant was charged with unlawful use of a weapon within five years following his release from the penitentiary on a felony charge.

  3. People v. Palmer

    120 Ill. App. 3d 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    The Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the use of a bifurcated proceeding in circumstances similar to those of the case at bar. ( People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478, 394 N.E.2d 1043.) In Pincham, the supreme court said:

  4. People v. Hicks

    119 Ill. 2d 29 (Ill. 1987)   Cited 25 times
    In People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill.2d 29, 518 N.E.2d 148, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a case brought under an earlier enactment of section 16-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16-1) and held that, absent legislative guidance to the contrary, where a prior theft conviction elevated the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, the prior theft conviction was an element of the offense of felony theft which must be alleged and proved to the trier of fact during the evidentiary phase of the trial.

    In Palmer the court reaffirmed a long line of cases holding, under a similar statutory scheme, that in order to obtain a conviction for the felony offense of unlawful use of weapons the State must both allege and prove the prior conviction during the evidentiary phase of trial. See People v. Ostrand (1966), 35 Ill.2d 520, 529, overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Bracey (1972), 51 Ill.2d 514; People v. Owens (1967), 37 Ill.2d 131, 132; People v. Edwards (1976), 63 Ill.2d 134, 138; People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478, 480. See also Spencer v. Texas (1967), 385 U.S. 554, 17 L.Ed.2d 606, 87 S.Ct. 648 (recidivist statutes which provide that proof of prior conviction be introduced and proved during the guilt or innocence phase of trial do not offend due process.

  5. People v. Howard

    78 Ill. App. 3d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 16 times
    In Howard, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of weapons, reckless conduct, attempted murder and armed violence for firing two shots into the victim's kitchen window.

    However, on remand defendant should be sentenced for a Class A misdemeanor, rather than a Class 3 felony, because the fact of defendant's felony conviction was not presented to the jury. This determination is consistent with the supreme court's holding in People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478. In Pincham, the Illinois Supreme Court, on the State's petition for a writ of mandamus, vacated the circuit court's order for a bifurcated trial.

  6. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Gaughan

    2016 IL 120110 (Ill. 2016)   Cited 23 times
    In Alvarez, the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the separate acts of oral and vaginal contact with the victim.

    2001) ; People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988) ; People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 121 Ill.2d 470, 118 Ill.Dec. 387, 521 N.E.2d 864 (1988) ; People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill.2d 26, 96 Ill.Dec. 83, 490 N.E.2d 1288 (1986) ; People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill.2d 41, 67 Ill.Dec. 790, 445 N.E.2d 270 (1983) ; People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill.2d 271, 65 Ill.Dec. 874, 442 N.E.2d 185 (1982) : People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis, 86 Ill.2d 459, 56 Ill.Dec. 666, 427 N.E.2d 1212 (1981) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo, 84 Ill.2d 170, 49 Ill.Dec. 342, 417 N.E.2d 1356 (1981) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill.2d 537, 48 Ill.Dec. 228, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d 67, 46 Ill.Dec. 156, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Collins, 81 Ill.2d 118, 39 Ill.Dec. 795, 405 N.E.2d 774 (1980) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill.2d 531, 34 Ill.Dec. 137, 397 N.E.2d 809 (1979) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill.2d 478, 31 Ill.Dec. 725, 394 N.E.2d 1043 (1979) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Rosin, 75 Ill.2d 151, 25 Ill.Dec. 816, 387 N.E.2d 692 (1979) ; People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill.2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57 (1976) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli, 61 Ill.2d 394, 336 N.E.2d 759 (1975) ; People ex rel. Carey v. Power, 59 Ill.2d 569, 322 N.E.2d 476 (1975) ; People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 61 Ill.2d 231, 335 N.E.2d 433 (1974) ; People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill.2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973) ; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 54 Ill.2d 154, 295 N.E.2d 472 (1973) ; People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill.2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971) ; People ex rel. Hollis v. Chamberlain, 49 Ill.2d 403, 273 N.E.2d 835 (1971) ; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill.2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971) ; People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill.2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968) ; People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill.2d 612, 192 N.E.2d 882 (1963) ; People ex rel. Adamowski v. Dougherty, 19 Ill.2d 393, 167 N.E.2d 181 (1960) ; People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 2

  7. People v. Davis

    405 Ill. App. 3d 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the defendant's prior convictions, including the names of those convictions, and allowing them to be entered into evidence, because the armed-habitual-criminal statute specifies particular qualifying offenses that must be proved by the State

    Illinois courts have also rejected the assertion that the United States and Illinois Constitutions require a prior felony conviction to be admitted as evidence in a bifurcated proceeding only after the jury has otherwise determined the defendant's guilt. People v. Johnson, 27 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1051-52 (1975); see also People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478 (1979) (trial court was not authorized to conduct a bifurcated trial on felonious unlawful use of a weapon, at which the jury would determine whether the defendant possessed a gun before hearing evidence of the prior conviction); but see Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 586-87 (in upholding a recidivist sentencing enhancement, the court observed that putting sentencing factors before a jury would "inevitably interject against the defendant highly prejudicial evidence during the trial" and "raise questions for the defense including issues of jury bifurcation"). We further observe that although recently Supreme Court Rule 451(g) was enacted to permit a bifurcated trial, that rule applies only where an enhanced sentence is imposed under section 111-3(c-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ( 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2004)), and not where the legislature has made particular facts elements of the offense.

  8. People v. Adams

    404 Ill. App. 3d 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 29 times
    Rejecting defendant's claim for a bifurcated proceeding and finding that the statute did not violate due process

    The State points out that such a procedure is not consistent with supreme court precedent in our state. See People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478, 479-80, 394 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (1979). Essentially, defendant's argument is supported by reference to statutes and case laws addressing sentencing factors.

  9. People v. Norwood

    362 Ill. App. 3d 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 15 times

    People v. Forcum, 344 Ill. App. 3d 427, 439 (2003) (rejecting defendant's argument that the wanton cruelty, extended-term sentencing issue could have been submitted to the jury in a bifurcated approach after the defendant had been found guilty of murder). See also People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478, 479-80 (1979) (where defendant was charged with unlawful use of a weapon within five years of a release from prison on a felony charge, the trial court could not bifurcate the trial to have the jury determine guilt first and then consider proof of aggravating circumstances); People v. White, 241 Ill. App. 3d 291, 301 (1993) (applying the Hicks rationale to hold that the State must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt during the evidentiary phase of the trial the fact that the victim was over 60 years of age to raise the degree of the robbery conviction from a Class 2 felony to a Class 1). The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a bifurcated jury trial on the issue of guilt and bench trial on the issue of wanton cruelty. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

  10. People v. Roberts

    136 Ill. App. 3d 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 11 times
    In People v. Roberts (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 863, 483 N.E.2d 1328, a jury instruction on necessity to a charge of unlawful use of weapons was held properly refused despite defendant's evidence that there was a contract on his life, that he was without blame in developing that situation of a contract on his life and that he reasonably believed it was necessary to carry a gun to avoid his own murder.

    The defendant argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the prior-felony element necessary for a felony conviction. In support of his argument, the defendant cites a number of cases, including People v. Ostrand (1966), 35 Ill.2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499, People v. Owens (1967), 37 Ill.2d 131, 225 N.E.2d 15, People v. Edwards (1976), 63 Ill.2d 134, 345 N.E.2d 496, People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham (1979), 76 Ill.2d 478, 394 N.E.2d 1043, and People v. Palmer (1984), 104 Ill.2d 340, 472 N.E.2d 795. In that line of cases, beginning with Ostrand and reaffirmed most recently in Palmer, the supreme court has uniformly held that it is proper to introduce, during the evidentiary stage of trial, evidence of prior convictions that serve to increase the degree of the offense of unlawful use of weapons.