People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar

    225 Ill. App. 3d 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    This court has recently held that the mere existence of a controlled substance in violation of the Act, on the person driving an automobile, subjects the automobile to forfeiture under section 505(a)(3) of the Act. People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188, 571 N.E.2d 888. McGowan contends the instant case falls within the scope of the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 109 S.Ct. 1892, where that Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."

  2. People v. 1986 White Mazda Pickup Truck

    251 Ill. App. 3d 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 7 times

    Honda, 182 Ill. App.3d at 325-26. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, followed Honda in People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188. In that case, the police officer stopped the defendant for driving a vehicle with tinted windows.

  3. Scott v. Glumac

    3 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1993)   Cited 8 times
    Reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of a police officer defendant who asserted the defense of qualified immunity in suit for destruction of plaintiff's seized automobile where no evidence could support a reasonable officer in believing that plaintiff had driven the car to facilitate his drug offenses

    Since Miller, Illinois courts have struggled with the issue of whether mere possession of a small amount of a controlled substance inside a car constitutes facilitation. Compare People ex rel. Kilquist v. One 1978 Mazda GLC, 165 Ill. App.3d 540, 116 Ill.Dec. 307, 518 N.E.2d 1287 (5th Dist. 1988) (shaving kit containing benzphetamine in unzipped duffle bag found in car, but no forfeiture because no facilitation) and People ex rel. Barra v. Lee, 128 Ill.App.3d 128, 83 Ill.Dec. 291, 470 N.E.2d 46 (3d Dist. 1984) (van not forfeitable despite controlled substance found in closed purse of driver because the "vehicle furnished no additional dimension of privacy") with People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg, 213 Ill.App.3d 188, 156 Ill.Dec. 908, 571 N.E.2d 888 (4th Dist. 1991) (the dimension of privacy, elusiveness, speed of departure, etc. offered by car facilitates possession of any quantity of drugs). We know from the caselaw that if Scott had sold drugs from his car or had hidden them in his car, an arresting officer would have probable cause to seize the car.

  4. Davis v. Jumio Corp.

    22-cv-00776 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2023)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    For instance, Jumio observes that courts have interpreted “in any manner” broadly in the context of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, 720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3), and the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/4(h). See, e.g., People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg, 571 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991) (concluding that the defendant used his vehicle “in any manner” to facilitate the transportation of narcotics when he hid cocaine in his sock while in a vehicle); Stevenson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 69 F.Supp.3d 792, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding that an employer interfered “in any manner” with an employee's right to seek medical treatment by requiring him to notify the company before obtaining medical treatment). Yet “the same word may mean one thing in one statute and something different in another, dependent upon the connection in which the word is used, the object or purpose of the statute, and the consequences which probably will result from the proposed construction.”

  5. People v. Mazda Pickup Truck

    162 Ill. 2d 67 (Ill. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    The State maintains that while the controlled substances were concealed in the claimant's clothing, the truck permitted him to possess the cocaine without the concern that the substances might be revealed. In support of its argument, the State cites People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188, and People ex rel. Daley v. 1986 Honda (1989), 182 Ill. App.3d 322. We disagree.

  6. People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar

    154 Ill. 2d 27 (Ill. 1992)   Cited 20 times
    Holding reinstated by In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91

    Requests to change the forfeiture provisions of the Act should be addressed to the legislature rather than to this court. See People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188, 195. II

  7. People v. 1991 Dodge Ram Charger

    250 Ill. App. 3d 810 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    When a person places a controlled substance in a vehicle, that person uses the vehicle to facilitate the possession and concealment of a controlled substance, within the meaning of section 505(a)(3) of the Act. ( People v. One 1986 Ford Ranger Pickup Truck (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 1085, 1088; People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188, 192-95.) This is so because a vehicle "`adds a dimension of privacy'" to the illegal conduct involved.

  8. People v. Whitamore

    241 Ill. App. 3d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 13 times

    Because a trial court, as trier of fact, determines whether the State has met its burden of proof based upon the court's assessment of the believability of the evidence, a reviewing court will reverse the trial court's determination only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. LeShoure (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 839, 844, 493 N.E.2d 687, 690; People ex rel. Broch v. Hogg (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 188, 195-96, 571 N.E.2d 888, 893. • 4 Defendant argues that none of the 14 machines seized, including the six machines in the storage room, were gambling devices.