After a hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court allowed the motion to dismiss, finding that Rule 0.7 related to the business of the circuit court. The appellate court reversed ( 146 Ill. App.3d 750), and we granted the defendants' petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315). Leave was granted to the Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County to appear as amicus curiae in support of the rule.

The chief judge of each judicial district shall have general administrative authority over his court, including authority to provide for divisions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times and places of holding court. Article VI, § 7(c) is a grant of limited administrative authority over the workings of the circuit court. SeePeople ex rel. Brazen v. Finley , 146 Ill.App.3d 750, 100 Ill.Dec. 744, 497 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (1986), aff'd , 119 Ill.2d 485, 116 Ill.Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898 (1988). Consistent with the Detention Home and Probation Acts, Franklin County and the Second Judicial Circuit memorialized their responsibilities in a Memorandum of Understanding.

The appellate court, after determining that the supreme court had preempted all authority having to do with attorney discipline, struck the local rule even though it served to further the effectiveness of the supreme court's own disciplinary rules. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 750, 497 N.E.2d 1013. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court. It held that it alone had the authority to regulate and to discipline attorneys in Illinois.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 21(a)), any local rules adopted by a circuit court must be consistent with the rules of our supreme court. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 750, 754, 497 N.E.2d 1013, 1016. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.