If there was then such an audit and disallowance the board was correct in holding that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon it a second time. ( People ex rel. Myers v. Barnes, 114 N.Y. 317; Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 id. 222.) But if it was not then presented by or on behalf of the relator and without its knowledge, or was improper and defective in form, such presentation is not a bar to a subsequent presentation and audit. ( People ex rel. Andrus v. Town Auditors, 33 App. Div. 277.) It cannot be properly said that the action of the board in December, 1903, was in any sense a reconsideration of its former action, for what was then done related to a distinct and separate presentation by a different party of a different claim than that first presented by the relator.

has attempted to do that which in law it had no right to do; it has assumed to fix the rate of the relator's compensation, which had already been lawfully determined. It has ordered paid one-fourth of the claim, thus admitting that the relator was the health officer of the town, and so much of the claim has passed on to the board of supervisors in the usual way, but there is still a legal obligation on the part of the town to pay the remainder of his salary at the rate of $100 per annum, and as to this much of the claim the town board of audit has not ceased to have power, and it is within the decisions that section 2125 of the Code of Civil Procedure "is not solely a Statute of Limitations, but that by implication it grants the relator four months in which to procure the writ in cases like this, in which, although the determining body has finally adjourned after disposition made of the matter, it or its successor at its next authorized meeting can obey the order made by the court." ( People ex rel. Andrus v. Town Auditors, 33 App. Div. 277; People ex rel. Village of Brockport v. Sutphin, supra.) In the latter case, in commenting on the above, the court say: "We think this is the correct rule, and that the Legislature intended to extend rather than restrict the scope of the writ. It prevents the defeat of an important remedy when the town board disallows a claim, makes and files the certificate and adjourns on the same day, whether from proper motives or with the intent to prevent an examination of their official action.

But in the recent case of People ex rel. Village of Brockport v. Sutphin ( 166 N.Y. 163) the court said that the Osterhoudt case gave some support to the contention which is made by the present defendants, but that it was a mere expression of opinion, and that the effect of section 2125 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not considered in that case and in the cases upon which the defendants therein relied, among them People ex rel. Jonas v. Town Auditors ( 49 App. Div. 4), decided by this court. The Court of Appeals referred to People ex rel. Andrus v. Town Auditors ( 33 App. Div. 277), and said (pp. 171, 172) that the question was considered in that case, which held "that the section is not solely a statute of limitations, as by implication it grants the relator four months within which to procure a writ in a case where, although the determining body has finally adjourned after making a disposition of the matter in question, it or its successor, at its next authorized meeting, can obey any order made by the court. We think this is the correct rule and that the Legislature intended to extend rather than restrict the scope of the writ. It prevents the defeat of an important remedy when the town board disallows a claim, makes and files the certificate and adjourns on the same day whether from proper motives or with the intent to prevent an examination of their official action.