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People C. v. Nappo

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Apr 13, 2000
729 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 2000)

Summary

In Nappo, the State did not argue, and the Court did not address, whether a chose in action representing a claim for unpaid taxes is property of the State. That would in any event have been irrelevant because there had been no taking, obtaining or withholding of the chose in action.

Summary of this case from Porcelli v. U.S.

Opinion

Argued February 23, 2000

Decided April 13, 2000.

Mark L. Freyberg, New York City, Ronald P. Fischetti and Covington Burling (Gerard E. Lynch of counsel), for William S. Nappo and another, appellants.

Legal Aid Society, Riverhead (George Grun and Robert C. Mitchell of counsel), for John Rocco, appellant.

James M. Catterson, Jr., District Attorney of Suffolk County, Riverhead (Glenn Green of counsel), for respondent.


The issue here is whether defendants' failure to pay taxes on motor fuel imported from New Jersey to New York constitutes larceny from New York State on the theory that New York was the owner of the unpaid taxes. We conclude that it does not.

In March 1997, defendants William S. Nappo, William K. Nappo and John Rocco were indicted, along with five additional individuals, and charged, in the first three counts, with enterprise corruption (Penal Law § 460.20), conspiracy in the fourth degree (conspiring to commit grand larceny in the first degree) (Penal Law § 105.10) and grand larceny in the first degree (Penal Law § 155.42), as well as a host of Tax Law offenses, including violation of Tax Law § 1812. The full 12-count indictment alleged defendants' involvement in a scheme to import motor fuel from New Jersey to New York without filing reports or paying "motor fuel taxes" as required by the New York Tax Law.

County Court dismissed counts one, two and three of the indictment, with leave to resubmit the charges to another grand jury. On the People's appeal, the Appellate Division reinstated both the larceny and conspiracy charges, stating, "The Grand Jury evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that [defendants] withheld property from its rightful owner, i.e., the State of New York, as defined by the Penal Law" ( 261 A.D.2d 558, 559). A Judge of this Court granted defendants leave to appeal. We now reverse and dismiss the larceny and conspiracy charges.

The People contend that defendants were required to pay taxes on the importation and distribution of motor fuel in New York State and that their failure to do so constituted a larceny of property owned by the State of New York. Defendants counter that, as a matter of law, the State is not the "owner" of the uncollected taxes.

The State of New York is not an owner, as defined by the Penal Law, of taxes required to be paid for the importation and distribution of motor fuel. The taxes due were not the property of the State prior to their remittance. Accordingly, defendants did not steal money that belonged to New York State, but rather failed to make payments of taxes which were their personal obligations under the Tax Law (see, People v. Zinke, 76 N.Y.2d 8, 12).

Our conclusion is supported both by the Penal Law and by our precedents. Penal Law § 155.05(5) defines larceny as stealing property by taking, obtaining or withholding it from an owner thereof. An "owner" is defined as "any person who has a right to possession [of property] superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder" (Penal Law 155.00).

In People v. Jennings ( 69 N.Y.2d 103, 126-128), we reversed a conviction for larceny when an insured retained insurance proceeds rather than distributing them to clients who had been victims of a warehouse robbery. We held that the clients were not the owners of the proceeds, and thus the defendant could not be convicted of larceny for failure to remit the proceeds to them. In People v. Yannett ( 49 N.Y.2d 296), this Court held that nursing home residents who had paid a higher private rate before a determination that they were eligible for a lower Medicare rate were not owners of the difference between the rates. Thus, the defendant nursing home operator was not liable for a larceny for failing to refund the difference (see also, People v. Wilson, 93 N.Y.2d 222 [because a mall security guard had no ownership interest in stolen boots, the defendant could not be convicted of stealing boots from him]). Here, as in Jennings, Yannett and Wilson, defendants were not in possession, by trust or otherwise, of monies owned by the State.

The People's reliance on Tax Law § 1817(k), which overruled the result in People v. Valenza ( 60 N.Y.2d 363, 367), is misplaced. In Valenza, we held that "[a] vendor who collects sales taxes from customers, but fails to remit the sales taxes due the State under circumstances indicating an intent to permanently deprive the State of the taxes, may not be subjected to criminal prosecution for larceny by embezzlement."

While Tax Law § 1817(k) now specifically authorizes prosecution under the Penal Law for failure to remit to the State sales taxes that have previously been collected from consumers, it does not follow that defendants may be prosecuted here for larceny or conspiracy. The People's position that failure to pay taxes due is equivalent to the failure to remit collected sales taxes is untenable. A seller who collects sales taxes holds money in trust for the State (Tax Law § 1817[k]). Thus, the State may be deemed the "owner" of "collected" but unremitted sales taxes. Here, by contrast, defendants were obligated to pay motor fuel taxes upon the importation or distribution of motor fuel (see, Tax Law §§ 284, 284-a, 1102; Herzog Bros. Trucking v. State Tax Commn., 72 N.Y.2d 720, 723), but their tax liability did not depend upon the collection of taxes from consumers. Moreover, defendants did not hold any funds in trust for the State.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed and counts two (conspiracy in the fourth degree) and three (grand larceny in the first degree) of the indictment dismissed.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed and counts 2 and 3 of the indictment dismissed. Opinion by Judge Smith. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur.


Summaries of

People C. v. Nappo

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Apr 13, 2000
729 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 2000)

In Nappo, the State did not argue, and the Court did not address, whether a chose in action representing a claim for unpaid taxes is property of the State. That would in any event have been irrelevant because there had been no taking, obtaining or withholding of the chose in action.

Summary of this case from Porcelli v. U.S.

In Nappo, the defendants were charged with larceny in that they failed to report the importation of motor fuel into the State of New York and to pay taxes required by New York law on such importation.

Summary of this case from Porcelli v. U.S.

In Nappo, the defendants were charged with, inter alia, larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny for their involvement in a scheme to import motor fuel from New Jersey to New York without paying or reporting motor fuel taxes due, as required under New York Tax Law. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the larceny convictions on the grounds that, prior to remittance, the State was not the owner of unpaid taxes.

Summary of this case from Porcelli v. U.S.

In Nappo, we recognized that once a trustee has collected the funds, then they can be said to be the property of the ultimate recipient: "the State may be deemed the 'owner' of 'collected' but unremitted sales taxes"(id. at 567).

Summary of this case from People v. Hightower

In Nappo, we recognized that once a trustee has collected the funds, then they can be said to be the property of the ultimate recipient: “the State may be deemed the ‘owner’ of ‘collected’ but unremitted sales taxes” (id. at 567, 708 N.Y.S.2d 41, 729 N.E.2d 698).

Summary of this case from People v. Hightower

In People v Nappo (94 NY2d 564 [2000]), we held that the State was not the "owner" of uncollected taxes within the meaning of the statutory definition of the term because "taxes due were not the property of the State prior to their remittance" (id. at 566).

Summary of this case from People v. Hightower

In People v. Nappo, 94 N.Y.2d 564, 708 N.Y.S.2d 41, 729 N.E.2d 698 (2000), we held that the State was not the “owner” of uncollected taxes within the meaning of the statutory definition of the term because “taxes due were not the property of the State prior to their remittance” (id. at 566, 708 N.Y.S.2d 41, 729 N.E.2d 698).

Summary of this case from People v. Hightower
Case details for

People C. v. Nappo

Case Details

Full title:The People c., Respondent, v. William S. Nappo, William K. Nappo, and John…

Court:Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Apr 13, 2000

Citations

729 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 2000)
729 N.E.2d 698
708 N.Y.S.2d 41

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