Peo. ex Rel. Kittenger v. Bd. of Civ. Ser

4 Citing cases

  1. Drake v. Paulhamus

    66 F. 895 (9th Cir. 1895)   Cited 1 times

    If he does not choose to resort to proceedings in insolvency, there is no way of compelling him to do so, and we have previously held that a debtor, even if in failing circumstances, may in good faith dispose of his entire property for the purpose of paying a portion of his debts, although other debts are left unsatisfied. Turner v. Bank, 2 Wash.St. 192, 26 P. 256; Ephraim v. Kelleher, 4 Wash. 243, 29 P. 985; Benham v. Ham, 5 Wash. 128, 31 P. 459; Samuel v. Kittenger, 6 Wash. 261, 33 P. 509.' A Colorado statute providing for general assignments came up for consideration in May v. Tenney, supra.

  2. Tomlinson v. Burgess

    52 P.2d 1259 (Wash. 1935)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that transfers from a debtor to creditors who were not trustees of a trust for the which the debtor was a beneficiary were valid and not fraudulent

    [2] However, this court has always held that it is no badge of fraud for an insolvent, personal debtor to prefer one or more of his creditors over others, even if it exhausts the whole of his property, where the debt is real and the payment actual and adequate. Samuel v. Kittenger, 6 Wn. 261, 33 P. 509; Holt Manufacturing Co. v. Bennington, 73 Wn. 467, 132 P. 30; Merrick v. Pattison, 85 Wn. 240, 147 P. 1137; Meakim v. Ludwig, 99 Wn. 180, 169 P. 24; Marinovich v. Newton, 126 Wn. 22, 216 P. 876; Puget Sound National Bank v. More, 159 Wn. 5, 291 P. 1081; Essig v. Collier, 159 Wn. 172, 292 P. 414; Putnam v. Peterson, 162 Wn. 130, 297 P. 1076. (The last four cases were not cited by counsel for respondent, although texts to the same effect were cited from Ruling Case Law and Corpus Juris.)

  3. Siegel v. Kracower

    258 P. 493 (Wash. 1927)   Cited 6 times

    Whichever party seeks to set aside a transfer of property on the ground of fraud has the burden of proving the fraud which vitiates the transaction. Samuel v. Kittenger, 6 Wn. 261, 33 P. 509; Straw-Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Cain, 20 Wn. 351, 55 P. 321; Troy v. Morse, 22 Wn. 280, 60 P. 648; Zent v. Gilson, 52 Wn. 319, 100 P. 739; Cashmere State Bank v. Richardson, 105 Wn. 105, 177 P. 727. [4] The last cited case of the foregoing list and others are also relied upon to the effect that the law of this state is well settled that an individual debtor in failing circumstances may prefer one creditor over another, even to the exhaustion of his property, if the value of the property given is not so grossly in excess of such creditor's claim, or the consideration is not so grossly inadequate that it is palpably a fraud upon all other creditors.

  4. People ex Rel. Moriarty v. Creelman

    152 A.D. 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912)   Cited 2 times

    (Municipal Civil Service Regulation, VII, subd. 6.) Said section 11 of the Civil Service Law also provides that, subject to the provisions of the chapter in which said section is contained, and of the municipal civil service rules, "the municipal commission of any city shall make regulations for and have control of examinations and registrations for the service of such city, and shall supervise and preserve the records of the same." No decision is cited in which the authority of the State or municipal civil service commission to prescribe minimum and maximum age limitations has been considered, and we have found none, with the exception of People ex rel. Kittenger v. Board of Civ. Serv. ( 20 Misc. Rep. 217), in which the relator was a veteran protected as to age by statutory provisions which are now section 21 of the Civil Service Law. It is manifest that the Legislature possesses authority to prescribe minimum and maximum age limitations with respect to persons entering the State and municipal civil service, and if this were not so the validity of numerous statutes that have been enacted on this subject would doubtless have been brought in question, instead of having been acquiesced in as constitutional (See People ex rel. Rossner v. Scannell, 49 App. Div. 244; People ex rel. Smith v. Creelman, 149 id. 716), and any authority it possesses in this regard doubtless may for the purpose of administration be delegated.