Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-1735
April 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff filed this complaint pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA"), seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award. Before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's motion is denied and defendant's motion is granted.
Although defendant styled its motion as a "motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 56," it is clear from the reference to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and the text of defendant's motion that it is seeking summary judgment. Accordingly, the court will review defendant's motion in that manner.
I. BACKGROUND
The undisputed material facts necessary for the resolution of the claim are not complicated. Plaintiff Pennsylvania Power Company's ("Company") employees are represented by defendant Local Union No. 272 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO ("Union"). At all relevant times, the Union and the Company were parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which dictated the terms and conditions of the employment relationship. During the period covered by the CBA, the Union contended that its members were entitled to voluntary retirement pension ("VRP") benefits. The Company contended that it could award such benefits only to its management employees without offering them to its bargaining unit employees. The parties were unable to resolve the dispute and eventually the matter was submitted to an arbitrator for resolution. Eventually, the arbitrator ruled in defendant's favor holding that the award of VRP benefits to management employees without the satisfaction of any prerequisites while holding that Union employees must meet two qualifying conditions before receipt of the benefits violated the anti-discrimination language in the CBA. Plaintiff now seeks a judicial review of that ruling.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court is limited in its review of an arbitrator's award and "may not overrule an arbitrator's decision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of the contract would be the better one."W. R. Grace Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983). The arbitrator's award will not be set aside "so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," and is not merely "his own brand of industrial justice." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). The award draws its essence from the agreement if "the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention." Roberts Schaefer Co. v. Local 1846, United Mine Workers, 812 F.2d 883, 885 (3rd Cir. 1987).
The limited scope of our review does not allow us to determine which witnesses are credible, or what weight the creditable testimony should be afforded. Such a determination is for the arbitrator. Kane Gas Light Heating Co. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen Oilers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 673, 681 (3rd Cir. 1982). Nor may the court determine whether the arbitrator violated the principles of contract construction, and even if he did, the court is still not at liberty to overturn the decision so long as the construction given was rational. Roberts Shaefer Co., 812 F.2d at 885.
The policy underlying a restricted judicial review is well reasoned. If the court is free to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator's, the credibility of the arbitration system would be undermined. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596. Consequently,
the question of interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.Id. at 599.
These well-settled principles are reaffirmed in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). "The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract." Id. at 36. "As long as the arbitrator's award is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."Id. (emphasis added).
With these principles in mind, the court notes a limited exception. A court may vacate an arbitrator's award if it violates a "well defined and dominant public policy, discerned by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). See also UPMC, Braddock v. Teamsters Local 250, 32 F. Supp.2d 231, 233 (W.D.Pa. 1998) (citing same principle as Exxon); Highlands Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, Dist. Council 84, 1996 WL 163947 at * 3 (W.D.Pa. 1996) (same).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts several bases for vacating the arbitrator's decision. The court will address each of these in turn.
A. The Arbitrator's Decision Does Not Violate Public Policy
Plaintiff claims that the arbitrator's award should be vacated on public policy grounds because the award's effect is to require the Company to award a term of employment, the VRP benefits, in the same manner as it awards them to Union employees governed by the terms of the CBA. Plaintiff claims that this has the effect of holding supervisors to the terms of the CBA, something specifically forbidden by the National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., ("NLRA"). Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the arbitrator was not including supervisors under the CBA, but, rather, interpreting the evidence and enforcing the non-discrimination clause of the CBA in finding that the Company offered no evidence as to why the supervisory employees did not have to meet certain qualifying conditions before they received VRP benefits while union members had to do so. That provision states as follows:
Plaintiff attempts to amend its complaint to include this public policy argument to the extent that its original complaint cannot be construed to include it. Defendant opposes the amendment. The court grants the motion to amend in light of the liberal amendment provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. See, e.g. Sola v. Lafayette College, 804 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting "liberal mandate of Rule 15" in permitting amendment and holding that new legal theory raised at oral argument and on summary judgment should have been treated as a motion to amend the complaint). Moreover, defendant asserts no prejudice and is not in fact prejudiced by this amendment because plaintiff has fully briefed the public policy argument in its summary judgment papers. See Bair v. City of Atlantic City, 100 F. Supp.2d 262, 265 (D.N.J. 2000) ("Leave to amend under Rule 15 should be denied only in certain circumstances, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice, or clear futility of the amendment."). Finally, statute of limitations issues are not a bar because under Rule 15(c), the amendment relates back to the time of filing of the original complaint since the public policy theory arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original complaint.
The Company and the Union agree that they will not discriminate, coerce, nor intimidate any employee because of membership or nonmembership in the Union except as expressly provided in Article II hereof.
Article I, Section 3 of CBA.
Application of the public policy exception requires a two step analysis. Exxon, 73 F.3d at 1291. The first consideration is whether a well defined and dominant public policy can be identified by reference to laws and legal precedents. Id.
Plaintiff begins its public policy challenge by pointing to a purported well defined and dominant public policy in the NLRA that forbids placing supervisors under a CBA. Plaintiff also cites case law supporting this conclusion.
After reviewing the NLRA and case law interpreting it, the court concludes that a well defined public policy exists in upholding the mandates of the NLRA. See, e.g., Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers Int.'l Union v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 962, 972 (D.N.J. 1991) ("The public policy set forth in the NLRA `represents well defined and dominant public policy.'" (quoting Van Waters Rogers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union 70, 913 F.2d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 1990)), aff'd, 941 F.2d 1201 (3d Cir. 1991) (mem.). Accord In re Local One Amalgamated Lithographers of America v. Stearns Beale, Inc., 812 F.2d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing same proposition and collecting cases). Furthermore, the Act specifically mandates that supervisors should not be included under a CBA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) ("The term `employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor."); 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) ("[N]o employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.");Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 659-60 (1974) (noting that sections 152(3) and 164(a) were amendments to the NLRA intended to make clear that "[e]mployers were not obliged to recognize and bargain with unions including or composed of supervisors."). Therefore, any transgression of this principle is against well defined public policy.
In light of the court's conclusion that a well defined public policy exists in not violating the NLRA by having supervisors covered under a CBA, the court moves to the second step, the determination of whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in the arbitrator's interpretation of the evidence and the agreement, violated the public policy.
Based on the stringent standard of review explained above, the court finds that the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement does not violate public policy.
For instance, the arbitrator never held that supervisory personnel were subject to the terms of the CBA, including its Cooperative Agreement. Rather, the arbitrator simply concluded that after examining the entire record, no explanation was given as to why supervisory personnel, unlike bargaining unit employees, were not subject to qualifying conditions for VRP benefits and such a lack of explanation amounted to discrimination in contravention of the CBA. The arbitrator wrote that
the Company made these [VRP] benefits available to Bruce Mansfield Supervisory personnel, and it has not been explained how they escaped the same hurdles which barred receipt of these benefits by Bruce Mansfield bargaining-unit employees.
If they [the Company] were subject to the same conditions as were the bargaining-unit employees, and there is no suggestion that they were not, and yet afforded these benefits in spite of their not satisfying these conditions, then the Union charge of improper discrimination in violation of the Agreement would appear to have been demonstrated.
Company witness Lubich made it clear that both groups were in the same plan, designed for all Ohio Edison and Pennsylvania Power bargaining-unit employees and Management personnel. Thus, the Company's making these VRP benefits available to Supervisory personnel at Bruce Mansfield even though they failed to meet qualifying conditions, while denying those benefits to Bruce Mansfield bargaining-unit employees for failure to meet the same conditions constituted improper discrimination, in violation of Article I, Section 3 of the Agreement.
So far as disclosed by this record, the posture of the two groups — Bruce Mansfield supervisors and Bruce Mansfield bargaining-unit employees — was the same. Thus, for purposes of these VRP benefits, they were alike, but they were not treated alike. That is the improper discrimination charged by the Union.
Arbitrator's Opinion and Award at ¶¶ 57-60 (first emphasis in original, other emphases supplied). The court must grant such conclusion and such an interpretation of the CBA great deference. Again, without repeating the entire standard of review discussed in detail above, recall that the court's limited scope of review does not allow it to determine which witnesses are credible, or what weight the credible testimony should be afforded. Such a determination is for the arbitrator. Kane, 687 F.2d at 681.
In light of the arbitrator's findings and this court's limited standard of review, the court concludes that the arbitrator's decision does not violate public policy by including supervisors under the coverage of the CBA.
B. The Arbitrator Did Not Ignore the Clear Language of the CBA
Next, the court addresses plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator ignored the clear language of the CBA by purportedly including supervisors within the coverage of the CBA.
The court rejects this argument too because, as explained above, the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA and the Cooperative Agreement is granted great deference and the interpretation is not irrational. In fact, the only interpretation of the CBA that is at issue is the arbitrator's conclusion that the CBA's anti-discrimination provision was violated, and the arbitrator's interpretation of this provision does not ignore the clear language of the CBA.
C. The Arbitrator's Decision is Supported By the Record
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator's decision is unsupported by the record. Again, in light of the great deference this court must give to the arbitrator's findings, the court concludes that the arbitrator's decision is supported by the evidence. For example, plaintiff cannot establish that no rational interpretation of the record and the CBA support the arbitrator's decision. Instead, plaintiff merely asks the court to substitute plaintiff's interpretation of the record for the arbitrator's. The court has no authority to do this. Accordingly, plaintiff's third argument must fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court has considered all of plaintiff's arguments advanced in its pleadings and brief and conclude that although it uses the appropriate language, its claim rises no higher than one asserting that the arbitrator's interpretation of the disputed contract provisions is wrong and, based on the terms of the agreement read as a whole, another interpretation is more compelling. This may or may not be so; yet, in applying the applicable standard of review to the instant case, we conclude that to disturb the arbitrator's award, right or wrong, would exceed the scope of our reviewing authority. Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
The appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this _____ day of March, 2001, upon consideration of plaintiff's and defendant's motions for summary judgment [documents # 8 and #5], IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is DENIED and defendant's motion is GRANTED. Additionally, plaintiff's motion for oral argument on its motion [document #13] is DENIED and plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint is GRANTED [document # 15].