As Article 43.03(d) suggests, an indigent probationer should not be assessed payments that would cause him “undue hardship.” Pennington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd).Id. (“Clearly, the trial court evaluated Pennington's other financial obligations and considered his probationary status.

In addition, this case is like many others where the death penalty has been imposed against defendants who have murdered victims they had abducted and against whom they had committed sexual offenses. See, e. g., State v. Ferguson, ___ S.W.3d ___(Mo.banc 2000) (No. SC78609, decided May 30, 2000); State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 502 (Mo.banc 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957 (1999); State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 926 (Mo.banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1094 (1997); State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 752 (Mo.banc 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1031 (1995); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1042 (1995); State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 741-42 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). CONCLUSION

In addition, this case is like many others where the death penalty has been imposed against defendants who have murdered victims they had abducted and against whom they had committed sexual offenses. See, e. g., State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 502 (Mo.banc 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2379 (1999); State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 926 (Mo.banc 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 772 (1997); State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1031 (1995); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo.banc 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1042 (1995); State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 741-42 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). CONCLUSION

Article 42.12 requires that prior to making payment of fines, costs, restitution, or reimbursement for court appointed counsel a condition of probation, the trial court "consider" a probationer's ability to make such payments ordered by the court. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(b); Pennington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd). Article 43.03 provides that if a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or costs defaults in payment, the court may not order the defendant confined unless the court

In similar contexts, the defendant's ability to pay fines cannot be used to challenge the imposition of the fines until the defendant has been imprisoned solely for failure to pay. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that incarcerated defendant could not assert equal protection challenge to fine when there was no evidence that incarceration was due to failure to pay fine); Wright v. State, 930 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.) (holding that indigent defendant could not assert equal protection violation for imposition of fine he could not pay until he was imprisoned for failure to pay); Pennington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd) (citing Rumph v. State, 687 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.) (holding that appellant's complaint concerning inability to pay restitution that was condition of probation is not ripe until probation is revoked solely because of inability to pay)). Accordingly, Green's argument that his inability to pay courts costs and restitution bars the trial court from assessing them against him fails, and we reform the judgment with regard to attorney's fees only.