Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-70581-DT.
November 3, 2000.
MEMORNDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Virginia Morgan's Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2000. The Commissioner filed a response to the Objections filed by Plaintiff. However, the Court's docket does not indicate that Plaintiff filed Objections or any document relating to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Since the filing of the Commissioner's response on Plaintiff's Objections on October 20, 2000, no further documents have been filed by Plaintiff.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited in scope to determining whether the findings of fact made by the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence, and deciding whether the Commissioner employed the proper legal criteria in reaching his conclusion. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). The credibility findings of an administrative law judge ("ALJ") must not be discarded lightly and should be accorded great deference. Hardaway v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987). A district court's review of an ALJ's decision is not a de novo review. The district court may not resolve conflicts in the evidence nor decide questions of credibility. Garner 745 F.2d at 397. The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, even if the record might support a contrary decision. Smith v. Secretary of HHS, 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989). An administrative decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
The Court has had an opportunity to review this matter and finds that the Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the record supports the ALJ's conclusion that although Plaintiff is unable to perform his past work, he remains able to perform a significant number of jobs in the economy and is not disabled. (Tr. 252, 255-56)
Plaintiff filed a prior application for disability benefits on September 5, 1991. The ALJ denied the claim on January 28, 1993 which was upheld by the District Court on June 2, 1994. (Tr. 299-306) Plaintiff's application for benefits submitted on June 27, 1996 and dated July 17, 1996 states that he became unable to work on January 5, 1991 and that he is still disabled. (Tr. 325-28) The ALJ found that res judicata applied to Plaintiff's request involving Plaintiff's claim for disability through January 28, 1993. (Tr. 252)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairment of the back but the impairment does not meet or equal in severity any listed impairment found in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (Tr. 252, 255) The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a carpenter but has the residual functional capacity to perform light work. (Tr. 255-56) The ALJ based his findings on Plaintiff's testimony on January 16, 1998 and the medical record submitted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted at the January 16, 1998 hearing that his back pain is much better since he stopped working in 1991 and that he is experiencing more of a feeling of weakness in his back which affects his legs. (Tr. 273-74) Plaintiff testified that prior to 1996 he did not have a regular treating physician. (Tr. 278-79) On September 21, 1996, Plaintiff was evaluated by Anjanette M. Stolz, M.D. Plaintiff's main complaint was back discomfort with no radiation of the pain. (Tr. 368) Dr. Stolz did not opine that Plaintiff was disabled because of the back pain. Dr. Stolz concluded that there is mildly diminished motion on forward flexion of the dorsolumbar spine but no other diminished motion. Straight leg raising is negative and there is no paravertegral muscle spasm. Dr. Stolz found no difficulty with orthopedic maneuvers and there is no evidence of nerve root irritation. (Tr. 370) Plaintiff has submitted no subsequent medical evidence from any treating physician indicating he is disabled because of his back pain since the ALJ's initial denial of his claim in January 1993. An MRI performed on January 27, 1998 was essentially normal with only a showing of minimal central herniated disc at L5-S1 without evidence of mass effect on the thecal sac or impingement of the neural foraminia. (Tr. 394)
Plaintiff submitted a deposition of Dr. Bernard E. Edwards taken on February 19, 1993 in connection with Plaintiff's worker's compensation case. Dr. Edwards diagnosed Plaintiff with the condition of reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD") which is a complex vascular-neuromuscular illness, treated primarily with physical therapy and nerve blocks. (Tr. 173-75) Dr. Edwards prescribed Procardia for Plaintiff which Plaintiff reported did wonders for him and provided a great deal of relief. (Tr. 175) Dr. Edwards testified that he had examined Plaintiff on two occasions in 1992 but had not seen him since. (Tr. 168, 173) Dr. Edwards admitted that he did no clinical testing on Plaintiff but merely performed clinical observation. (Tr. 178) Dr. Edwards concluded that the RSD was employment related and that Plaintiff was disabled from his employment because he could not do a thing. (Tr. 176) However, as Plaintiff admits at his hearing, he currently has no pain but weakness in his lower back and that he did not begin seeing his current doctor until 1996. (Tr. 273, 278-79) Other than Dr. Edwards' conclusion, there is no medical evidence submitted to support a finding that Plaintiff is disabled because of back pains.
Plaintiff seeks to include a letter dated December 9, 1999 from Dr. D.K. Bhrany who treated Plaintiff on September 1999, after the ALJ had rendered his decision denying Plaintiff's request for benefits on February 18, 1998. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has not shown good cause why the opinion should now be considered. The burden of providing a complete record, defined as evidence complete and detailed enough to enable the Commissioner to make a disability determination rests with the claimant. Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff has not established that the Court has the authority to consider new evidence which was not submitted before the ALJ. Review by a court of purported new evidence is permitted for the limited purpose of determining the appropriateness of a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Wyatt v. Secretary of HHS, 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court only recognizes two kinds of remands involving social security cases-those pursuant to sentence four and those pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99 (1991); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 617, 626 (1990). The Supreme Court concluded that Congress's explicit delineation in § 405(g) regarding circumstances under which remands are authorized clearly showed that Congress intended to limit the district court's authority to enter remand orders to these two types of cases. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 100. Sentence four allows a district court to remand in conjunction with ajudgment affirming, modifying or reversing the Commissioner's decision.Id. at 99-100. Sentence six allows the district court to remand in light of additional evidence without making any substantive ruling as to the merits of the Commissioner's decision, but only if a claimant can show good cause for failing to present the evidence earlier. Id. at 100. The Sixth Circuit has long recognized that a court may only remand disability benefits cases when a claimant establishes that new material evidence is available and shows good cause for failure to incorporate such evidence into prior proceedings. Willis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 727 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1984). In this case, Dr. Bhrany's letter indicates that the patient has demyelinating disease (multiple sclerosis) and that the prognosis is guarded. Dr. Bhrany does not state that Plaintiff is disabled because of the disease. Dr. Bhrany's letter does not establish good cause that this matter should be remanded to the ALJ.
Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ's determination was not supported by the evidence submitted to the ALJ. The ALJ reviewed the medical evidence submitted by Plaintiff and found that there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of disability because there was no underlying medical evidence to support that Plaintiff was disabled. Reviewing the record, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence is correct.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Morgan dated September 22, 2000 is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings and conclusions of law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ( Docket No. 8-1, filed June 15, 2000) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Addition and Inclusion of New Medical Documentation and Evidence ( Docket No. 8-2, filed June 15, 2000) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ( Docket No. 7, filed June 1, 2000) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.