Opinion
March 17, 1988.
Motor vehicles — Revocation of motor vehicle operator's license — Permitting vehicle to be operated by suspended operator — Scope of appellate review — Power of trial court — Conviction — Collateral attack.
1. In a motor vehicle license revocation appeal, review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is to determine whether discretion was abused, an error of law was committed or findings of fact were unsupported by competent evidence. [455-6]
2. In reviewing a motor vehicle operator's license suspension or revocation, a lower court may determine only whether the licensee was convicted of a traffic violation and whether proper procedures for the suspension or revocation action were followed. [456]
3. When a motor vehicle licensee pleaded guilty and paid a fine as a result of being charged with permitting an operator under suspension to drive her vehicle, a reviewing court cannot permit a collateral attack upon that conviction and cannot consider whether the licensee should or should not have been convicted. [456]
Submitted on briefs December 14, 1987, to President Judge CRUMLISH, JR., Judge DOYLE, and Senior Judge KALISH, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 774 C.D. 1986, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lourene F. Morris, No. S.A. 861 of 1985.
Motor vehicle operator's license revoked by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Appeal sustained. DOYLE, J. Department appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed and suspension of operating privileges reinstated.
Christopher J. Clements, Assistant Counsel, with him, Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Counsel, Spencer A. Manthorpe, Chief Counsel, Morey Myers, General Counsel, for appellant.
Lourene F. Morris, for herself.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which sustained the appeal of Lourene F. Morris (appellee) from a six-month revocation of her operating privileges. We reverse the court of common pleas and reinstate the suspension of appellee's operating privileges.
Appellee was convicted for a violation of section 1575 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1575 (permitting violation of title). Appellee was cited for permitting her husband to drive her vehicle while knowing that her husband was under a suspension of his operating privileges for his conviction of driving under the influence. On the back of her citation, appellee pled guilty and paid the fine.
The trial court sustained appellee's appeal on the basis that appellee did not know that her husband was using her car. Appellee testified that she did not authorize her husband to use the car and did not know that he was using the car because she was physically present at the home of a girlfriend of hers on the night in question. The trial court held that since appellee did not "permit" her husband to use her car, she was "not guilty." By order dated February 27, 1986, the trial court sustained appellee's appeal.
Our scope of review in a driver's license suspension appeal is to determine whether findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, whether there has been an erroneous conclusion of law, or whether the trial court's decision is a manifest abuse of discretion. Schnitzer v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. Commw. 38, 480 A.2d 388 (1984). It has consistently been held that in such administrative proceedings for license suspensions, the trial court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the appellant has in fact been convicted of a traffic violation and whether DOT has faithfully observed the provisions of the Vehicle Code in suspending driving privileges. The trial court may not consider the question of whether appellant should have been convicted. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Schmidt, 57 Pa. Commw. 318, 426 A.2d 1222 (1981).
This court has previously found appeals of this nature to be frivolous, as the law is clear that the underlying criminal conviction may not be challenged in a suspension appeal, which is civil in nature. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Seiscio, 56 Pa. Commw. 45, 424 A.2d 566 (1981). For a trial court to sustain a suspension appeal based on such a challenge to the criminal conviction is clearly an error of law. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Brown, 31 Pa. Commw. 620, 377 A.2d 1027 (1977). The issue is whether the licensee was convicted and not whether she should have been convicted. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Lea, 34 Pa. Commw. 310, 384 A.2d 269 (1978).
Here, appellee pled guilty to a violation of section 1575 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1575, and paid the fine. Her appeal to the trial court was a collateral attack on her conviction by way of a contention that she had not "permitted" her husband to use her vehicle. In sustaining her appeal on that ground, the trial court committed error.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and reinstate the suspension of appellee's operating privileges pursuant to section 1543(c) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543(c).
ORDER
NOW, March 17, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, No. S.A. 861 of 1985, dated February 27, 1986, is reversed and the suspension of the operating privileges of Lourene F. Morris is hereby reinstated.