Commonwealth v. Cumberland Construction Co.

12 Citing cases

  1. Blankenship v. Xlibris Corporation

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-709 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    Such a claim could be considered consequential damages for breach of contract, provided Plaintiff shows that the damages are "(1) such as would normally and ordinarily result from the breach, or (2) that they were reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, and (3) that the damages can be proven." Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Cumberland Constr. Co., 494 A.2d 520, 525 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1985) (citing Taylor v. Kaufhold, 84 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. 1951)). Without any allegations suggesting that either party foresaw lost profit damages of a magnitude over one hundred and fifty times greater than the original contract, the Court cannot find that a breach of the Publishing Agreement would entitle Plaintiff to recover in excess of $75,000 in consequential damages.

  2. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Stella

    994 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1998)   Cited 42 times
    Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on misappropriation of trade secrets claim where there were questions of fact as to whether the proprietary information, including client files, constituted a trade secret, and as to whether the information was protected once disseminated to defendant

    Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813, 843 (E.D.Pa. 1993), citing DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v. Mainman, Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703, 710 (W.D.Pa. 1979) and Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 416, 418 (1964). See Also: Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa.Cmwlth. 273, 494 A.2d 520, 525-526 (1985). These elements derive from Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:

  3. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr.

    834 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1993)   Cited 42 times
    Holding sale of dealer's inventory at dealers-only auction was commercially reasonable and did not prevent floor plan financier from seeking deficiency judgment

    Interference with a prospective business or contractual relation is a tort long recognized by the Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Levin, 382 Pa. Super. 146, 554 A.2d 989, 994 (1989) allocatur denied, 524 Pa. 622, 571 A.2d 384 (1990) citing Thompson Coal Company v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979); Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa.Cmwlth. 273, 494 A.2d 520, 525 (1985), alloc. den., 513 Pa. 636, 520 A.2d 1386 (1986); Sachs v. Continental Oil Company, 454 F. Supp. 614, 620 (E.D.Pa. 1978).

  4. In re Wilbar Realty, Inc.

    325 B.R. 354 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2005)   Cited 1 times

    I note that "it has been held that the destruction of a business is not a normal or ordinary result of the failure to make timely payments." Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Cumberland Const. Co. 90 Pa.Cmwlth. 273, 282, 494 A.2d 520, 525 (1985) citing Ramsey v. United States, 101 F.Supp. 353, 357 (Ct.Cl. 1951). As referenced in Cumberland Const. Co., consequential damages requires that damages be either "norma[l] and ordinar[y]" or "reaonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties" and the damages can be proven.

  5. In re Asousa Partnership

    Bankruptcy No. 01-12295DWS, Adversary No. 03-1005 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2005)   Cited 1 times

    To the extent that Debtor seeks such damages under a contract theory, Pennsylvania law clearly allows consequential damages stemming from a breach of contract. E.g., Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. Cumberland Constr. Co., 494 A.2d 520, 525 (Pa.Commw. 1985). To the extent Debtor is seeking such damages in tort, the damages stem from CK's tortious conduct, not the Policy, and its exclusions are therefore irrelevant.

  6. Trinity Contracting, Inc. v. Mun. Sewage Auth. of the Twp. of Sewickley

    No. 523 C.D. 2015 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Dec. 15, 2015)

    The Project delays were attributable to unforeseen site conditions that required extra work of Trinity. We agree with Trinity that this case is similar to Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Company, 494 A.2d 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). In Cumberland, this court held that the Department of Transportation (DOT) was not entitled to retain delay damages from the amount due to Cumberland Construction Company under a construction contract because:

  7. Wayne Knorr v. Dept. of Transportation

    973 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that, in context of determining when contractor's claim for payment of services rendered to government agency accrued, letter issued by government agency was not final decision denying contractor's claim, in part, because government agency did not follow its regular practice of including language in letter indicating that letter was final determination and advising contractor of time within which contractor could appeal

    " Dep't of Transp. v. W.P. Dickerson Son, Inc., 42 Pa.Cmwlth. 359, 400 A.2d 930, 933 (1979) (citations omitted). Also, in Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa. Cmwlth. 273, 494 A.2d 520 (1985), this Court stated PennDOT was not entitled to retain liquidated delay damages where a contractor's delay was occasioned by unusual site conditions and additional work ordered by PennDOT personnel. Here, the Contract's construction engineering liquidated damages provision states, in relevant part:

  8. Pennsylvania State Troopers v. Com

    146 Pa. Commw. 467 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1992)   Cited 14 times

    The Association attempts to analogize the situation in the case at bar to Board of Claims (Board) cases. The Board cases cited by the Association are as follows: Department of Transportation v. Trumbull Corp., 99 Pa. Commw. 557, 513 A.2d 1110 (1986); Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa. Commw. 273, 494 A.2d 520 (1985), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 636, 520 A.2d 1386 (1987); Department of Transportation v. DePaul, 29 Pa. Commw. 447, 371 A.2d 261 (1977); General State Authority v. Loffredo, 16 Pa. Commw. 237, 328 A.2d 886 (1974); Department of Property and Suppliesv. Berger, 11 Pa. Commw. 332, 312 A.2d 100 (1973). These cases allow the payment of interest and damages from the Commonwealth on contract disputes with the Commonwealth.

  9. Martin v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources

    548 A.2d 675 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    Credibility determinations are for the Board. Pritz Auto, Inc. v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons, 113 Pa. Commw. 89, 536 A.2d 485 (1988); Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa. Commw. 273, 494 A.2d 520 (1985), appeal denied, 513 Pa. 636, 520 A.2d 1386 (1987). The force majeure clause required that Martin notify DER by telephone within five days and in writing within ten days of the date Martin became aware or reasonably should have become aware that an occurrence would cause delay or obstruction.

  10. Solar Const. Inc. v. Dept. Gen. Serv

    525 A.2d 28 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    In Solar Construction Co. v. Department of General Services, 105 Pa. Commw. 609, 525 A.2d 28 (1987), this Court recently rejected an argument by the claimant that the Commonwealth could waive the statute of limitations by continuing to correspond with a contractor after appropriate notice.

    We agree with the Board that Solar's claim accrued on April 20, 1981, the date the Department declared it in default. The case law provides that a claim under Section 6 of the Act of May 20, 1937 (Act), P.L. 728, as amended, 72 P. S. ยง 4651-6, commences at the point a party is capable of formulating the detailed statement of claim required by Section 6. Department of Transportation v. Cumberland Construction Co., 90 Pa. Commw. 273, 494 A.2d 520 (1985), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 636, 520 A.2d 1386 (1987); Department of Public Welfare v. Federated Security, Inc., 49 Pa. Commw. 411, 411 A.2d 284 (1980). On April 20, 1981, Solar was informed that it would no longer receive any payments under the contract of March 19, 1980. At that point in time, it was capable of computing with sufficient detail any claims it had against the Department since its surety, as of that date, took its place under the contract and completed the work.