Summary
In Pennsylvania Department of Transportation v. Crawford, 121 Pa. Commw. 613, 550 A.2d 1053 (1988), the Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of whether the Department of Transportation could establish at a license suspension proceeding brought pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(b) that the motorist had refused to submit to chemical testing, although it had previously been determined with respect to criminal charges filed against the motorist that he did not refuse chemical testing.
Summary of this case from Com. v. WolfeOpinion
December 9, 1988.
Motor vehicles — Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license — Refusal of chemical test — Collateral estoppel — Criminal proceedings — De novo hearing.
1. The refusal of a motor vehicle operator to submit to a properly requested chemical test justifies the suspension of his operator's license through a civil proceeding independent of any criminal proceeding, and the action of suspension is not intended as punishment of the operator but as a protection of the public. [615]
2. Collateral estoppel bars a subsequent action when the issues decided in the prior adjudication were identical to those in the later action, a final judgment was rendered on the merits, the party against whom estoppel is urged was a party or in privity with a party in the earlier action and such party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier action. [616]
3. A determination in a criminal proceeding that a requested chemical test was not improperly refused does not estop the Department of Transportation from raising such issue in a subsequent civil license suspension proceeding as such proceedings are separate and distinct and the Department is not in privity with a district attorney prosecuting the criminal charge. [616]
4. When a licensee appeals action of the Department of Transportation suspending his motor vehicle operator's license, a de novo hearing must be held before the court of common pleas. [617]
Submitted on briefs July 26, 1988, to Judges BARRY and SMITH, and Senior Judge NARICK, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal No. 2729 C.D. 1987, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County, in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gregory Eugene Crawford, No. 480-1984.
Motor vehicle operator's license suspended by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County. Appeal sustained. WISER, P.J. Department appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Vacated and remanded.
Melissa K. Dively, Assistant Counsel, with her, Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Chief Counsel, and John L. Heaton, Chief Counsel, for appellant.
Wayne H. Hundertmark, for appellee.
Before us is an appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (Department) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County sustaining the appeal of Gregory Eugene Crawford (Crawford) from the suspension of his operating privileges by the Department. The trial court sustained the appeal based upon its determination at Crawford's criminal trial that Crawford did not refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test. For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate and remand.
No testimony was received by the trial court.
The primary issue presented for our resolution on appeal is whether the Department is "collaterally estopped" from establishing in a civil license suspension proceeding that Crawford refused to submit to chemical testing because it had been previously determined with respect to the criminal charges filed against Crawford that he did not refuse to submit to a breathalyzer.
In civil license suspension cases the Department bears the burden of proving: (1) the motorist was arrested for driving while intoxicated by an officer who had reasonable grounds to believe such was the case, (2) the motorist was requested to submit to chemical tests, and (3) the motorist refused to do so. Department of Transportation v. Sinwell, 68 Pa. Commw. 605, 450 A.2d 235 (1982).
It is well settled that a Department suspension proceeding for a refusal to take a breathalyzer test is an independent civil proceeding separate and distinct from any criminal charges brought against a motorist. Hando v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. Commw. 63, 478 A.2d 932 (1984); Wisniewski v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. Commw. 318, 457 A.2d 1334 (1983); Commonwealth v. Clawson, 9 Pa. Commw. 87, 305 A.2d 732 (1973); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 7 Pa. Commw. 535, 300 A.2d 831 (1973). The civil proceeding to revoke or suspend a license is not intended as punishment; rather, it is designed to protect the public by denying intoxicated motorists the privilege of using the roadways. Hando; Abraham. Also, a judgment in the criminal proceeding has no effect on the outcome of the civil proceeding because for a criminal proceeding the guilt of the accused must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and in a civil proceeding it is sufficient if the offense is established by a preponderance of the evidence. Abraham. Thus, an acquittal of the criminal charge of driving under the influence is of no consequence to the outcome of the civil proceeding. Clawson; Abraham.
Hence, the outcome of the criminal proceeding cannot collaterally estop the Department from suspending a motorist's license in civil proceedings. Collateral estoppel will effectively bar a subsequent cause of action if four elements exist: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and question in a prior action. Glasgow v. Department of Transportation, 108 Pa. Commw. 48, 529 A.2d 576 (1987). Clearly, the third and fourth elements of the "collateral estoppel" test are not present here. Firstly, we do not believe the Department and the District Attorney stand in sufficient relationship so that the Department could be considered the same party as, or in privity with the District Attorney. Secondly, as we have already stated, the Department's civil suspension proceeding is separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding initiated by the Clarion County District Attorney.
Our holding today is in accord with two recent New York cases. See People v. Walsh, 139 Misc.2d 182, 527 NYS 2d 708 (1988), a New York case where the defendant in a criminal proceeding was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant therein sought to have the court bound by the decision of the administrative law judge in the civil proceeding regarding the suspension of his license by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The court refused to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. People v. Riola, 137 Misc.2d 616, 522 NYS 2d 419 (1987) where the court rejected the defendant's argument that the Commonwealth was estopped from using evidence of defendant's alleged refusal to take a chemical test at the criminal proceeding because of the decision rendered by the administrative law judge at the civil proceeding. The court therein also refused to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
This Court has held that a de novo hearing before the court of common pleas shall be conducted when a licensee appeals the Department's suspension of his license pursuant to Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1547 (refusal to submit to chemical testing). Department of Transportation v. Quinlan, 47 Pa. Commw. 214, 408 A.2d 173 (1979) (where this Court remanded for a hearing on the merits because the trial court refused to admit testimony of a police officer, thereby preventing the Department from meeting its burden of proof). Also see Liebler v. Department of Transportation, 83 Pa. Commw. 270, 476 A.2d 1389 (1984) (where this Court remanded for a de novo hearing because the trial court, without a hearing, summarily dismissed the licensee's appeal).
Thus, because the Department is required to prove that Crawford refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, the trial court erred in its failure to conduct a de novo hearing whereby the Department could present evidence in support of the license suspension.
Therefore, we will vacate the order of the trial court and remand this case for a hearing on the merits.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of December, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County in the above-captioned matter is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the court for a hearing on the merits consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge MacPHAIL did not participate in the decision in this case.