Opinion
111,833.
11-14-2014
In the Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas John E. PENN, Appellant, v. Emmalee CONOVER, Warden of Winfield Correctional Facility, Ray Roberts, Secretary of Corrections, and Lisa Rupert, Corporal at Winfield Correctional Facility, Appellees.
Ian T. Otte, of Herlocker, Roberts & Herlocker, L.L.C., of Winfield, for appellant. Julie St. Peter, of Kansas Department of Corrections of Winfield, for appellees.
Ian T. Otte, of Herlocker, Roberts & Herlocker, L.L.C., of Winfield, for appellant.
Julie St. Peter, of Kansas Department of Corrections of Winfield, for appellees.
Before MALONE, C.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
John E. Penn appeals the district court's dismissal of his K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501 petition because it was untimely filed. Penn argues that the district court erred by dismissing his petition as untimely because there was no evidence in the record establishing when Penn delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing. He also argues that the district court erred by failing to consider whether the time for filing his petition was tolled due to a legal disability or as a result of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.
In November 2013, Penn was an inmate at the Winfield Correctional Facility. On November 23, 2013, he was found guilty of battery at a disciplinary hearing. He filed an appeal to the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections (Secretary). On January 29, 2014, Penn received notice that the Secretary had approved the hearing officer's decision. Sometime during his appeal process, Penn was transferred to the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (HCF).
Penn filed a K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501 petition in Cowley County District Court on March 26, 2014, naming as defendants Emmalee Conover, the warden of the Winfield Correctional Facility; Ray Roberts, the Secretary of Corrections; and Lisa Rupert, the victim of Penn's battery. Defendants Conover and Roberts filed a motion to dismiss on April 2, 2014, alleging that Penn had failed to file his petition within 30 days of the Secretary's decision as required by K .S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b). On April 28, 2014, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. In its order, the district court noted that Penn received a response to his disciplinary appeal on January 29, 2014, that he mailed his 60–1501 petition on March 19, 2014, and that it had been filed at the district court on March 26, 2014. The district court found that, even using the earlier March 19, 2014, date as the filing date, Penn's petition was filed outside the 30–day statute of limitations.
On April 29, 2014, Penn filed a document entitled “Motion to Stay on Appeal Process,” which essentially constituted an untimely response to the motion to dismiss. The record does not reflect that the district court considered Penn's late filing. Penn timely appealed the district court's judgment.
On appeal, Penn first argues that the district court erred by dismissing his 60–1501 petition as untimely because there was no evidence on the record as to when Penn delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing. Penn did not raise this issue before the district court. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 403, 266 P.3d 516 (2011). However, we will consider Perm's claim for the first time on appeal because it involves only a question of law that may be finally determinative of the case. State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1116, 299 P.3d 292 (2013).
The determination of the timeliness of a 60–1501 petition requires interpretation of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660, 662, 267 P.3d 743 (2011).
K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b) provides that an inmate shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus within 30 days from the date the administrative action is final. Here, the parties do not dispute that that administrative action was deemed final when Penn received notice of the Secretary's decision on January 29, 2013. The issue is whether Penn filed his 60–1501 petition within 30 days of January 29, 2013.
Penn is correct that the critical date for determining whether a 60–1501 petition is timely filed is the date when the inmate delivers the petition to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk of the district court. Holt v. Saiya, 28 Kan.App.2d 356, 361, 17 P.3d 368 (2000). Here, at the time the district court dismissed Penn's petition, there was no evidence in the record indicating when Penn delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing. While the district court noted the date Penn's petition was actually mailed, it does not appear from the record that the district court made any attempt to learn the date that Penn delivered his petition to a prison official for mailing.
Nevertheless, Perm's response to the motion to dismiss, filed 1 day after the district court's order of dismissal, clearly indicates that Penn delivered his petition to the HCF mailroom on March 19, 2014. Therefore, the record on appeal establishes March 19, 2014, as the date Penn's 60–1501 petition was deemed filed. This date was beyond the 30–day deadline. If a district court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. Hockett v. The Trees Oil Co., 292 Kan. 213, 218, 251 P.3d 65 (2011). Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Penn's petition was filed outside the 30–day statute of limitations found in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b).
Next, Penn argues that the district court committed reversible error by failing to consider whether the statute of limitations for habeas corpus relief had been tolled either due to a disability under K.S.A. 60–515(a) or because the defendants were equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations. Penn claims that he attempted to raise these arguments in his response to the motion to dismiss which was not filed until 1 day after the district court had dismissed the case. Thus, the district court never addressed these claims before dismissing the petition.
Legal disability
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Penn alleged that he was in segregation and had limited access to legal material at the time he received the disposition of his disciplinary appeal. He asserts on appeal that this should be interpreted as a claim that he did not have access to the courts for the purpose of bringing his action and was therefore under a legal disability. He cites K.S.A. 60–515(a), which states:
“Except as provided in K.S.A. 60–523, if any person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property or a penalty or a forfeiture, at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the period the statute of limitations is running, is ... imprisoned for a term less than such person's natural life, such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one year after the person's disability is removed, except that no such action shall be commenced by or on behalf of any person under the disability more than eight years after the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, if a person imprisoned for any term has access to the court for purposes of bringing an action, such person shall not be deemed to be under legal disability.”
As previously noted, Penn's response alleging he was in segregation and had limited access to legal materials was filed with the district court after it already had dismissed the petition. Penn mailed his response on April 22, 2014, 20 days after the motion to dismiss was filed and mailed to him. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 133(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 241) requires that a party file a response to a written motion within 7 days after service of the motion or as otherwise provided by the court. Here, there is nothing in the record showing the district court granted Penn an extension of time to file a response to the motion to dismiss. Thus, the district court had no obligation to consider Penn's response when ruling on the motion, as it was both mailed and filed out of time.
Even if the district court had considered the substance of Penn's filing, he did not allege that he lacked access to the courts for the purpose of filing his petition. Instead, he merely alleged that he was in segregation and had limited access to legal materials. The statute is clear that mere imprisonment is insufficient to establish a legal disability. K.S.A. 60–515(a). Rather, an inmate must show that he or she lacked access to the courts for the purpose of filing his or her petition. See Bulmer v. Bowling, 27 Kan.App.2d 376, 378, 4 P.3d 637, rev. denied 269 Kan. 931 (2000). In addition, Penn alleged in the same filing that his petition was outside the 30–day statute of limitations because he was unaware of the deadline, not because he lacked access to the court system. Penn's response was insufficient to establish a claim of legal disability in order to toll the statute of limitations to file his 60–1501 petition.
Equitable estoppel
Penn also argues that the district court should have considered whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred enforcement of the statute of limitations found in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b). Equitable estoppel may prevent a party from relying on a statute of limitations if that party has, by deception or in violation of a duty toward the plaintiff, prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action within the statutory period. Rockers v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 268 Kan. 110, 116, 991 P.2d 889 (1999). Penn states in his brief that “he was held by the Department of Corrections in such a way as to deny him access to the legal materials necessary to file his action.” He appears to be referring again to his allegation that he was held in segregation and had limited access to legal materials.
The basis for invoking equitable estoppel is, by its nature, fact intensive, and the burden was on Penn to show the defendants should be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations. Penn did not allege in district court that the employees of the correctional facility deceived him or violated any duty owed to him. Further, he failed to include any information in district court as to how long he was segregated, what legal materials he did or did not have access to, or exactly how prison authorities prevented him from filing his petition. Penn's vague allegations that he was segregated and had limited access to legal materials did not constitute an attempt to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel sufficient to toll the statute of limitation under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–1501(b).
Affirmed.