Fire Insurance Co. v. Greenville Bank Trust Co., 180 Miss. 405, 177 So. 534; Erickson v. Genisot (Mich.), 33 N.W.2d 803; Farley v. American Automobile Insurance Co. (W. Va.), 72 S.E.2d 520, 34 A.L.R. 2d 933; Fleckenstein v. Citizens Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 326 Mich. 591, 40 N.W.2d 733; Fleming v. Travelers Insurance Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885; Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp (Ill.), 88 N.W.2d 499; Fullilove v. United States Casualty of New York (La.), 125 So.2d 389; Great American Insurance Co. v. Bass, 208 Miss. 436, 44 So.2d 532; Intestate Life Accident Co. v. Waters, 213 Miss. 265, 56 So.2d 493; Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Addy, 286 P.2d 622; Life Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. Greenlee, 187 Miss. 143, 192 So. 340; Lloyds America v. Ferguson (Miss.), 116 F.2d 920; Lumbermen Mutual Casualty Co. v. Broadus, 237 Miss. 387, 115 So.2d 130; McKee v. Exchange Insurance Assn. (Ala.), 120 So.2d 690; Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West (Okla.), 351 P.2d 398; Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co. of New York, 233 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535; St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Heflin (Ark.), 137 F. Supp. 520; Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Logan, 238 Miss. 580, 119 So.2d 268; Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Wall, 156 Miss. 865, 127 So.2d 298; Southern States Fire Insurance Co. v. Hand-Jordan Co., 112 Miss. 565, 73 So. 578; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821; Western Casualty Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Cook, 181 Miss. 619, 179 So. 551; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Yazoo Cooperage Co., 157 Miss. 27, 127 So. 579; 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles, Secs. 103, 104, 166, 167 pp. 411, 413, 498; 44 C.J.S., Insurance, Sec. 296 p. 1163. Brewer, Brewer Luckett, Clarksdale, for appellee.

[2] Courts interpreting language nearly identical to State Farm's business personal property loss provision have concluded that the policy language affords coverage only to the extent of the value of the bailed property, and does not cover liability to third parties in tort or contract. See, e.g., Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 101 So.2d 535 (Miss. 1958) (the phrase "property for which the insured is liable" points to insurance on the property, not on the insured's potential liability to third parties); see also 10A Couch on Insurance 2d § 42:345 (rev. ed. 1982), which states: In the absence of a clause covering property "held in trust" or in similar custody, a number of cases have found that policy provisions covering property contained in specified places and "for which the insured is liable" were intended to insure against loss of the property and not to indemnify the insured against his legal responsibility in tort or by contract to the owners of the property.

1994) ("Any ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed against the insurer and in favor of insured. . . .") (emphasis added); Lewis, 730 So.2d at 68 ("Under Mississippi law, ambiguous and unclear policy language must be resolved in favor of the insured.") (emphasis added); Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Keith's Breeder Farms, Inc., 227 So.2d 293, 294 (Miss. 1969) ("[T]he rule is that any ambiguity in the language of the policy will be construed more strictly against the writer of the policy.") (emphasis added); Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 101 So.2d 535, 536 (Miss. 1958) ("[T]he universal rule is that it must be construed most strongly against the insurer.") (emphasis added); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 110 So. 432, 433 (Miss. 1926) ("[W]hen there are two reasonable constructions of the contract of insurance, one favorable to the insurance company and the other to the insured, it is the duty of the courts to adopt the one favorable to the insured, because the contract is to be construed most strongly against the writer of it. This is the universal rule, as we find it in all jurisdictions.") (emphasis added).

1952) ("If ambiguous, [the insurance policy] should be construed most strongly in favor of the insured. . . . If the language is doubtful or ambiguous, a reasonable construction in favor of the insured follows.") (emphasis added); Lewis, 730 So.2d at 68 ("Under Mississippi law, ambiguous and unclear policy language must be resolved in favor of the insured.") (emphasis added); Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Keith's Breeder Farms, Inc., 227 So.2d 293, 294 (Miss. 1969) ("[T]he rule is that any ambiguity in the language of the policy will be construed more strictly against the writer of the policy.") (emphasis added); Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 101 So.2d 535, 536 (Miss. 1958) ("[T]he universal rule is that it must be construed most strongly against the insurer.") (emphasis added); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 110 So. 432, 433 (Miss. 1926) ("[W]hen there are two reasonable constructions of the contract of insurance, one favorable to the insurance company and the other to the insured, it is the duty of the courts to adopt the one favorable to the insured, because the contract is to be construed most strongly against the writer of it. This is the universal rule, as we find it in all jurisdictions.").

In so ruling, the court followed the weight of authority, which holds that insurance against damage or loss of property of others for which the insured is "legally liable" "affords coverage only to the extent of the bailed property, and does not cover liability to third parties in tort or contract." Id. at 227; see United States v. Globe Rutgers Fires Insurance Co., 104 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.Tex. 1952), aff'd 202 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1953); Folger Coffee Co. v. Great American Insurance Co., 333 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Miss. 1971); C.S. Rouse v. Albany Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 267 (1962); Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co., 233 Miss. 178 (1958); Home Insurance Co. v. Peoria P.U.RY Co., 78 Ill. 64 (1899). As explained in 11 Couch on Insurance § 154:34 (3d ed. 2000), "the term `liable,' as used in the policy, was not intended to describe a particular fixed legal liability which would require a showing that the insured was responsible by contract or in tort for the . . . loss, but, instead, referred to his liability or `responsibility' as a bailee.

There is simply no "fair doubt [to] be resolved in favor of the insured." Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Company of New York, 238 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535, 536 (1958). Carrom cannot claim that it is without notice of the limited nature of International's coverage, for it is expressed elsewhere in the excess policy that "[i]n the event there is no recovery available to the insured as a result of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the underlying Insurer, the coverage hereunder shall apply in excess of the applicable limit of liability specified in Schedule A."

It does not provide coverage for any contingent liability based in negligence. See United States v. Globe Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, 104 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.Tex. 1952), aff'd., 202 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1953); Northwest Insurance Company v. Albrecht, 22 Wn. App. 16, 587 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (1978); Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Company of New York, 233 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535 (1958); Annotation, Fire Insurance-Insured's Bailor, 67 A.L.R.2d 1241, 1255. There being no question that Paktank was not Gold Bond's bailee or warehouseman, the Underwriters policy does not cover the loss of Gold Bond's property. Defendants admit this fact on page 11 of their Memorandum of Fact and Law.

Some authorities have held that the bailee, after satisfaction of its liens on the goods, serves as trustee of the unallocated proceeds and is obligated to satisfy the bailor's loss before it satisfies its own. See, e.g. Stillwell v. Staples, 19 N.Y. 401; DeForest v. Fulton Insurance Co., 1 Hall (N.Y.) 84 (1828); Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co., 233 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535. Other authorities have held that the bailor and the bailee are entitled to share the proceeds in proportion to the value of their respective interests ("the pro rata approach"). See, e.g. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563, 575 (N.D.Ala. 1961); Edwards v. Cleveland Mill Power Co., 193 N.C. 780, 138 S.E. 131 (1927); Johnston v. Charles Abresch Co., 123 Wis. 130, 101 N.W. 395 (1904); Boyd v. McKee, 99 Va. 72, 37 S.E. 810 (1901); Smith v. Carmmack, 64 S.W. 372 (Tenn.Ch. 1901); Ferguson v. Pekin Plow Co., 141 Mo. 161, 42 S.W. 711 (1897); Beidelman v. Powell, 10 Mo.App. 280 (1881); Snow v. Carr, 61 Ala. 363, 32 Am.Rep. 3 (1973); Siter v. Morrs, 13 Pa. 218 (1850).

`The rule that the insurance policy prepared by the insurer must be construed more strongly against the insurance company, and that any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured, is so well-settled in the law of insurance that we hesitate to cite any cases. See Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Company of New York, 233 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535, 67 A.L.R.2d 1238. It is equally well-settled that when the provisions of an insurance policy are subject to two interpretations equally reasonable, that interpretation which gives greater indemnity to the insured will prevail. Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Company of New York, supra.

In cases like that at bar, however, the courts have almost uniformly held that if, from the contract construed in its entirety, the fair interpretation and construction of the insurance contract is that it was intended primarily to cover the property held by the insured, then "liable," as used within the policy, does not refer to any fixed legal liability of the insured to respond in damages, but should be construed more broadly to mean "responsible." This view is well developed in the leading cases of Penn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 233 Miss. 178, 101 So.2d 535, 67 A.L.R.2d 1238, and United States v. Globe Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. (N.D.Tex.) 104 F. Supp. 632, affirmed (C.A.5) 202 F.2d 696.