Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-6903.
July 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Defendant's Response in opposition thereto. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 23, 2003, Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, initiated this action by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons in the Court of Common pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Defendant's counsel in Florida was sent a package by Plaintiff's Counsel which contained the Writ of Summons, the Entry of Appearance and a letter. This letter told Defendant's counsel that only a Pennsylvania counsel could handle the dispute.(Pl.'s Ex.4) The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County docket does not show that this letter was ever filed with the court. (Def.'s Ex. 1).
On November 26, 2003, Plaintiff filed its Complaint for declaratory relief under the Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7532 et seq. and for monetary damages. in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment under ERISA, regarding death benefits payable to Florida Defendant for the death of Florida resident on benefit contract made and administered in Pennsylvania. (See Def.'s Notice. of Removal ¶ 1). On December 29, 2003, Defendant had this action removed to this Court on the premise that federal question jurisdiction exists because this is an ERISA matter. The Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand, arguing that Defendant's removal was untimely filed. Defendant has responded.
II. Discussion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), in order for a defendant to remove an action from a state court to a federal district court, it must file a notice of removal in the district court. The notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after the removing defendant receives the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The time period begins to run once the defendant is formally served. Id.
The Third Circuit has held that the thirty day time limit begins to run ". . . when a writ of summons, a praecipe, or of course a complaint provides adequate notice to defendant of federal jurisdiction . . ." Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 49 (3rd Cir. 1993). In defining the basis which courts should use to determine whether or not a pleading has provided adequate notice of federal jurisdiction, the Third Circuit in Foster approved the rationale of Rowe v. Marder, 750 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Pa. 1990). "The relevant test according to the court is not what the defendants purportedly knew, but what the documents said."Foster at 54. The Third Circuit went on to say that ". . . the inquiry begins and ends within the "four corners of the pleading" and at minimum anything considered a pleading must be something of the type filed with a court." Id., quoting Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 721.
Plaintiff's argument in support of remand is that the writ of summons, in conjunction with the letter from Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's counsel, put Defendant on notice of the existence of federal jurisdiction and as such started the 30 day clock ticking. Defendant however responds that the letter was simply correspondence between counsel and is a non-court related document that was never filed as the main point of the letter was to let Plaintiff's counsel know that only a Pennsylvania counsel could handle a dispute regarding the policy. (Pl.'s Ex. 1). As such, Defendant contends that Defendant were not on notice of removability until the Complaint was filed on November 26, 2003.
The question before this Court is whether the contents of the writ of summons Plaintiff filed was adequate to alert Plaintiff of the presence of federal jurisdiction. The answer is no, as the Summons did not explicitly informed the defendant, to "a substantial degree of specificity that the matter involved federal question jurisdiction." Foster, 986 F.2d at 53. Even if it is true that the letter from Plaintiff's counsel might have given Defendant's counsel some indication of the claims Plaintiff might bring, Foster mandates that the Court disregard such non-court related documents. See Foster, at 53-54 Solely looking within the four corners of the Summons, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff's claims gave rise to federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff contends that the Writ's reflection of a Pennsylvania address for Plaintiff and a Florida address for Defendant should have put Defendant on notice of diversity jurisdiction. While it is undisputed that the writ of summons and the praecipe served by the plaintiff disclosed that the plaintiff resided in Pennsylvania, and that the defendants resided in Florida, this information, by itself, did not provide sufficient notice to defendants that the action was removable. (Pl.'s Ex. 3-Writ of Summons). The Summons did not explicitly inform the Defendants of the amount in controversy, or contain a specific allegation that the claim exceeds the diversity jurisdiction threshold. (See Pl.'s Ex. 3-Writ of Summons).
In light of Foster, it is clear that the Summons itself fails to inform the Court to a "substantial degree of specificity that all of the elements of federal jurisdiction are present." or that the elements of diversity jurisdiction are present. See Foster, 986 F.2d at 53. The Court will, therefore, deny Plaintiff's Motion to Remand this action to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
An Appropriate Order follow is attached.