Opinion
C.A. NO. 00A-04-002-NAB.
Submitted: September 6, 2000.
Decided: September 28, 2000.
Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Reversed and Remanded.
Scott A. Holt, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Appellant.
Trudy Crookshank, P.0 Box 1352, Bear, Delaware, Pro Se Appellee.
James J. Hanley, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Board.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is the Court's decision on an appeal by Peninsula United Methodist Homes (Employer) of a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) granting unemployment benefits to Trudy Crookshank (Claimant). The Board determined that Claimant was discharged from her employment without just cause and was therefore qualified for benefits. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court concludes that the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board erroneously applied the legal standard for just cause. For these reasons, the Board's decision granting unemployment insurance benefits to Trudy Crookshank must be reversed.
POSTURE
Claimant Trudy Crookshank worked as a licensed practical nurse for Employer from August 8, 1996, through July 13, 1999, when she was terminated from her position. She filed a petition for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment. A Division claims deputy found that Claimant had been discharged for just cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits. Claimant appealed this decision, and an appeals referee held a hearing on September 3, 1999. The appeals referee affirmed the decision of the claims deputy.
Claimant appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) and asked the Board to subpoena numerous records from Employer's files. At the Board hearing on December 1, 1999, the Board remanded the matter to the referee to consider the subpoenaed materials.
On remand, the referee attached great significance to the fact that much of the information on the subpoenaed records had been redacted. Claimant had apparently requested the documents to demonstrate that she had performed certain tasks on the day prior to her discharge. Despite some disagreement as to who performed which tasks on the day in question, the reason for Claimant's discharge was insubordination, not failure to complete assigned tasks. The documents were therefore of dubious relevance, and the Court need not address the question of redaction.
On remand, the referee reversed his previous decision, ruling that Claimant was fired without just cause and was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. Employer appealed to the Board, and, after another hearing, the Board affirmed the referee's decision. Employer appealed to this Court. Briefing is complete, and the issues are ripe for decision.
FACTS
On May 25, 1999, Claimant was asked to work a shift that would have interfered with her visitation schedule with her daughter. She refused the shift but did not give a reason. Later that day, she overheard part of a conversation between two other nurses. Claimant apparently assumed that one of the nurses was being forced to work even though she had a bad case of hives. Based on her faulty assumption, Claimant made a series of loud, derogatory remarks about management.
The next day, Susan Beck, the assistant of health services, presented Claimant with an "Employee Disciplinary Notice" regarding her inappropriate behavior. Beck's written comments on the form describe Claimant's behavior as "comments made in presence of . . . staff and within residents' living area which were false and defamatory in manner." Beck cited to Group I, #5 of the employee handbook: "Unsatisfactory work, behavior and/or attitude," and Group II, # 4: "False or defamatory remarks." Beck also checked the box next to a statement that provided as follows: "Any further violation of either Corporate or Departmental Policy may result in more severe disciplinary action, including suspension and/or termination." Claimant denied any misconduct and refused to sign the form.
Record of the Proceedings at 36. Although the certified record from the Board in this case consists of two volumes, their labels are identical. For this reason, subsequent references to the volume containing the various decisions and the parties' exhibits appear as "Rec. at page no." Because the volume containing the transcripts of the four hearings is not numbered consecutively, references in this opinion are to specific hearings, e.g., "Tr. of Ref.'s First Hrg. at page no."
Rec. at 38.
Rec. at 39.
Rec. at 36.
On July 8, 1999, Claimant was assigned to work as the charge nurse on the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift. Virginia Bilow, one of Claimant's supervisors, had worked the previous shift. When Claimant reported for duty, she was apparently annoyed by the amount of work that carried over from Bilow's shift to her own. According to Claimant, the transition from Bilow's shift was a "royal mess." She acknowledged complaining both about the workload and the recent denial of her vacation request. She also acknowledged questioning Bilow, who was her supervisor, about why Bilow could work overtime but she denied any inappropriate behavior. According to Bilow, Claimant voiced her dissatisfaction in a loud and belligerent manner, repeatedly complaining that her supervisors were not doing their jobs properly. Susan Beck, the assistant director of health services, was standing nearby and observed the incident. She described Claimant's manner as angry, loud and unconcerned with the tasks at hand.
Tr. of Ref.'s First Hrg. at 94.
Much controversy exists over the exact nature of Claimant's statements and conduct, although all parties agree that the exchange was less than pleasant. This incident took place at the nurses station, which is located in a public area where residents, visitors and other staff members are often present. There is also controversy about how many people overheard Claimant's loud complaints.
The next day, July 9, 1999, Claimant telephoned Beck to discuss a vacation request that had been denied due to lack of staffing. After Beck explained the reason for the denial, Claimant persistently questioned her in a loud and disrespectful manner. Her remarks culminated with the accusation that she was on a management "hit list" because she had telephoned the CEO when the job she wanted was given to someone else. Beck repeatedly asked Claimant to calm down, but to no avail. When Claimant continued to argue and interrupt, Beck stated that she was going to hang up, and she did. The nature of Claimant's comments and behavior is in dispute, although there is no debate that Claimant was distraught.
Tr. of Ref.'s First Hrg. at 69.
Beck filed another warning form following this incident. Claimant was again written up for a Group I, #5 infraction ("Unsatisfactory work, behavior and/or attitude"). She was also cited for a Group III, #3 violation: "Insubordination (not submitting to authority, disobedient, disrespectful, obscene or abusive treatment of supervisor"). Claimant again refused to sign the form. The employee handbook clearly states that the Group III violations are "serious violations of our policies and procedures and are grounds for IMMEDIATE TERMINATION." Shortly thereafter, Claimant was fired.
Rec. at 42.
Rec. at 40.
Rec. at 40 (underlining and capitalization in the original).
ISSUES
Employer argues first that the Board erred in failing to consider the written warning which Claimant received in May 1999. Claimant responds that the May 1999 warning was her first warning and therefore could not be a final warning. She also suggests that Employer altered the warning after it was submitted to her. Second, Employer argues that the Board's finding that Claimant was fired without just cause was legally erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence. Claimant asserts that her conduct was not insubordinate and that she was singled out for harassment because she had contacted the CEO to register her displeasure at not getting the job she wanted.
The Court has attempted to characterize Claimant's assertions as cognizable legal arguments. See Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 85A-NO-9, Bifferato, J. (Sept. 24, 1986) (Letter Op.) (observing that the Court may exhibit leniency toward a pro se litigant).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The function of this Court on review of a Board decision is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is adequate to support the Board's factual findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686 (1960).
Boughton v. Division of Unemployment Ins., Del. Super., 300 A.2d 25, 26-27 (1972); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (1979).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Title 29 Del. C. § 10142 (d).
DISCUSSION
The Board's decision. Despite what the Board acknowledges to be an "extensive record" in this case, the Board made few actual findings:
The record indicates that the claimant did not quietly respond in May 1999 to the request that she work a shift or in July 1999 to the information that she was not going to receive the vacation requested. There are allegations that these outbursts were heard by staff and residents. The Board concludes that the claimant's conduct was not appropriate, but weighing the evidence in the circumstances of this case where the employer was asking of the employee what she did not want to do, it was not wilful or wanton misconduct.Just cause. Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315 (2), an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he is "discharged from his work for just cause in connection with his work." "Just cause" for termination is defined as a "wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest, or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." Even a single instance of failure to heed an employer's instructions can constitute just cause for dismissal.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3315 (2); Abex Corp. v. Todd, Def. Super., 235 A.2d 271, 272 (1967)
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, Del. Super., 431 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1981).
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the Board did not apply the legal definition of just cause to the facts of this case, and in fact, never even alluded to the statute which governs this case. Rather, the Board concluded that because Claimant was asked to do "what she did not want to do," her behavior was not wilful or wanton misconduct. This is a startlingly erroneous definition of just cause. A supervisor s request that an employee work a particular shift cannot justify insubordinate or otherwise inappropriate conduct, particularly where the conduct is explicitly prohibited in the employee handbook and where the employee has been previously warned about such conduct. Furthermore, the Board's reference to Claimant being asked to do something she did not want to do pertains to the May 1999 incident, not to the July 1999 incident that led to Claimant's discharge.
To reiterate, just cause for dismissal is defined as a "wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest, or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." In this case, Claimant acknowledged receipt of the employee handbook, which clearly prohibited insubordination and unsatisfactory behavior. In addition, Claimant was warned about her negative behavior and attitude in May 1999. In light of these uncontested facts, it must follow that Claimant's loud, argumentative behavior was in violation of employer's interest and Claimant's expected standard of conduct.
Abex Corp. v. Todd, Del. Super., 235 A.2d 271, 272 (1976).
Although Claimant suggests that Employer altered the written warning after the fact, there is no evidence to support this allegation.
Wilful or wanton misconduct. The remaining question is whether this conduct was wilful or wanton. Such conduct requires only a showing that claimant was conscious of her conduct and recklessly indifferent to its consequences. In the case at bar, the referee and the Board found that Claimant's conduct was inappropriate. In light of the evidence that the employee handbook prohibited such behavior and that Claimant had previously been warned about such conduct, the only conclusion that is supported by the record is that Claimant was recklessly indifferent to the consequences of her conduct. As a matter of law then, the Court concludes that Claimant's persistent loud, angry behavior constituted wilful or wanton misconduct sufficient to meet the just cause standard.
Coleman v. Dep't of Labor, Del. Super., 288 A.2d 285, 288 (1972).
The Board has discretion to resolve conflicts in the evidence, but it does not have discretion to ignore relevant evidence. In this case, the Board disregarded the evidence of the prior warning and mistakenly based its finding on wilful or wanton misconduct on the May 199 incident rather than on the July 1999 incident. The Court finds that these errors constitutes abuses of the Board's discretion. In addition, the Board's misapplication of the standard for wilful or wanton misconduct is a clear error of law. Based on the record evidence, the Court concludes that Employer carried its burden of showing that Claimant was discharged for just cause in connection with her work.
Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (1971).
The Court notes that, in his second decision, the appeals referee found the written warning to be defective because it did not identify the witnesses to Claimant's inappropriate outbursts. The Court knows of no legal definition or precedent that could lead to this conclusion. The violations of conduct for which Claimant was cited do not provide that insubordination in private is acceptable but is prohibited in public. The behavior itself is prohibited, regardless of the presence or absence of witnesses. Inasmuch as Employer described the misconduct on the warning form and referred to specific violations of the employee handbook, the warning was sufficient.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons explained above, the decision of the Board granting unemployment insurance benefits to Trudy Crookshank must be and hereby is Reversed and the matter is Remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent herewith.It Is So ORDERED .