1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 2.10, 2.15, 7.20. See also: Peninsula Corporation v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 174 (D.C.Cir 1945); Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799 (1946). In testing the statute for the adequacy of such safeguards it is important to consider the character of administrative action which the statute authorizes.

On the other hand docket management is a discretionary matter as to which courts virtually never substitute their judgment for that of an administrative agency. E.g., FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 272 (1949); Peninsula Corp. of Seaford, Delaware v. United States, 60 F.Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1945) (three-judge court). Having said this, we recognize the exceptional situation where two mutually exclusive, bona fide applications should be considered together.

Besides, there is ample evidence of alteration of other documents adduced by the applicant. But even if the 31 questionable bills of lading be simply disregarded, in our opinion the Commission would be justified in denying applicant's claim based upon the remaining bills of lading covering new furniture. If the 31 questioned bills should be eliminated, there would remain only bills showing 12 shipments in 1934, 8 in 1935, 11 in 1936, 6 in 1937, 8 in 1938, and 12 in 1939. It would be entirely within the province of the Commission to hold that shipments, so few in number, constitute only evidence of intermittent, sporadic or infrequent service, and fall short of proof of the "bona fide operation" mentioned in the statute, with its connotation that such service must be substantial and continuous. United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra, Peninsular Corporation of Seaford v. United States, D.C., 60 F. Supp. 174, Watson Brothers Transportation Co. v. United States, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 762, Beasley v. United States, D.C., 47 F. Supp. 468. Conclusion.

" In Peninsula Corporation v. United States, D.C., 60 F. Supp. 174, at page 180, the court said: "The `grandfather' clause, so-called, requires that the Commission in specifying in a certificate the service to be rendered shall endeavor to preserve `substantial parity between future operations and prior bona fide operations.' Alton R. Co. et al. v. United States et al., 315 U.S. 15, 22, 62 S.Ct. 432, 437, 86 L.Ed. 586; United States et al. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation, 315 U.S. 475, 481, 62 S.Ct. 722, 86 L.Ed. 971; Crescent Express Lines v. United States et al., 320 U.S. 401, 409, 64 S.Ct. 167, 88 L.Ed. 127." In Howard Hall Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 495, at page 498, 62 S.Ct. 732, 734, 86 L.Ed. 986, the court stated: "Prior operations to several points in a region may or may not justify the Commission in authorizing service throughout the whole region.

'         In Peninsula Corporation v. United States, D.C., 60 F.Supp. 174, at page 180, the court said: 'The 'grandfather' clause, so-called, requires that the Commission in specifying in a certificate the service to be rendered shall endeavor to preserve 'substantial parity between future operations and prior bona fide operations.' Alton R. Co. et al. v. United States et al., 315 U.S. 15, 22, 62 S.Ct. 432, 437, 86 L.Ed. 586; United States et al. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation, 315 U.S. 475, 481, 62 S.Ct. 722, 86 L.Ed. 971; Crescent Express Lines v. United States et al., 320 U.S. 401, 409, 64 S.Ct. 167, 88 L.Ed. 127.

1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 2.10, 2.15, 7.20. See also: Peninsula Corporation v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 174 (D.C. Cir 1945); Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799 (1946). "In testing the statute for the adequacy of such safeguards it is important to consider the character of administrative action which the statute authorizes.

The ordinary meaning and effect of a grandfather clause contained in an act authorizing the transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle is to preserve substantial parity between future and prior operations. Utilities Commission v. Fleming, 235 N.C. 660, 71 S.E.2d 41; Crescent Express Lines v. United States, 320 U.S. 401, 88 L.Ed. 127; United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 86 L.Ed. 971; Goncz v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 48 F. Supp. 286; Chicago, St. P., M. O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 249, affirmed 322 U.S. 1, 88 L.Ed. 1093; Transamerican, Freight Lines v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 405; Peninsula Corp. v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 174. There can be no legitimate dispute about the facts involved in this proceeding.

The Supreme Court of the United States in interpreting the meaning and effect of the grandfather clause contained in the Federal Motor Carrier Act, in the case of Crescent Express Lines v. United States, supra said: "The statute, . . . contemplated `substantial parity' between future and prior operations," citing Alton R. Co. v. United States, supra. To like effect are the following decisions: United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 86 L.Ed. 971; Goncz v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 48 F. Supp. 286; Chicago, St. P., M. O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 249, affirmed 322 U.S. 1, 88 L.Ed. 1093; Transamerican Freight Lines v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 405; Peninsula Corp. v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 174. In the case of McCracken v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 444, the court in considering a motor carrier's rights under the grandfather clause contained in the Federal Motor Carrier Act, said: "There is often a clear conflict between the public convenience and necessity and the rights thus confirmed.