These allegations do not claim that McDonald's statements were false. In support of its claim, McDonald's cites to Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188 (1949). In Pendleton, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint against the defendant, Time, Inc.

Plaintiff maintains that a number of other Illinois Appellate Courts have in fact recognized a cause of action for malicious injury to property. In Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1st Dist. 1949), the plaintiff was an artist who painted the first portrait of Harry S. Truman before he became the President of the United States. After Truman became President, Time published a portrait of Truman painted by artist Jay Wesley Jacobs, falsely characterizing the painting as the first portrait for which Truman had ever sat.

We do not find such argument to be persuasive. Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 6 Cir., 383 F.2d 352, 354-355. Plaintiff's reliance upon Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435, is misplaced. There the court pointed out ( 339 Ill. App. 188, 196, 89 N.E.2d 435) that the action involved was not to be confounded with a libel action where unless the words are actionable per se, special damages must be alleged.

Id. at 519. Citing two cases - Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Co., 342 Ill.App. 379 (1951), and Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill.App. 188 (1949) - the author opined that Illinois has "recognized" the prima facie tort doctrine. ¶ 65 In Lowe Foundation, which involved a challenge to a holographic will, the appellate court observed that "the rule which gives a right of action for the malicious and wrongful interference with the making of a contract applied to such interference with the making of a will."

In the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the alleged misrepresentations, by means of which the defendants are asserted to have embellished their promotional advertising, in and of themselves gave rise to a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff. It is true that false advertising may be actionable if it is of such a nature that its effect is to disparage the product or enterprise of another (see Prosser on Torts [2d ed.], p. 764; cf. Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal.App.2d 292, 299 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 919]; Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188 [ 89 N.E.2d 435, 438]) or to cause the confusion of one organization with another. (See Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 322, 325.)

However, this court is not sure that the entire complicated regime of defamation pleading requirements, such as the per se/per quod distinction and the innocent construction rule, should carry over intact into a commercial disparagement action. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 196, 89 N.E.2d 435, 438-439 (1st Dist. 1949) (regretting confusion with libel actions and doubting that per se/per quod distinctions apply); Pain Prevention Lab, Inc. v. Electronic Waveforms, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (noting criticism of a special damages requirement for disparagement actions). The court in Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1965), later proceeding, 393 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923, 89 S.Ct. 254, 21 L.Ed.2d 259 (1968), applied the innocent construction rule to a statement about the moisture content of green Brazil nuts, but the plaintiffs in that case had brought a conventional libel action.

Because we do not find that such a tort is recognized as a separate tort in Illinois, we grant Craftex's motion for summary judgment on this issue. Gilberg has cited two Illinois cases for the proposition that this tort exists under Illinois law. Gilberg cites statements from these two cases and contends that they create this Prima Facie Tort. Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924, reh. denied, 176 Ill. 618, 54 N.E. 524 (1898), and Pendelton v. Time, 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949). Doremus v. Hennessy is considered the establishing Illinois case for the torts of tortious interference with business relationships and contractual relationships, torts which plaintiff has abandoned.

" ( 52 N.E. at 926). Perhaps most relevant of the more recent Illinois cases is Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill.App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1950), which involved only the sufficiency of the complaint. Plaintiff, a portrait painter, alleged that defendant maliciously, with intent to injure plaintiff, had published a false statement to the effect that someone other than plaintiff had been the first to paint a portrait of President Truman.

Since Count I is fatally defective in the ways just demonstrated, it is unnecessary to consider the various other objections to it which defendants urge. Count II repeats most of the allegations of Count I, and states a cause of action for tort, alleging an intentional and wrongful invasion of plaintiff's right to establish and conduct a lawful business, Shell Oil Co., Inc., v. State Tire Oil Co., 6 Cir., 1942, 126 F.2d 971, 975; see also Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theater, 2 Cir., 1943, 133 F.2d 187, 189, and Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 1949, 339 Ill. App. 188, 189, 89 N.E.2d 435. "No persons, individually or by combination, have the right to directly or indirectly interfere or disturb another in his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten to do so, for the sake of compelling him to do some act which, in his judgment, his own interest does not require."

In Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 615, the Illinois Supreme Court said: "Every man has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will, and any one who invades that right without lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong, and, if followed by an injury caused in consequence thereof, the one whose right is thus invaded has a legal ground of action for such wrong." • 2, 3 It is established in Illinois, also, that the damage or injury can be loss of potential income from property, and an existing contract is not required. ( Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 194.) As the comment to section 766 of the Restatement of Torts explains, "The liability for inducing breach of contract is now regarded as but one instance, rather than the exclusive limit, of protection against unjustified interference in business relations."