As a general rule, "a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings." 392 U.S. at 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008 (footnote omitted); Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The Harrison case created an exception to the general rule.

AFFIRMED. See Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). DELL, GUNTHER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

, State v. Marr, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1985) (instruction that, where there are no witnesses to alleged act, testimony of rape victim should be "rigidly scrutinized," is plainly erroneous and not the law of this state). Accord, Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) and Hicks v. State, 388 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The next issue concerns a separate order entered in this cause wherein the trial court found:

Defendant's testimony at his first trial is admissible in his second trial, even if he does not choose to take the witness stand in the second trial. In Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the court states what is the general rule as follows: 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 655 at 561.

We recognize that there is contrary authority on this point. In Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in using the standard jury instruction, rather than a special instruction involving a sexual battery under section 794.011. Accord, Hicks v. State, 388 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Williamson v. State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).

There, the First District held this similar fact evidence was clearly relevant in its bearing on the defendant's identity, intent, plan and design, as well as to show lack of inadvertance. See also Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), where the Fourth District upheld admissibility of similar fact testimony of two witnesses, noting that their testimony tended to corroborate that given by the victim. In Cotita v. State, 381 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), petition for review denied, 392 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1981), the defendant was convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious act on his 5-year-old daughter.

See Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1). We also believe that the ruling below is legally erroneous, for as stated in Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), "polygraph tests and information gleaned therefrom are not admissible evidence in any criminal proceeding" in the absence of a "stipulation between the state and defense counsel." Accord, State Dept. of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 398 So.2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

For such value as it may have, coming as it does from the dissenting opinion, one other matter deserves comment. The state contends that since the court charged the jury in the language of the standard jury instruction, the given charge cannot be claimed as error, citing this Court's opinion in Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The precise language in the Pendleton case, ". . . the use of the standard jury instruction cannot be claimed as error," when considered alone and out of context is overly broad, and should not be construed to confer infallibility on the standard jury instructions.

Nevertheless, the court did not err in declining to charge the jury to treat the uncorroborated testimony of the victim with caution. Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Williamson v. State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 794.022(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). The court sentenced appellant to concurrent fifteen and five year terms of imprisonment, and the sentencing order stated that the "court maintains jurisdiction over defendant."

.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976), affirming conviction of rape and murder and holding evidence of defendant's attempted homosexual act shortly prior to commission of rape was properly admitted; Dean v. State, 277 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1973), affirming rape conviction and upholding admission of testimony of four other rape victims showing system or general pattern of criminality; Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 847 (1959), rape conviction affirmed and evidence of prior aborted attempt on another similar victim properly allowed; Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So.2d 201 (1948), rape conviction affirmed where five other women testified as to defendant's approach which was similar to that of victim of the crime charged; Nathey v. State, 275 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert. denied 279 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1973), conviction of rape of defendant's 11-year-old daughter upheld despite admission of evidence of sex offenses by defendant against three other daughters; Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), conviction of sexual battery affirmed and testimony of two other women similarly attacked by defendant properly admitted to "corroborate" testimony of victim; Summit v. State, 285 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), prior lewd assaults against both the victim and her sister held properly admitted in trial under Florida Statute § 800.04; Cantrell v. State, 193 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), prior lewd assaults against two similar victims properly admitted; Ross v. State, 112 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), conviction of lewd and lascivious assault against 11-year-old girl upheld and evidence of prior similar acts against another similar victim properly admitted. Similar fact evidence has been properly disallowed where its probative value was slight or where its effect was unduly prejudicial.