Nos. 05-07-00913-CR, 05-07-00914-CR, 05-07-00915-CR
Opnion Filed May 8, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F04-50967-SP, F04-50968-SP, F04-50969-SP.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FRANCIS, and LANG.
DOUGLAS S. LANG, Justice.
William Deon Pendgraft was convicted of three deadly conduct offenses. In four issues, appellant challenges the judgments revoking his community supervision. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.
Procedural History
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded nolo contendere to three deadly conduct offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(b) (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to plea agreements, after finding appellant guilty in each case, the trial court assessed punishment at seven years' imprisonment, probated for four years, and a $1000 fine in each case. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision in each case, alleging appellant violated several conditions of his community supervision. At a hearing on the motions, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at four years' imprisonment in each case. Applicable Law
Appellate review of an order revoking probation is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation. See id at 763-64. Due Process
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision without specifying which allegations it found had been proven. Specifically, appellant asserts the judgments revoking community supervision failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process because the trial court did not set out the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation. The State responds appellant did not request that specific findings be included in the order revoking community supervision, and the trial court stated the grounds it relied upon in revoking appellant's community supervision. The minimum requirements of due process that must be observed in probation revocation hearings include a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). However, Texas courts require a defendant to make a request for specific findings. See King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). In the absence of such a request, the trial court's failure to make specific findings in the order revoking probation is not reversible error. Id. Appellant neither raised this issue in motions for new trial nor requested findings or conclusions. Moreover, the trial judge stated she found the allegations in the motions to revoke had been proved, and the judgments recite that. We conclude the judgments revoking appellant's community supervision satisfied minimum due process requirements. We decide appellant's second issue against him. Abuse of Discretion
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision because he did not violate all eight of the allegations in the motions to revoke. In his third and fourth issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the failure to pay costs and fees because he proved an inability to pay. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the revocations. The State alleged appellant violated eight conditions of community supervision, including testing positive on two occasions for THC (an active ingredient in marijuana), failing to pay costs and fees, failing to complete community service hours, failing to start work on his GED as directed, and that he had contact with one of the complainants. During the revocation hearing, appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations in the motion to revoke. A plea of true, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence were admitted into evidence without objection. Moreover, appellant testified he knew he was not to have contact with one of the complainants, but he contacted her anyway because he loved her. Appellant also testified he smoked marijuana while on community supervision. Appellant's admissions he smoked marijuana and had contact with a complainant, standing alone, are sufficient to support the trial court's judgments revoking community supervision. See Watts v. State, 645 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. We decide against appellant on his first, third, and fourth issues. We affirm the trial court's judgments.