No. 13-04-656-CR
Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed June 1, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and CASTILLO.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice VALDEZ.
Appellant, Mark Pena, was found guilty of robbery, and as a habitual felony offender as proven by enhancement allegations in the indictment, was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove the enhancement allegations. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2004, appellant attacked and then robbed Kevin Felix of his car and cell phone. Later that night, Felix identified appellant as his assailant. Along with robbery, the indictment also cited appellant's two prior felony convictions. During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant testified that he had served time in prison for both of the convictions cited in the indictment. II. ENHANCEMENT ALLEGATIONS
By his sole issue, appellant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the same person previously convicted, as alleged in the enhancement allegation. In evaluating this issue, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that appellant was the same person convicted in the prior offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). There are various acceptable methods to prove the prior criminal record of a defendant. Lyle v. State, 669 S.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.). These include the following: (1) testimony of a witness who identifies the defendant as the same person previously convicted; (2) stipulation or judicial admission of the defendant; (3) introduction of certified copies of the judgment and sentence and record of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail, including fingerprints of the defendant, supported by expert testimony identifying them with known prints of the defendant; and (4) comparison by the fact finder of a record of conviction that contains photographs and a detailed physical description of the named person with the appearance of the defendant in court. Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Lyle, 669 S.W.2d at 856. However, this list is not exclusive or exhaustive. Human, 749 S.W.2d at 835. Each case should be judged on its own individual merits. Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 32. During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant testified that he had been convicted of aggravated assault in 1987 and burglary of a habitation in 1991, the two prior convictions alleged for enhancement. See Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31; Lyle, 669 S.W.2d at 856. When an accused admits a prior offense or conviction, his testimony is sufficient to connect him with the prior conviction, and the state need not offer any further evidence to support this issue. Wright v. State, 932 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no pet.) (citing Rascon v. State, 496 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)). We conclude a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the same person convicted of the prior offenses. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Human, 749 S.W.2d at 834. Appellant's issue is overruled. III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.