Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6378-11T2
07-14-2014
MARIA E. PENA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and VEXWIRE, LLC, Respondents.
Maria E. Pena, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Vexwire, LLC has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Ashrafi and St. John.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 358,353.
Maria E. Pena, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Vexwire, LLC has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Maria E. Pena (Pena) appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review (Board) finding her ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because she left her position "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We conclude the Board's decision was adequately supported by facts in the record and consonant with the applicable statutory provisions and, therefore, we affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record, which includes a testimonial hearing conducted via telephone on February 13, 2012. Pena was employed by Vexwire, LLC as a data-entry clerk from April to September 2011. On September 19 or 20, she failed to show up for work and did not inform her employer about her absence. However, Pena was given another chance by her immediate supervisor, Corey Cupo. Cupo recommended to his superior, Abe Benmoussa, that Pena be permitted to continue working because the employer needed her services.
On September 21, Pena and Cupo had an exchange that resulted in Pena being sent home by her bosses. After that encounter, the details of which the parties offer competing versions, Cupo brought Pena to Benmoussa's office and informed him, in Pena's presence, that he was sending her home. Pena apparently interpreted that statement to mean she was terminated, and did not report to work after September 21.
Pena thereafter applied for but was denied unemployment benefits. The Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance Division (Deputy) determined that Pena had abandoned her job and failed to demonstrate good cause for so doing. Pena appealed that disqualification to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) and a testimonial hearing was conducted by telephone on February 13, 2012.
Pena, Cupo and Benmoussa all testified during the hearing. According to the two supervisors, Pena reported to work on September 21 "with an attitude." There were problems with the company's network that day, and Pena was idle for a period of time while waiting for the system to restart. Cupo testified that when he asked Pena to perform a different task, she responded, "hell no." He explained that he did not have the authority to terminate Pena - he could only recommend such action to Benmoussa — but he was empowered to send her home. According to Cupo's hearing testimony, he never told Pena that she was terminated, nor did he witness anyone else from management fire Pena.
Benmoussa testified that he spoke with Pena after Cupo left, and asked her if she would like to take a few minutes to cool off and then return to work. Pena replied that she could not because her husband was already on the way to pick her up. Benmoussa said that he told her, "please if you want to go today, you don't want to stay at work today, I understand. Go and come back tomorrow." He never heard from Pena after that day.
For her part, Pena testified that Cupo approached her that day, informed her that she was not doing her work properly and then said, "you can pick up your things and I'm going to send you home." She stated that she followed Cupo to Benmoussa's office where the two men discharged her without further explanation. She disputed the two other witnesses' testimony, testifying that she was "never told to go home and return the following day." Pena also asserted she never gave her employer any notice that she was quitting.
By written decision dated February 14, 2012, the Tribunal disagreed with the Deputy's determination that Pena had left work voluntarily, but nevertheless found her ineligible for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) because she had been "discharged for misconduct connected with the work."
In its findings of fact, the Tribunal determined that Pena had failed to notify her employer about her absence on September 20, in contravention of the company's policy. It also found that:
On [September 20, Pena] reported to work with an attitude and did not talk to anyone at work. The employer's network system was slow as [Pena] was printing the production reports. [Pena] had to restart the process over again. [Pena]'s supervisor noticed that she was not doing anything while waiting for [the] system to restart and
asked her to do something else. [Pena] told the supervisor "hell no." At that point, [Pena] was sent to the coordinator's office where she was told to go home. [Pena] took that statement to mean she was being fired and did not return to work.
Pena then appealed to the Board, which rendered a written decision dated July 17, 2012. Noting that the Tribunal's factual findings were "substantially correct," the Board almost entirely adopted those facts. The single exception was the Board's contrary finding that Pena "was not told she was discharged on September 21, 2011." Instead, the Board found that "the employer told [Pena] to go home for the day but she failed to return to work."
It its decision, the Board initially determined that the appeal would be reviewed as a "voluntary quit" because there was no testimony presented to substantiate a discharge. It then concluded that "[Pena]'s failure to return to work and/or seek clarification on the status of her job, makes this case job abandonment." Finding no evidence of good cause for Pena's abandonment, the Board ruled Pena disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as "she quit work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the job." The Board also reversed the Tribunal's conclusion, deciding instead that Pena "was not discharged for misconduct connected with the work."
Pena appeals from that decision, contending she satisfactorily demonstrated that she did not voluntarily quit but was terminated from employment.
Our role in reviewing administrative agency decisions involving unemployment benefits is generally limited. See Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We defer to factual findings where supported by sufficient credible evidence. Ibid. "'[T]he test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
A reviewing court will intervene only if the challenged action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or "clearly inconsistent with [the agency's] statutory mission or with other State policy." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the scope of appellate review is confined to determining: first, whether the agency decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; second, whether such action violates legislative policies; third, whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency's factual findings; and, lastly, whether the agency, in applying legislative policies to the facts, clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made. Id. at 210-11.
Our decision is also guided by fundamental principles of law governing unemployment compensation. Our State's Unemployment Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30 (the Act), is designed primarily to lessen the impact of unemployment that befalls workers without their fault. Id. at 212. "The public policy behind the [Act] is to afford protection against the hazards of economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment." Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 374 (1989); see also N.J.S.A. 43:21-2.
Accordingly, an individual who has "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" is ineligible for benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Moreover, an employee is required to do "whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is the employee who bears the burden to show that he or she is entitled to unemployment benefits. Id. at 218.
Applying the foregoing principles here, we find no basis to upset the Board's decision. Pena, in essence, challenges the Board's fact-finding that she left work voluntarily as not supported by sufficient credible evidence. We disagree.
Although the Board's decision was brief and additional findings would have been preferable, the findings were sufficient, and the Board was not required to make any additional findings. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(e)(stating that the Board may, in part, "affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case").
The factual issue in this matter, whether Pena voluntarily left or was terminated, was uncomplicated. Although in conflict with Pena's own testimony, both witnesses for the employer testified that Pena was never terminated but only told to go home for the day. We perceive no grounds to disturb the Board's reasonable determination, based on the evidentiary record and findings of fact adopted from the Tribunal, that Pena's actions constituted a voluntary quit.
Accordingly, we are satisfied there was sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the Board's decision that Pena left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work, and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION