Opinion
H043834 H043835
12-10-2018
STEPHEN PELTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTY WILSON, Defendant and Appellant. REBECCA MENDEZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTY WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 16CV01616) (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 16CV01615)
In 2016, Stephen Pelton and Rebecca Mendez were granted civil harassment restraining orders against appellant Christy Wilson. Wilson appeals the court's orders, arguing that they are not supported by substantial evidence, there is an inadequate record of the trial court proceedings, the orders improperly restrict her constitutional rights to travel and association, and she was denied her due process rights because there was not a court reporter present for the proceedings. We find that there is substantial evidence to support the orders, but we reverse and remand the matters for the trial court to clarify the orders in accord with constitutional principles.
On October 26, 2016, we ordered the two appeals in Wilson v. Pelton (H043834) and Wilson v. Mendez (H043835) considered together for the purpose of briefing, oral argument and disposition. Wilson did not file a reply brief in either of the appeals.
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
Pelton, Mendez and Wilson live in the same mobile home park, Castle Mobile Estates in Santa Cruz, California. Pelton and Mendez both work at the park in management. From October 2014 through June 2016, Pelton and Mendez allege that they were harassed by Wilson.
On June 28, 2016, Pelton and Mendez filed separate petitions requesting civil harassment restraining orders against Wilson. Mendez attached a nine-page log to her petition alleging 45 separate incidents of Wilson's harassment occurring between October 30, 2014 and June 20, 2016. Mendez's petition described incidents in which Wilson verbally taunted her, accused Mendez and her husband of being cult members, cited bible verses at her, and drove aggressively "using her vehicle as a weapon, veering into [Mendez] and others" in a manner that made Mendez feel unsafe. Wilson screamed at Mendez and her husband in "rants" that lasted as long as 30 minutes. The petition also included three letters Wilson wrote and a screen shot of a video that depicted Wilson's daughter Morgan holding a six-foot wooden cross in front of the surveillance camera of the office where Mendez worked. Morgan was smiling into the camera and waving while holding the cross. The log described Mendez's report to the Capitola Police Department. In that report, Mendez characterized Morgan's actions with the cross as a religious hate incident.
Pelton's petition stated that he was harassed and stalked by Wilson when he was close to his home, and when he was going in and out of his home. On two separate occasions, Wilson tried to run Pelton over with her vehicle. On one of these occasions, Wilson said it "could have been murder with no witnesses." In a separate incident, after trying to run Pelton over, Wilson got out of her truck and yelled: "you are the witness. I just tried to run him over. I just tried to kill him. I thought he was going to get hit after he had assaulted me. It's kind of scary. It was real, wasn't it?" Wilson tailgated Pelton while he was driving in the park, followed him in public, accused him of murder in public in front of others and used obscenities.
Wilson did not file a response to the petitions.
The court ordered temporary restraining orders against Wilson and set the matter for a contested hearing.
At the contested hearing, the court informed everyone present in the courtroom that all respondents had the right to one continuance. The court also informed the participants that the court had reviewed all of the documents filed in the case, including the petitions in support of the requested restraining orders, and would consider that information as a part of the evidence in each case. The court considered Pelton's and Mendez's petitions at the same time because they both involved similar allegations against Wilson, and all of the parties live in the same mobile home park. Pelton, Mendez and Wilson were placed under oath at the beginning of the hearing.
There was no court reporter for the contested hearing in this matter. The facts are taken from the settled statement presented in this appeal.
The evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that Mendez and Wilson's homes are on the same side of the street and are separated by one home, which is adjacent to carports on both sides. Pelton lives farther away from Wilson and works in the park along with Mendez. Pelton presented a video to the court of an incident involving Wilson. At the time, Wilson said: "I have the exact same video," and she held out her phone. Pelton filmed the video while a new home was being delivered to the park. The efforts to deliver the new home temporarily blocked an exit to the park. Wilson was frustrated that she could not get out of the mobile home park and began to yell at the people facilitating the delivery, including Pelton. The video showed that Wilson came very close to Pelton's face a number of times, and sneered at him. She "violated any notion of basic 'personal space.' " She started doing jumping jacks, singing and doing karate kicks and jabs. During the incident, Pelton thought that Wilson might hit him. After viewing the video, the court stated: "That's certainly in your face, isn't it?" The settled statement indicates, "The videos showed, in a way that words cannot, how intrusive and harassing [Wilson's] behavior was." Pelton stated that whenever Wilson approaches him, he suffers anxiety attacks. Pelton lives and works in fear due to Wilson's behavior toward him.
Mendez supplemented her petition at the contested hearing with a video that was taken at night and depicted Wilson holding a flashlight and a lighted flame torch. Wilson was walking around a home and waving the torch at the steps of the home that appeared to be wooden. Wilson testified that she was "smudging," which she said was similar to a Native American ritual to ward off evil spirits. The court stated that someone seeing her waiving a torch around a home might reasonably think Wilson was "trying to set fire to something" or was going to commit arson. Mendez is afraid for her safety due to Wilson's behavior. Mendez is consumed with anxiety and she is afraid to leave her home for fear of seeing Wilson.
After Pelton and Mendez presented their cases, the court asked Wilson if there was anything that she would like the court to consider. Wilson said that she had a police report detailing an incident between her and Pelton. The court noted that the Capitola police report that referred to contact between her and Pelton was already attached to Pelton's petition. Wilson did not offer any additional evidence.
The court found that Pelton and Mendez had met their burden of proof and granted their requests for restraining orders. The court included in the protective orders the following members of Pelton's family who lived with him: Tiffinee Lynnn Pelton (daughter), Andrew Jess Pederson (son-in-law), Mackenzee Lee Pederson (granddaughter), Jason Dean Pederson (grandson) and Ashlee Irene Pelton (daughter), as additional protected persons.
Wilson objected at the contested hearing to the restraining orders on the ground that they would prevent her from coming to her own home. The court discussed with the parties how to best accomplish the intent of the orders while still respecting Wilson's ability to go to and from her home. The court asked that one of the parties draw a map of the mobile home park to clarify what specific restrictions would be placed on Wilson.
The court used a map that had been drawn by Mendez in crafting the order. The court specifically ordered that Wilson could be in her home and her carport, without respect to distance from any of the protected persons. The court ordered Wilson to stay 100 feet away from any of the protected persons if she saw them in public or within the park. Mendez and Pelton had requested that Wilson stay 50 yards from them. The court further ordered that if Wilson was to encounter any protected person while she was coming into or leaving from the park, she was to go directly to her own home or leave the park. The court ordered that Wilson was not permitted to go to the park office, because both Pelton and Mendez work there. The court also prohibited Wilson from using the common dumpster for the park.
The court specifically allowed Wilson to use the park laundry room and mailbox. The court also allowed Wilson access to pedestrian short-cuts and certain walkways to walk her dog.
The court declined Mendez's request that Wilson's daughter be enjoined by the protective order as well, noting that it only had jurisdiction over the parties. However, the court did note that Wilson cannot use any third party to contact Pelton or Mendez.
Pelton's and Mendez's restraining orders were imposed for a period of five years. Wilson filed timely notices of appeal from both orders.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Civil Harassment Injunctions and the Standard of Review
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that "[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment in this section." The statute was enacted " 'to protect the individual's right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.' " (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.)
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) defines " '[h]arassment' " as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner." A " '[c]redible threat of violence' " is defined as "a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) " 'Unlawful violence' " is defined as "any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(7).)
A " '[c]ourse of conduct' " is defined as a "pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer mail. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.' " (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
We review the trial court's decision granting a restraining order for substantial evidence. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 (Harris).) " 'The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court's entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the record. [Citation.] But whether the facts, when construed most favorably in [petitioner's] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review. [Citation.]" (Ibid. at p. 497.) "[When] assessing whether substantial evidence supports the requisite elements of willful harassment, as defined in . . . section 527.6, we review the evidence before the trial court in accordance with the customary rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 (Schild).) Appealed judgments and orders are presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Wilson argues broadly that the restraining orders against her are not supported by sufficient evidence. However, within this broad argument, she asserts that the record is not adequate for appellate review in part because there was no court reporter at the hearing, certain evidence was inadmissible and should not have been considered by the trial court, and the orders are unconstitutional. We discuss each of these issues separately.
B. Adequacy of the Record on Appeal
Wilson contends that the record is inadequate for appellate review and that she is entitled to reversal as a result. Here, the parties stipulated to a settled statement because there was no official court reporter to record the trial proceedings. "A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by the superior court." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a).) Moreover, "Any evidence or portion of a proceeding not included will be presumed to support the judgment or order appealed from." (Id., rule 8.137(d)(2)(A).)
In her opening briefs in both matters, Wilson represents that she has augmented the record and requested judicial notice of the "[t]he hearing on the settlement of the oral argument proceedings" in this court. We note that Wilson has not filed a motion to augment the record or to request judicial notice of these proceedings in either appeal.
Specifically, Wilson asserts that Pelton's cell phone video that was considered by the trial court should have been included in the record so that it could be reviewed by this court on appeal. She concludes that the absence of the video from the appellate record renders the record inadequate for review. However, there is nothing in the settled statement indicating that Wilson requested that the video be made part of the record during the contested hearing, or indeed, when the settled statement was created. We note that she also had the video on her phone, so could have provided a copy to the court for admission into evidence and the record. It is Wilson's burden as the appellant to provide an adequate record for appellate review. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant. (Id. at pp. 1295-1296.)
1. Lack of Court Reporter at Trial
Wilson also argues that she "has been denied due process and equal protection as a result of there being no court reporter or other means to obtain a verbatim transcript of the trial." Wilson asserts that without a reporter's transcript, she "is facing up to 18 months in county jail along with social stigma, loss of job opportunities, and negative effect on her life without any ability to meaningfully challenge, in the criminal court, the facts on which the order was issued." Wilson further asserts that the Santa Cruz County Superior Court failed to follow its own local court rules regarding court reporters and failed to follow the California Rules of Court when it did not provide a court reporter for her trial.
On May 4, 2017, this court granted Wilson's request for judicial notice of a criminal complaint and minute order filed in Santa Cruz County Superior Court Case No. 16CR06864. The complaint alleges that Wilson violated the civil harassment restraining order protecting Mendez on three occasions in 2016. (Pen. Code § 166, subd. (a)(4).) The minute order dated March 22, 2017 reflects that the superior court continued the criminal matter against Wilson pending the outcome of this appeal.
We agree with Wilson regarding the importance of a court reporter in trial court proceedings. The impact of budgetary reductions state wide on the trial court's ability to provide court reporters on a regular basis in civil proceedings is a matter of tremendous concern to courts of review. In the recent case of Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 (Jameson), the California Supreme Court noted that "[T]he absence of a court reporter at trial court proceedings and the resulting lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant's ability to have his or her claims of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court. This is so because it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Id. at pp. 608-609.)
In Jameson, the plaintiff was a prison inmate who brought an action against a prison physician for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court had adopted a policy that the court would not provide court reporters for most civil trials, even for persons who qualified for a fee waiver, and that parties who wished a court reporter must hire and pay for one. The plaintiff could not afford a private court reporter and the doctor did not hire one either. As a result, no reporter's transcript was prepared of the trial. The plaintiff appeared by telephone from state prison and a jury was impanelled. At the conclusion of opening statements, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's suit based on defendant's two motions. The clerk's record on appeal included minute orders, but no verbatim transcript and no settled statement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment on appeal, finding that plaintiff's legal contentions were not cognizable in the absence of a court reporter's transcript. The plaintiff argued that the absence of a reporter's transcript was not a proper ground for upholding the trial court judgment, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a local court policy requiring all parties to pay the costs related to court reporter services for civil cases and other matters in which the court does not provide official court reporters must contain an exception for fee waiver recipients. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 623.)
We fully endorse the Supreme Court's concern regarding the importance of a verbatim transcript in trial proceedings. We are also particularly concerned about the lack of court reporters for proceedings that may ultimately affect a party's liberty interests, such as the civil harassment restraining order hearing in the present case. (See fn. 5, ante.) However, we do not find the lack of a court reporter in this instance to be a basis to reverse the trial court's orders for the reasons we explain below.
2. Local and State Rules of Court
Wilson argues that the Santa Cruz County Superior Court was required by its own local rule to provide a court reporter, because the case involves a restraining order, and that she is entitled to relief as a result because a reporter was not provided to her. In support of this argument, Wilson cites the Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 3.7.01, which provides: "The family court does not provide a court reporter in family law matters, except when possible a reporter will be provided for DCSS and restraining order matters. If you would like to have a court reporter present you will need to hire and pay all costs associated with the reporter." Wilson argues that because this matter involved a restraining order, rule 3.7.01 required that a reporter be provided.
The Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 3.7.01 was in effect at the time of the trial in this case in 2016. It was revoked on January 1, 2018 and incorporated into the Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 9.1.02, which provides, in relevant part: "2. Official court reporters are not provided in departments assigned to the following subject matters: [¶] . . . [¶] Unlimited civil trials, [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Procurement of Private Court Reporter: For matters where the court does not provide a court reporter due to unavailability, any party who desires a verbatim record of a court proceeding must arrange for or hire a private certified court reporter pro tempore to report any scheduled hearing or trial."
Wilson also cites In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1 (Obrecht), wherein this court addressed the Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 3.7.01. In Obrecht we stated, "We are deeply troubled by the trial court's policy of conducting all family law matters without a reporter unless a reporter is engaged by one or both parties at their own expense." (Obrecht, supra, at p. 9, fn. 3.) Wilson makes note of the fact that the present case was conducted in the same department of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court as the one in which Obrecht was heard.
In citing the Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 3.7.01 and Obrecht, Wilson overlooks the fact that the present case was conducted in the civil division of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court where different court rules apply. Specifically, the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County Local Rule that applied to this civil case in 2016 was rule 9.1.03, which stated: "The Santa Cruz Superior Court does not provide official court reporters for civil trials. The party or parties desiring an official court reporter must arrange for or hire an official court reporter for any civil trials." (Italics added.) The court thus did follow the proper local rule for Wilson's civil trial.
The Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 9.1.03 was in effect at the time of the trial in this case in 2016. It was revoked on January 1, 2018 and incorporated into the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 9.1.02, as stated in footnote 6, ante. --------
In addition to her argument that Santa Cruz County Superior Court failed to follow its own local rules, Wilson asserts that the court failed to follow the California Rules of Court. Specifically, she cites California Rules of Court, rule 2.956, which provides, in relevant part: "(1) Local policy to be adopted and posted: [¶] Each trial court must adopt and post in the clerk's office a local policy enumerating the departments in which the services of official court reporters are normally available, and the departments in which the services of official court reporters are not normally available during regular court hours. If the services of official court reporters are normally available in a department only for certain types of matters, those matters must be identified in the policy." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(1).) The rule further states: "Instead of publishing the policy, the court may: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Adopt the policy as a local rule." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(2)(B).) Finally, the rule provides: "(3) Requests for official court reporter for civil trials and notices to parties: [¶] Unless the court's policy states that all courtrooms normally have the services of official court reporters available for civil trials, the court must require that each party file a statement before the trial date indicating whether the party requests the presence of an official court reporter. If a party requests the presence of an official court reporter and it appears that none will be available, the clerk must notify the party of that fact as soon as possible before the trial. If the services of official court reporters are normally available in all courtrooms, the clerk must notify the parties to a civil trial as soon as possible if it appears that those services will not be available." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(3).)
Wilson argues that the court failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 2.956, because it did not provide "fair warning that there will not be a court reporter" for her trial. However, we note that the court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 in 2016 by providing notice of the lack of court reporters for civil trials in the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 9.1.03.
Wilson also complains that the court violated California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 when it failed to require each party to file a statement before trial indicating whether the party requests a court reporter, stating: "a review of the Santa Cruz County local forms show[s] that there is [not] even a form available to warn litigants that they must provide a statement regarding a possible use of a court reporter." However, the portion of the rule requiring each party to file a statement before trial is not the means by which a party is notified that a court reporter will not be available as Wilson suggests. That notice is accomplished by the other provisions in California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 requiring the court to adopt a policy and post that policy in the clerk's office and to either notify parties of the policy or adopt the policy as a local rule. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(1) & (2)(B).) Santa Cruz County Superior Court complied with these provisions by adopting a policy as a local rule that itself notified parties that court reporters were not provided in civil trials. (See Super. Ct. Santa Cruz County, Local Rules, rule 9.1.03.)
Wilson had notice through the court rules that there would be no court reporter for her civil trial in this case. The Superior Court of Santa Cruz, Local Rules, rule 9.1.03 clearly stated that there are no court reporters provided in Santa Cruz County Superior Court for civil trials. California Rules of Court, rule 2.956(c) provides the requirement for procuring a court reporter as follows: "If the services of an official court reporter are not available for a hearing or trial in a civil case, a party may arrange for the presence of a certified shorthand reporter to serve as an official pro tempore reporter. It is the party's responsibility to pay the reporter's fees for attendance at the proceedings, but the expense may be recoverable as part of the costs, as provided by law." There is nothing in the record indicating that Wilson ever requested the services of a court reporter or requested that the court waive fees for a reporter, or that she applied to defend her case in forma pauperis.
Finally, the court told the parties on the day of trial that they could request a one-time continuance "perhaps to consult with an attorney or to get their affairs in order. The reason did not matter." Wilson did not request a continuance of the trial to secure the services of a court reporter.
We recognize that it is well established under the law that litigants are not exempt from knowledge of the rules because they are representing themselves. "Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] '[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.].' " (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) An attorney is charged with knowledge of the rules of court, and consequently, so is a self-represented litigant.
With that knowledge, we also recognize the reality that civil harassment restraining order proceedings are largely conducted by self-represented litigants who have little choice but to represent themselves because of the financial constraints attendant on hiring an attorney. These litigants might not have the knowledge or resources to access the state and local rules of court, which in this case provided notice of the lack of court reporters for the hearings. Under circumstances where the court calendar consists of civil harassment restraining order proceedings or other matters that are largely conducted by self-represented litigants, rather than rely solely on the court rules, a better practice would be for the court to provide explicit oral notice at the beginning of the hearing that no court reporter will be provided so that each litigant can make an informed choice to proceed or not without an official transcription of the proceedings. This would have been particularly useful here, as the court was prepared under the statute to grant one continuance to a litigant in any event. However, in this case, given the existence of a settled statement, and the fact that Wilson presented no evidence in opposition to respondents' petitions, we find no error from any lack of notice that compels reversal on that basis here.
3. Due Process
As we are aware from Jameson, it does not necessarily follow that because the trial court employed the proper the local rule and California Rule of Court that a litigant's right to due process was honored. Wilson argues that the lack of a reporter's transcript violates her due process rights because she cannot effectively challenge the criminal charges against her for violating the restraining order protecting Mendez under Penal Code section 166, subd. (a)(4).
As Wilson correctly notes, a criminal defendant is entitled to defend against charges that she has violated a restraining order on the ground the injunction she is accused of violating is void as unconstitutional on its face. (People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804.) This is because a void order cannot be the basis for a valid contempt judgment. (In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147.) Thus, the defendant, who is the contemnor, may collaterally challenge the validity of the order he or she is charged with violating. (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (2984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 327.)
However, in this instance, we find that the absence of a reporter's transcript does not violate Wilson's due process rights. The parties entered into a settled statement that contains substantial evidence to support the protective orders in this case. Wilson did not file a response or present evidence in opposition to the issuance of the restraining orders. Rather, she objected to the reach of the order, an argument well documented along with its resolution in the settled statement. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the absence of a court reporter's transcript constitutes a violation of Wilson's due process rights.
C. Admissibility of Evidence
Wilson further argues that the court should not have considered certain evidence during the trial. Specifically, Wilson identifies three letters that she had written that were included in Pelton's and Mendez's petitions. One letter was written to the other homeowners in the mobile home park disparaging Mendez as a member of a cult and asking if anyone was interested in pursuing litigation against her. The remaining two letters were written to the Castle Mobile Homes, and Haven Management Services stating that Mendez had acted inappropriately in her work as the park's manager, and that Pelton had assaulted Wilson. Wilson argues that the letters should not have been considered to support the restraining order because doing so infringed on her First Amendment right to free speech, and violated her privilege as set forth in Civil Code section 47 subdivisions (b) and (c).
In addition to the three letters, Wilson argues that the court should not have considered her actions of chalking biblical scriptures on the ground, carrying a lit torch around one of the homes in an attempt to "smudge" evil spirits, and posting scripture by the communal mailbox, because all of these actions were an exercise of her religious freedom.
Finally, Wilson maintains that the court improperly considered Pelton's and Mendez's petitions together and did not conduct a "question or answer format at the trial." Wilson asserts that the trial court's procedural error resulted in an inability to determine what evidence was used to support each of the restraining orders in this case.
It does not appear from the settled statement that Wilson objected to the admission of any of the evidence presented at trial, nor does it appear that she objected to the court proceeding on both petitions during the same hearing. We will not consider procedural defects or allegedly erroneous rulings when an objection could have been but was not raised in the trial court by some appropriate method. (Children's Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 776 (Children's Hospital).) The purpose of this doctrine is to encourage a party to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264.) "It is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an alleged error on appeal where it could easily have been corrected at trial." (Children's Hospital, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 776.)
Even if the items of evidence Wilson found objectionable were admitted in error, however, the evidence separate and apart from that evidence is sufficient to support the issuance of the civil harassment restraining orders protecting Mendez and Pelton. The descriptions provided by each party of Wilson's reckless driving alone, as stated in their respective petitions and in the settled statement, establish a pattern of conduct that any reasonable person would find disturbing. Both Pelton and Mendez described Wilson using her car to tailgate them, and driving erratically and veering so that each of them felt fearful within the mobile home park when they were walking on foot. Mendez also described Wilson screaming at her for extended periods of time and directing obscenities at her. Pelton testified that Wilson admitted that she tried to run him over and tried to kill him with her car. She also stated on a separate occasion that she had attempted to run him over and that it "could have been murder with no witnesses." Wilson did not file a written response to the petitions, and neither testified nor offered rebutting evidence to Mendez's or Pelton's accounts of the events. The trial court was well within its discretion to find that this evidence alone, without any of the evidence that Wilson now contends was inadmissible, provided support for a finding of both a credible threat of violence and a course of conduct under section 527.6 justifying the issuance of separate restraining orders protecting Mendez and Pelton.
D. Substantial Evidence of Emotional Distress
In order for a course of conduct to justify the issuance of an injunction under section 527.6, that conduct "must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress . . . to the petitioner." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) "Section 527.6 does not define the phrase 'substantial emotional distress.' However, in the analogous context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase 'severe emotional distress' means highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish 'from socially unacceptable conduct' [citation], which entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that 'no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.' [Citations.]" (Schild, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762-763.)
Wilson claims that there is insufficient evidence that Pelton or Mendez suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of her actions or that a reasonable person would have suffered substantial emotional distress under the circumstances. In particular, she argues that the evidence of emotional distress is insufficient because neither Pelton nor Mendez offered "direct testimony" that he or she suffered any distress.
As an initial matter, we note that it is not necessary that there be direct testimony presented by a person seeking a restraining order that he or she suffered emotional distress as a result of the harassment to justify the issuance of the order. If the evidence otherwise raises an inference of such distress, it is sufficient to support an injunction. (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110-1111.) Here, however, both Pelton and Mendez included statements in their petitions regarding the emotional distress they were each experiencing, and the petitions were considered by the court in its decision to issue the restraining orders. Specifically, Pelton stated that whenever Wilson approaches him, he suffers anxiety attacks and he lives and works in fear due to Wilson's behavior toward him. Mendez stated that she is afraid for her safety due to Wilson's behavior and is consumed with anxiety. We agree with the trial court that Pelton's and Mendez's anxiety and fear qualified as "highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish," that was caused by Wilson's " 'socially unacceptable conduct.' " (Schild, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762-763.) In addition, " 'no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure' " continual verbal taunting, stalking, or threats from aggressive driving near home or near a place of employment, as Pelton and Mendez have. (Ibid.)
E. Additional Protected Persons
Wilson asserts that the court erred when it included five additional protected individuals in the injunction because "[t]here is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that Wilson has engaged in any acts involving these additional individuals."
Section 527.6, subdivision (c), provides: "In the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, a temporary restraining order or injunction issued under this section may include other named family or household members." The injunction entered by the trial court in this case listed Pelton's family members, Tiffinee Lynnn Pelton (daughter), Andrew Jess Pederson (son-in-law), Mackenzee Lee Pederson (granddaughter), Jason Dean Pederson (grandson) and Ashlee Irene Pelton (daughter), as additional protected persons. Pelton stated in his petition that all of the individuals except his grandson Jason help him with his work in the mobile home park where Wilson has been continually harassing him, and that his family members do not want to be harassed.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the restraining order to include Pelton's family members. Wilson, Pelton and Pelton's family all live in the same mobile park. Pelton works in the mobile home park, and his family helps him with his work. Wilson has harassed Pelton while he is working at the mobile home park. The proximity of Pelton's family to Wilson in the mobile home park, coupled with their participation in Pelton's work at the mobile home park support a finding of good cause to include them as additional protected persons pursuant to section 527.6, subdivision (c).
F. Wilson's Right to Travel and Association
Wilson argues that the civil harassment orders in this case unconstitutionally limit her First Amendment rights to travel and free association. Specifically, Wilson asserts that the restriction that she only drive to and from her residence limits her ability to visit other members of the park because it confines her to her home, and restricts her ability to check on maintenance in the park, to assemble other park members for a meeting at a club house or to visit persons at their homes in the park. Wilson claims that she "has been placed on what is—essentially—house arrest."
By its nature, a restraining order impacts the restrained party's right to move about freely and thus impacts that person's constitutional rights. (People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 882.) The court is obligated to craft an order that protects the aggrieved parties while intruding on any constitutional right only to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate that protection (See, e.g, In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 149 ["[l]ike all constitutional rights the right to free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest."]; People Ex Rel Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 22.) Whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, is " '[a] question[] of law subject to de novo review. [Citation.]' " (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.)
We find that the trial court crafted the orders in this case under difficult circumstances. We note that Wilson's behavior was not only intrusive, but dangerous to the protected parties. By issuing the orders, the trial court found that Wilson used her car as a weapon and engaged in reckless conduct with fire that threatened the mobile home park with structural damage. The court's finding that Wilson harassed the protected parties and caused them to be fearful of her is supported by substantial evidence.
However, reviewing the orders de novo, while we find that their issuance was justified in this case, we also find that they are not crafted in such a way that provides Wilson with clear notice of their proscriptions. Wilson and the protected persons all live in the same mobile home park in close proximity to one another. Under these circumstances, the orders must be very specific to ensure not only that the protected persons are safe, but also that Wilson has clear notice of where she can and cannot go within the mobile home park. With regard to the roads where Wilson can travel, the orders include a hand-drawn map of the park, as well as the following requirements: "Ms. Wilson may drive the streets marked in yellow on the attached map (Attachment 10A) but no other roads in the mobile home park. Ms. Wilson may go to her own mobile home and her own carport but no farther." We note that in the record before us, there are no yellow markings on the map, making it impossible for us to determine the limitations of her travel on the roads within the park. In addition, the provision that she may go to her own home and carport "but no farther" is vague, and does not specify the distance or direction from her home that would be considered too far.
The orders are also vague with regard to her contact with the protected persons. The orders state: "If Ms. Wilson is on her way to or from her home, and she sees Mr. Pelton or Ms. Mendez [or any of the protected persons], Ms. Wilson must proceed directly on her way, either to her home or out of the mobile home park, and may not speak to the others in any way." The way this provision is worded, depending on the location of any of the protected persons whom Wilson might come upon, it could be impossible for her to "continue on her way" to her home or out of the park without violating the 100-foot distance limitation stated in the order.
Finally, adding to the orders' confusion, the minute order from the contested hearing and the representations in the settled statement are inconsistent with the protective orders themselves. For example, the minute order states that Wilson is "allowed to use the park laundry room and mailbox," however, the protective orders do not include these allowances. The settled statement provides that Wilson is permitted to "access the pedestrian short cuts or certain walkways to walk her dog," however, this allowance is also not included in the protective orders. In addition, the settled statement provides that Wilson is not permitted to go to the park office or the common garbage dumpster, but the protective orders do not state this prohibition.
While we find that there is substantial evidence to support the protective orders in this case, we find that the orders are impermissibly vague, and do not provide adequate notice to Wilson of the specific proscriptions on her travel and behavior to satisfy constitutional requirements. The evidence shows that Wilson harassed and endangered the protected parties and the court correctly issued protective orders. However, the matters must be remanded for the court to craft orders that accurately reflect all of the provisions discussed at the contested hearing, and to provide Wilson with clear notice of what she is permitted to do and prohibited from doing.
III. DISPOSITION
The civil harassment restraining orders in case numbers H043834 and H043835 are reversed, and the matters are remanded for the sole and limited purpose of issuing new orders that meet constitutional requirements of clarity, precision and notice.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/_________
Premo, J.
/s/_________
Grover, J.