"It is the insurer's burden to affirmatively demonstrate the applicability of an exclusion." Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 267 (2006). "Exclusion provisions that limit or exclude coverage must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer."

Under Illinois law, the term "accident" means "an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character." Pekin Ins. Co. v. Miller, 854 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ill.App.Ct. 2006) (internal quotations omitted); accord Lyerla v. AMCO Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 688-89 (7th Cir. 2008); Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Vic Koenig Leasing Co., 136 F.3d 1116, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "[t]he natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident."

Under Illinois law, "[i]t is the insurer's burden to affirmatively demonstrate the applicability of an exclusion." Pekin Ins. Co. v. Mller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "[e]xclusion provisions that limit or exclude coverage must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer."

Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883-84. {¶ 35} An Illinois intermediate court also decided a case with facts that are similar to this case in Pekin Ins. Co. v. Miller (Ill.App. 2006), 854 N.E.2d 693. Ken Miller operated a tree cutting service and was retained to remove trees from Lots 13, 14, and 15 in a subdivision. Miller mistakenly cleared trees from lots 10, 11, and 12, and the owners of these lots sued him.

Burlington's position is that because we now know that at least part of RDP's work order did encompass working on the entire dryer (including the dryer's shell), Willett has more applicability than it did in my previous ruling. In further support of its position, Burlington cites another Illinois appellate court case, Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 854 N.E.2d 693 (Ill.App. 2006), that addressed the related j(5) exclusion. In Miller, the issue was whether a CGL policy provided coverage when the insured contractor mistakenly cut down trees from the wrong property.

The insurer has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the applicability of an exclusion. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 267 (2006). Further, exclusion provisions which limit or exclude coverage must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.

The duty to defend arises if the complaint's allegations, when construed liberally in favor of the insured, fall within or potentially fall within the policy's coverage provisions. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 193, 355 N.E.2d at 28; Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 265, 854 N.E.2d 693, 695-96 (2006). If recovery is premised on several theories of liability, the insurer is obligated to defend as long as one of the theories might possibly fall within the scope of coverage. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 194, 355 N.E.2d at 28.

¶ 34 In Illinois, it is the insurer's burden to affirmatively demonstrate the applicability of an exclusion. Insurance Corp. of Hanover v. Shelborne Associates, 389 Ill.App.3d 795, 799, 329 Ill.Dec. 138, 905 N.E.2d 976 (2009); see also Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill.App.3d 263, 267, 305 Ill.Dec. 101, 854 N.E.2d 693 (2006). “Exclusion provisions that limit or exclude coverage must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”

As the majority point out, the all-risk homeowner's insurance policy issued to Gulino provided that Economy “will pay for sudden and accidental direct physical loss or damage to the property * * * except as excluded in Section I—Losses We Do Not Cover.” It is well established that “[t]he natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident.” Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill.App.3d 263, 266, 305 Ill.Dec. 101, 854 N.E.2d 693 (2006), (quoting Monticello Insurance Co. v. Wil–Freds Construction, Inc., 277 Ill.App.3d 697, 703, 214 Ill.Dec. 597, 661 N.E.2d 451 (1996)). ¶ 32 In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit involving an insurer's failure to pay a claim under an all-risk insurance policy, an insured bears the initial burden of presenting sufficient facts establishing a prima facie case.

" It is well established that "[t]he natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident." Pekin Insurance Co. v. Miller, 367 Ill. App. 3d 263, 266 (2006), (quoting Monticello Insurance Co. v. Wil-Freds Construction, Inc., 277 Ill. App. 3d 697, 703 (1996)). ¶ 32 In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit involving an insurer's failure to pay a claim under an all-risk insurance policy, an insured bears the initial burden of presenting sufficient facts establishing a prima facie case.