Opinion
06 Civ. 6910 (SAS).
March 30, 2007
Plaintiff (Pro Se): H.E. Elya Peker, Brooklyn, New York.
Counsel for Defendant: Lawrence Heath Fogelman, Assistant United States Attorney, New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
H.E. Elya Peker brought this action seeking to hold Anna Steglich, a Deputy Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Steglich" or "Government"), liable for damage to, and loss of, his art posters. The Government moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. On March 5, 2007 (the "March 5 Opinion"), this Court granted the Government's motion. Peker now moves for reconsideration. For the following reasons, Peker's motion is denied.
See Peker v. Steglich, No. 06 Civ. 6910, 2007 WL 683796 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2007).
II. BACKGROUND
The background to this action is set forth in the March 5 Opinion, and familiarity with that opinion is assumed. For purposes of clarity, the relevant facts will be restated. Peker alleges that Steglich damaged his large art posters when she folded them so they would fit into the court's document folder. Peker first sought compensation for this damage from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which denied his claim in full. Peker then commenced this action. In the March 5 Opinion, this Court dismissed Peker's claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Rule 6.3 and is appropriate where "the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Local Rule 6.3 must be "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." A court should deny a motion for reconsideration when the movant "seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." The restrictive application of Local Rule 6.3 helps "to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters."
In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
DGM Invs., Inc. v. New York Futures Exch., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
Naiman v. New York Univ. Hosps. Ctr., No. 95 Civ. 6469, 2005 WL 926904, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Peker makes three arguments in support of his motion for reconsideration. First, he argues that this Court "overlooked and ignored that art reproductions are not documents, and damaging them is vandalism, a criminal offense." Second, he contends that this Court inappropriately applied qualified immunity to clerks of court. Third, Peker alleges that this Court erred in substituting the Government as the defendant in place of Steglich. None of these arguments is persuasive.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 1.
See id. at 4.
See id.
I surely agree that the damage to Peker's art reproductions is "a shame"; however, as I noted in my March 5 Opinion, "[A] court clerk acting within the scope of [her] official duties enjoys at least qualified immunity from suit." Peker does not point to any controlling law contradicting this proposition. Peker only notes that qualified immunity "was originally made for law enforcement officers, like policeman [sic], not for clerks of court (to defend deputy clerk's criminal offense)." While it may be true that qualified immunity was originally applied to law enforcement officers, it is also true that clerks performing ministerial functions are entitled to qualified immunity.
Id. at 3.
Kitchen v. Doe, No. 88 Civ. 7885, 1991 WL 4730, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1991).
Motion for Reconsideration at 4.
See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Vergari, 499 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Ministerial conduct enjoys only a qualified immunity.").
Peker does not support his request not to substitute the Government as the defendant in this matter with any controlling decision or facts that the Court overlooked. As noted in this Court's March 5 Opinion, the substitution is proper because the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York certified that Steglich was acting within the scope of her duties when the incident occurred.
See Motion for Reconsideration at 4 ("I request the following: . . . not to substitute the government as defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2674.").
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) ("Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.").
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Peker's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [Docket No. 20] and this case.
SO ORDERED: