Opinion
No. 339620
05-17-2018
DANIEL PEIFFER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CENTRAL MICHIGAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED Gratiot Circuit Court
LC No. 2017-000179-AH Before: MURRAY, C.J., and SERVITTO and BOONSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals by leave granted from the circuit court's order denying his complaint for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
See Peiffer v Central Mich Correctional Facility Warden, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 16, 2017 (Docket Nos. 339620, 340453).
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner was convicted in the Clinton Circuit Court of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (third offense) (OUIL-III), MCL 257.625(10)(c), and driving while license suspended (DWLS), MCL 257.904(3)(a). The circuit court sentenced petitioner, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 3 to 6 years' imprisonment for the OUIL-III conviction and six months' imprisonment for the DWLS conviction.
Petitioner appealed by right his criminal convictions, and this Court affirmed. People v Peiffer, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 28, 2016 (Docket No. 325148). In that appeal, we set forth the following facts underlying his arrest:
Clinton County Sheriff's Department Deputy Andrew Wiswasser testified that at approximately 11:30 p.m. on April 18, 2014, while conducting a routine patrol of the area, his attention was drawn to a fast-moving Dodge pickup truck traveling in the opposite direction of his vehicle on Hubbardston Road.
Wiswasser then engaged his moving radar and concluded that the truck was traveling 50 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone. Wiswasser made a U-turn and attempted to catch up to the truck. The truck "accelerated rapidly," made two turns, and abruptly stopped in a driveway. Wiswasser stopped behind the truck, ready to jump out of his car.
Wiswasser testified that as he exited his patrol car, defendant was already out of the truck; believing that defendant was going to run, Wiswasser drew his gun and ordered defendant to stop. Defendant complied, stating, "you got me." According to Wiswasser, defendant stated that he was coming from a party where he had a few drinks and "he was just trying to get home." Wiswasser testified that he "smelled the odor of intoxicants" and had defendant complete a series of field sobriety evaluations. Wiswasser explained that he observed several signs in defendant's performance that are indicative of intoxication. Wiswasser then arrested defendant and took him to jail, where pursuant to a search warrant, defendant's blood was drawn and tested. The results revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.159 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. [Id. at 1-2.]
In his appeal by right, petitioner did not argue that Deputy Wiswasser was outside his proper jurisdiction, Clinton County, when he stopped petitioner's vehicle. Rather, petitioner argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to investigate and failed to call his alibi witness at trial, failed to object to a statement by the prosecutor during closing argument, failed to advise him that he was ineligible for boot camp, and failed to object to statements contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. Id. at 2-4. Petitioner also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the driver of the truck stopped by Deputy Wiswasser. Id. at 5.
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal from this Court's decision upholding his criminal conviction, petitioner filed a verified complaint for writ of habeas corpus in the Gratiot Circuit Court, arguing that a radical jurisdictional defect existed because Deputy Wiswasser had stopped petitioner in Ionia County, rather than Clinton County. The circuit court ordered respondent to show cause in writing or by dispositive motion why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued, and respondent filed a brief in the circuit court opposing petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dispensing with a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying petitioner's complaint for writ of habeas corpus, relying on MCL 762.3(1), which provides:
Any offense committed on the boundary line of 2 counties, or within 1 mile of the dividing line between them, may be alleged in the indictment to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished in either county.The circuit court summarized its understanding of the statute by stating that either county could prosecute a person for a crime that occurs between the two counties. The circuit court acknowledged that defendant was arrested in Ionia County but stated that Hubbardston Road, where the offense occurred, ran along the boundary line of Clinton and Ionia Counties. Because the circuit court concluded that Clinton County possessed jurisdiction to prosecute and punish petitioner under this statute, it concluded that petitioner's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus was without legal merit.
This appeal by leave granted followed.
Although petitioner was paroled on October 24, 2017, he remains in the legal custody and control of the Department of Corrections until the termination of his sentence. See People v Holder, 483 Mich 168, 172-173; 767 NW2d 423 (2009). Therefore, his appeal is not moot. See Morales v Mich Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 32-33; 676 NW2d 221 (2003).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the construction of court rules and statutes as a question of law. People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 231; 769 NW2d 605 (2009). We also review de novo constitutional questions, such as the determination of whether a radical defect in jurisdiction exists. People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 124; 748 NW2d 859 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by failing to find that respondent's noncompliance with MCR 3.303(N) required his immediate release, by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on his habeas corpus petition, and by denying habeas corpus relief on the ground that no radical defect in jurisdiction existed. We disagree in all respects.
A. RESPONDENT'S COMPLIANCE WITH MCR 3.303(N)
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.303(N) in the circuit court and that respondent's filing of a nonconforming answer to his complaint requires petitioner's immediate release from custody under MCL 600.4352(1). We disagree.
"A prisoner's right to file a complaint for habeas corpus is guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution." Morales v Mich Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 40; 676 NW2d 221 (2003). "Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, the main purpose of which is to cause the release of persons illegally confined and to inquire into the authority by which a person is detained." Trayer v Kent Co Sheriff, 104 Mich App 32, 34; 304 NW2d 11 (1981). "An action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this state." MCL 600.4307. "Application for the writ of habeas corpus is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made in a new and independent civil action instituted to enforce a civil right, the right to liberty." People v McCager, 367 Mich 116, 121; 116 NW2d 205 (1962). The judicial proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus "is not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into the right to liberty notwithstanding the act." Id.
A complaint for habeas corpus is designed to test the legality of detaining an individual and restraining him of his liberty. If a legal basis for detention is lacking, a judge must order the release of the detainee from confinement. However, the writ of habeas corpus deals only with radical defects which render a judgment or proceeding absolutely void. A radical defect in jurisdiction contemplates . . . an act or omission by state authorities that clearly contravenes an express legal requirement in existence at the time of the act or omission. [Morales, 260 Mich App at 40 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
MCR 3.303(N) dictates what is required in a respondent's answer to a complaint for writ of habeas corpus. It provides:
(1) Contents of Answer; Contempt. The defendant or person served must obey the writ or order to show cause or show good cause for not doing so, and must answer the writ or order to show cause within the time allowed. Failure to file an answer is contempt. The answer must state plainly and unequivocally
(a) whether the defendant then has, or at any time has had, the prisoner under his or her control and, if so, the reason; and
(b) if the prisoner has been transferred, to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason or authority for the transfer.
(2) Exhibits. If the prisoner is detained because of a writ, warrant, or other written authority, a copy must be attached to the answer as an exhibit, and the original must be produced at the hearing. If an order under subrule (E) requires it, the answer must be accompanied by the certified transcript of the record and proceedings.
(3) Verification. The answer must be signed by the person answering, and, except when the person is a sworn public officer and answers in his or her official capacity, it must be verified by oath.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.303(N) because (1) respondent filed a brief, rather than an answer, in response to petitioner's complaint; (2) respondent's brief did not satisfy many of the mandates of MCR 3.303(N), including addressing the reason for petitioner's confinement; and (3) respondent's brief was neither signed by the person answering nor verified by an oath. Petitioner further argues that a respondent's failure to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.303(N) triggers the requirement set forth in MCL 600.4352(1) that the circuit court must discharge the petitioner from confinement.
Petitioner's argument is without merit. Assuming that respondent failed to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.303(N) by filing a nonconforming answer, such a failure does not empower a circuit court to order a prisoner's release from confinement.
MCL 600.4352 provides for the discharge of a prisoner as follows:
(1) If no legal cause is shown for the restraint, or for the continuation thereof, the court or judge shall discharge the person restrained from the restraint under which he is held.
(2) Obedience to any order for the discharge of any prisoner may be enforced by the court or judge granting such order, by arrest in the same manner as is herein provided for disobedience to a writ of habeas corpus, and with like effect in all respects. The person guilty of disobedience to an order for the discharge of any prisoner is liable to the party aggrieved in the sum of $1,000.00 damages, in addition to any special damages the party may have sustained.
(3) No sheriff or other officer is liable to any civil action for obeying any such order of discharge. [MCL 600.4352(1).]
Petitioner's proposed interpretation of the statute was squarely addressed and rejected by this Court in Phillips v Warden, State Prison of Southern Mich, 153 Mich App 557, 565-566; 396 NW2d 482 (1986). In Phillips, the petitioner filed a complaint for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the circuit court issued an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. The respondent repeatedly failed to file any response, despite being given numerous opportunities to do so. Because of respondent's silence, the circuit court ordered the petitioner's unconditional discharge from custody and the petitioner was released from prison. Id. at 562-563. On appeal, this Court reversed the discharge and granted the state of Michigan authority to regain custody of the petitioner. Id. at 563. This Court held that the circuit court's order for the petitioner's release was improper:
On the scant record before us, we can only conclude that plaintiff's discharge was ordered not on the merits but in response to plaintiff's position that defendant, by failing to answer or defend, had failed to state a defense or to show legal cause for plaintiff's continued incarceration, MCL 600.4352(1). This was improper. A writ of habeas corpus is a writ of inquiry. Neither MCR 3.303 nor the statutes governing habeas corpus actions contemplate a habeas corpus plaintiff's discharge in the face of a defendant's silence. Indeed, both the statutes and the court rules specifically guard against such a result by forcing a nonresponding defendant to answer the writ, either by way of contempt, MCR 3.303(N)(1), or by arresting him and holding him in close custody until he complies with the writ. MCL 600.4331. Defense counsel's display of absolute indifference to the orders of the court and the outcome of this case was totally egregious; dilitoriness [sic] standing alone, however, does not provide a sufficient basis for granting the writ. Accordingly, the order of discharge is declared void and is hereby vacated. The circuit court is ordered to immediately enter a bench warrant for plaintiff's arrest and return to defendant's custody. [Id. at 563-564 (some citations omitted).]
As explained in Phillips, even a respondent's complete failure to respond to a circuit court's order to show cause is insufficient to empower the circuit court to grant a writ of habeas corpus and order release of the petitioner. Based on the reasoning set forth in Phillips, we conclude that respondent's filing of a brief opposing petitioner's request for relief, rather than an answer opposing petitioner's request for relief, does not entitle petitioner to release from prison, even if the brief failed to conform to the requirements of MCR 3.303(N). Therefore, petitioner's argument is without merit.
B. DENIAL OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Petitioner also argues that he was entitled to a hearing on his complaint for writ of habeas corpus. We disagree.
As this Court stated in Phillips, 153 Mich App at 561:
MCR 3.303 governs the procedure to be followed in an action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention. On the filing of the complaint, the court may issue a writ or an order to show cause why the writ should not be issued, unless it appears that the prisoner is not entitled to relief. MCR 3.303(D)(1). If the writ is to be answered and a hearing held at a specified time, the answer must be made, and the prisoner must be produced, at the time and place specified in the writ. MCR 3.303(K)(1).
As noted in Phillips, the court rule governing the time allotted for answer and hearing in habeas corpus actions, MCR 3.303(K), provides:
(1) If the writ is to be answered and the hearing held on a specified day and hour, the answer must be made and the prisoner produced at the time and place specified in the writ.
(2) If an order to show cause is issued, it must be answered as provided in subrule (N), and the hearing must be held at the time and place specified in the order.
A hearing on a complaint for writ of habeas corpus is held at the discretion of the circuit court. The court rule clearly contemplates the discretionary nature of a hearing when it states that an answer to the complaint must be made if a writ has issued and the writ is to be answered. MCR 3.303(K). The circuit court is further empowered to simply deny the complaint for the writ, even without issuing an order to show cause, if "it appears that the prisoner is not entitled to relief." MCR 3.303(D)(1)(b). Because the court rule contains discretionary rather than mandatory language with regard to the holding of a hearing, petitioner's argument that the circuit court was required to provide him with a hearing is without merit.
C. RADICAL DEFECT IN JURISDICTION
Petitioner further argues that the circuit court erred by failing to find a radical jurisdictional defect regarding his underlying criminal conviction. We disagree. As this Court explained in Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 485-486; 736 NW2d 269 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted):
The writ of habeas corpus deals with radical defects that render a judgment or proceeding absolutely void. In general, MCL 600.4310(1) prohibits habeas corpus relief to '[p]ersons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or
criminal.' But relief is open to a convicted person in one narrow instance, . . . where the convicting court was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime in question.Therefore, if petitioner can demonstrate that the circuit was without jurisdiction to try him for third offense drunk driving, then petitioner is entitled to apply for habeas relief.
In its ruling denying petitioner's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court concluded that Clinton County possessed jurisdiction to prosecute and punish petitioner under MCL 762.3(1), which provides:
Any offense committed on the boundary line of 2 counties, or within 1 mile of the dividing line between them, may be alleged in the indictment to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished in either county.Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that Deputy Wiswasser possessed the authority to stop and arrest him for drunk driving. Petitioner's argument misses the mark. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over felony charges filed by information or indictment. MCL 767.1. MCL 762.3(1) allows the prosecution to allege that an offense committed on a boundary road was committed in either county, and allows the proceedings to be venued in either county. The parties do not dispute that Hubbardston Road is such a road. Petitioner merely repeats the argument he made in his legal malpractice claim against his defense counsel, i.e., that his arrest by Deputy Wiswasser was invalid because his offense occurred in Ionia County. See Peiffer v Cole, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 11, 2018 (Docket No. 337543). But an illegal arrest is not a radical jurisdictional defect. People v Hernandez, 41 Mich App 594, 598; 200 NW2d 447 (1972). Nor does the filing of a void or ineffective information divest a circuit court of jurisdiction (although it may compel dismissal of the charges). See In re Elliott, 315 Mich 662, 675; 24 NW2d 528 (1946). The circuit court in this case acquired jurisdiction over petitioner's felony charges once he was charged by information and bound over for trial. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 221; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Simply put, the question is not whether petitioner's arrest was invalid (and therefore whether exclusion of evidence or dismissal of the charges against him was warranted), but whether the proceedings against petitioner were void for lack of jurisdiction (such that he must immediately be released). We conclude that it was not, for the reasons stated above.
Although MCL 762.3(1) allows the allegation "in the indictment" that the offense occurred in either county, "[a]ll provisions of the law apply to prosecutions upon indictments . . . shall, in the same manner and to the same extent as near as may be, be applied to informations and all prosecutions and pleadings thereon." MCL 767.2.
Petitioner declined to argue the legality of his arrest in his appeal by right, and we will not litigate that issue under the guise of habeas corpus review. However, we do note that this Court determined, albeit in the context of a legal malpractice proceeding, that Deputy Wiswasser possessed the authority to arrest petitioner.
See Peiffer v Cole, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 11, 2018 (Docket No. 337543), p 1. --------
Petitioner cannot establish a radical jurisdictional defect that rendered his underlying criminal conviction absolutely void. See Morales, 260 Mich App at 40. Therefore, the circuit court correctly denied plaintiff's complaint for writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra