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observing that under the effects-of-battery statute, "a defendant's evidence that she does not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, such as in circumstances of manic-episodes, schizophrenic breaks, and similar situations in which it is clear they are attempting to disprove their understanding of the wrongfulness of their conduct, are still prohibited from use outside of an insanity defense"
Summary of this case from State v. Brooks-BrownOpinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-1169
02-04-2022
Peggy Sue HIGGINSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorney for Appellant: William W. Gooden, Mt. Vernon, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant: William W. Gooden, Mt. Vernon, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Oral argument was held on January 10, 2022, in the Court of Appeals of Indiana Courtroom in Indianapolis. We commend counsel for the quality of their oral presentations.
[1] On June 21, 2018, law enforcement responded to a 911 call, where they found Peggy Sue Higginson sitting on the side of Wade Road in Posey County with Troy Higginson, her husband, dead in a nearby black BMW. The State charged Peggy with murder. In October of 2018, Peggy filed her notice of intent to raise a claim of self-defense and introduce effects-of-battery evidence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11(b)(2) and retained Dr. Polly Westcott as her expert witness. In May of 2021, the State moved to exclude Dr. Westcott's testimony on the basis that her anticipated testimony concerning Peggy's PTSD diagnosis was inadmissible to support a claim of self-defense. The trial court granted the State's motion, Peggy moved to certify the trial court's order for interlocutory appeal, and the trial court granted Peggy's request. We accepted jurisdiction, and now we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 20, 2018, in response to a possible domestic battery, Indiana State Police Trooper Zack Fulton and Posey County Sherriff's Deputy Jacob Melliff were dispatched to Wade Road. Troy, Peggy's husband , explained to officers that he and Peggy had been arguing, though, according to Troy, their argument had not turned physical. In an attempt to separate the couple, officers gave Peggy a ride to Evansville. Later that evening, Peggy took photos of her allegedly bruised arms and hands, posted the photos to Facebook, and also posted that Troy had hurt her and that she wanted "everyone to know." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 62.
Troy had filed for a divorce from Peggy on April 30, 2018, and a final hearing on the dissolution of their marriage had been scheduled for June 29, 2018. (Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58)
[3] On June 21, 2018, around 8:30 pm, Peggy made another Facebook post referring to her husband, stating "He needs a good old fashioned a[**] whooping to knock some of that air out of his swollen ego filled head." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 62. Approximately one hour later, Posey County Sherriff's Deputy Bryan Hicks was dispatched to Wade Road in response to a report that Peggy had shot Troy. When Deputy Hicks arrived on the scene he found Peggy sitting on the side of the road near a black BMW with Troy, deceased, in the driver's seat of the BMW.
[4] Deputy Hicks cut Troy's seatbelt and removed him from the vehicle, at which point Deputy Hicks could see that Troy had been shot in the right side of his chest. Peggy informed Deputy Hicks that she had used a handgun to shoot Troy and that it was on the passenger-side floorboard of the BMW. Deputy Hicks subsequently recovered the handgun from the vehicle. Deputy Hicks placed Peggy in handcuffs but was unable to speak with her much about what occurred because she appeared to be under the influence of narcotics "given her manner of speech" and because, upon questioning, she admitted that she had taken twenty-five Seroquel pills shortly before the police had arrived. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56. Peggy was transported to Deaconess Hospital in Evansville for treatment.
Seroquel, a brand name for quetiapine, is a medication that works in the brain to treat schizophrenia. Seroquel works to rebalance dopamine and serotonin in order to improve thinking, mood, and behavior. Quetiapine (Seroquel) , National Alliance on Mental Illness , https://www.nami.org/About-MentalIllness/Treatments/Mental-Health-Medications/Types-of-Medication/Quetiapine -(Seroquel ) (last visited January 25, 2022).
[5] The State charged Peggy with murder on June 25, 2018. On October 3, 2018, Peggy filed her notice of intent to raise a claim of self-defense and to introduce effects-of-battery evidence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11(b)(2) and retained Dr. Westcott as her expert witness. After administering a variety of tests, Dr. Westcott diagnosed Peggy with PTSD and noted that she had suffered from a major depressive disorder in the past. When the State deposed Dr. Westcott on April 20, 2021, she answered "No" when asked whether Peggy's PTSD had prevented her from understanding the wrongfulness of her conduct when she killed her husband.
[6] On May 14, 2021, the State moved to exclude Dr. Westcott's testimony on the basis that her anticipated testimony, specifically that Peggy's PTSD "affected her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct," was inadmissible to support a claim of self-defense. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 68. The trial court granted the State's motion on May 17, 2021. On May 19, 2021, Peggy moved to certify the trial court's order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted on May 20, 2021. We accepted jurisdiction on July 8, 2021.
Discussion and Decision
[7] "The decision to admit evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is afforded a great deal of deference on appeal." Bacher v. State , 686 N.E.2d 791, 793 (Ind. 1997). "This Court will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when it constitutes an abuse of discretion." Washington v. State , 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). "An abuse of discretion occurs only if, having examined solely the evidence supporting the ruling and any unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor, we are convinced that the evidentiary ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court." Hinds v. State , 906 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
However, when the matter turns on a question of statutory interpretation, we employ a de novo standard of review. Statutory interpretation is a function for the courts, and our goal in statutory interpretation is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain language of its statutes. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the
rules of statutory construction and interpret statutory language in its plain, ordinary, and usual sense.
Kelley v. State , 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citations omitted).
However, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, then it is ambiguous; and we thus resort to rules of statutory interpretation so as to give effect to the legislature's intent. For example, we read the statute as whole, avoiding excessive reliance on a strict, literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. And we seek to give a practical application of the statute by construing it in a way that favors public convenience and avoids an absurdity, hardship, or injustice.
Suggs v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted).
[8] Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2 states that "[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person [...] from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." "[T]he phrase ‘reasonably believes,’ as used in the Indiana self-defense statute, requires both subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury, and that such actual belief was one that a reasonable person would have under the circumstances." Littler v. State , 871 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind. 2007).
[9] Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-109 defines "Effects of Battery," which may relate to the culpability of a defendant, as
a psychological condition of an individual who has suffered repeated physical or sexual abuse inflicted by another individual who is the:
(1) victim of an alleged crime or which the abused individual is charged in a pending prosecution; and
(2) abused individual's:
(A) spouse or former spouse[.]
The Indiana Supreme Court describes the effects-of-battery statute, Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11, as follows:
The effects of battery statute is found among the "defenses relating to culpability." It applies to a defendant who either (1) "raises the issue [of] not responsible as a result of mental disease or defect" (for convenience we refer to this as an "insanity" defense) or (2) "claims to have used justifiable reasonable force" ("self-defense"), and, in conjunction with either, raises the issue that the defendant was at the time of the alleged crime suffering from the effects of battery as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the alleged crime.
Although not limited by its terms to battered women, the statute typically comes into play with respect to efforts to introduce evidence of battered women's syndrome in defense of a charge against the mistreated victim.
Marley v. State , 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind. 2001) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court has determined that "where the defendant claims that battered women's syndrome has affected her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, she must proceed under the insanity defense." Id. at 1228. "If the lack of knowledge or intent is attributable to a ‘mental disease or defect,’ [...] it falls within the legislature's definition of the ‘insanity’ defense and must be asserted accordingly." Id.
[10] Peggy argues that she intends to use Dr. Westcott's testimony to support "the reasonableness of her apprehension of imminent harm" and that the testimony "would not relate to the defense of insanity[,]" Appellant's Br. p. 11, because the statute, specifically the self-defense portion, provides a " ‘middle ground’ between insanity and sanity." Appellant's Br. p. 15. The Indiana Supreme Court stated in Marley ,
Limiting the admissibility of battered women's syndrome evidence in this manner is consistent with well established principles of Indiana law. Over one hundred years ago, in Sage v. State , 91 Ind. 141, 145 (1883), this Court held that the current statutory scheme did not recognize a middle ground between sanity and insanity. Thus, insanity was recognizable as a defense, but not as a mitigating circumstance. Our current statutory scheme recognizes no "middle ground" between insanity and sanity. More recently, this Court summarized this principle, stating that, in Indiana we do not recognize degrees of insanity. Rather, within the ambit of the terms comprising the definition of legal insanity, complete mental incapacity must be demonstrated before criminal responsibility can be relieved. In short, as a general proposition Indiana has long held that a defendant may not submit evidence relating to mental disease or defect except through an insanity defense.
747 N.E.2d at 1128 (citations and quotations omitted).
[11] Peggy further argues as follows:
[ Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-109 ] contemplates the use of psychological evidence to establish that a person is suffering from the effects of battery. In fact, there is no other way to prove a psychological condition without the testimony of a professional. This is the only application of the Effects of Battery Statute in a self-defense case that makes any sense. Otherwise, the statute is meaningless. Since the statute specifically applied to two (2) types of case, insanity and self-defense, it is reasonable to conclude that the self-defense portion of that statute contemplated evidence that is short of what is admissible in an insanity case.... The reversal of the trial court would still leave Marley as good law. Marley did not address the use of evidence to establish reasonableness in a self-defense case. It only addressed evidence deemed to be related to insanity and in that decision it was correct. A decision to reverse would fill in the blanks left in Marley .
Appellant's Br. p. 15. While we are cognizant of our duty to follow our Supreme Court's precedent, and do not believe that Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11 provides a middle ground between sanity and insanity, we also agree with much of Peggy's argument. It would make very little sense for Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11 to state that it allows the use of effects-of-battery evidence, which, again, "refers to a psychological condition of an individual who has suffered repeated physical or sexual abuse inflicted by another individual," in self-defense claims while actually limiting the use of that evidence to insanity defenses. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-109 (emphasis added). To entirely forbid the use of effects-of-battery evidence, or psychological trauma, in self-defense cases that fall under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11, would render the self-defense portion of the statute superfluous. "[W]hen engaging in statutory interpretation, we ‘avoid an interpretation that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.’ " ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. Notre Dame Police Dept. , 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1199 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Hatcher v. State , 762 N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ). "And we seek to give a practical application of the statute by construing it in a way that favors public convenience and avoids an absurdity, hardship, or injustice." Suggs v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016). [12] Still, we strike a delicate balance between allowing appropriate effects-of-battery evidence for defendants invoking self-defense and preserving Indiana's long held principle of disallowing degrees of insanity. While Marley outlines one such scenario in which evidence must be brought under the insanity defense, Marley does not completely foreclose the use of testimony regarding the psychological effects of battery in self-defense cases.
[13] In essence, evidence which is clearly encompassed by the traditional bounds of an insanity defense is still not suitable for a self-defense claim. For instance, a defendant's evidence that she does not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, such as in circumstances of manic-episodes, schizophrenic breaks, and similar situations in which it is clear they are attempting to disprove their understanding of the wrongfulness of their conduct, are still prohibited from use outside of an insanity defense. The use of effects-of-battery evidence in self-defense cases need not run afoul of the well-established "principles of Indiana law" outlined in Marley . 747 N.E.2d at 1128.
While we acknowledge the State's comparison of this case to Green v. State , 65 N.E.3d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), factually these cases are distinct. In Green , expert witness Dr. Karla Fischer testified that Green was in a "traumatized state" when she shot and killed her ex-husband and that Green still viewed her ex-husband as a threat after shooting him, evidenced by Green padlocking his dead body in a metal box outside of her home. 65 N.E.3d at 631. While another panel of this court concluded that Dr. Fisher's testimony could only be introduced to support an insanity defense, we believe that the "traumatic state" that Green experienced is not present here. Id. We do not believe that the entirety of Dr. Westcott's testimony should be excluded because she answered "No" when asked whether Peggy understood the wrongfulness of her actions, and there is very little additional evidence which supports that assertion or that Dr. Westcott intended to testify as much. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 201.
[14] In self-defense cases, the ultimate question of whether a specific defendant acted reasonably in responding to a perceived threat of violence still belongs to the factfinder. Hood v. State , 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that, when a defendant is claiming self-defense, "[w]hether the State has met its burden is a question of fact for the factfinder"). A defendant who is using effects-of-battery evidence in support of their claim of self-defense may not circumvent this rule. For instance, an expert witness may not testify that, given the specific defendant's psychological trauma because of their battery, the defendant was justified in using reasonable force in their defense. Expert witnesses, as in all other cases, may still not testify as to "ultimate factual determination[s]." Douglas v. State , 484 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("Nevertheless, the ultimate factual determination of whether the incident actually occurred should be made by the trier of fact.").
[15] While there are clearly limits to what a defendant may do in using effects-of-battery evidence when arguing self-defense, Peggy may use effects-of-battery evidence in her self-defense claim. Dr. Westcott may testify as to evidence which relates to the general reasonableness of one's apprehension of fear, given the psychological trauma which comes from battery. However, as stated above, Dr. Westcott may not reach an ultimate factual determination exclusive to the jury: for instance, she may not testify that Peggy was, given the psychological trauma she suffered due to her battery, reasonable in using justifiable force. See Douglas , 484 N.E.2d at 612. In essence, Dr. Westcott may testify as to the objective component of a person's reasonable belief that they were under threat of imminent harm, given their PTSD, but not Peggy's specific subjective belief. See Littler , 871 N.E.2d at 280. We take special care in outlining the appropriate use of effects-of-battery evidence in self-defense cases under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11 because an opposite ruling would effectively make the self-defense portion of the statute useless, which we strive to avoid. See ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1199.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.