We confirm the determination. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Peeso v Fiala, 130 AD3d 1442, 1443 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 910 [2015]). The arresting officer's testimony at the hearing established that the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle driven by petitioner for a traffic violation (see generally People v Grimes, 133 AD3d 1201, 1202 [4th Dept 2015]), possessed reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had been driving while intoxicated based on, inter alia, petitioner's failure of field sobriety tests (see Peeso, 130 AD3d at 1443), and had probable cause to arrest petitioner (see Matter of Sherwood v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 153 AD3d 1022, 1024-1025 [3d Dept 2017]; People v Lewis, 124 AD3d 1389, 1390-1391 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 931 [2015]).
We confirm the determination.Contrary to petitioner's contention, the determination is supported by substantial evidence (seeMatter of Peeso v. Fiala , 130 A.D.3d 1442, 1443, 13 N.Y.S.3d 742 [4th Dept. 2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 6457395 [2015] ). The arresting officer's testimony at the hearing established that the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle driven by petitioner for a traffic violation (see generallyPeople v. Grimes , 133 A.D.3d 1201, 1202, 20 N.Y.S.3d 261 [4th Dept. 2015] ), possessed reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had been driving while intoxicated based on, inter alia, petitioner's failure of field sobriety tests (seePeeso , 130 A.D.3d at 1443, 13 N.Y.S.3d 742 ), and had probable cause to arrest petitioner (seeMatter of Sherwood v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 153 A.D.3d 1022, 1024–1025, 59 N.Y.S.3d 837 [3d Dept. 2017] ; People v. Lewis , 124 A.D.3d 1389, 1390–1391, 999 N.Y.S.2d 661 [4th Dept. 2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 931, 17 N.Y.S.3d 94, 38 N.E.3d 840 [2015] ).
While the arresting officer initially testified that petitioner failed three administered field sobriety tests, he stated at various points throughout his testimony that he could not definitively testify as to his observations of petitioner outside the vehicle without first referencing his notes, and he immediately corrected his testimony once he looked at such notes on cross-examination. Furthermore, the report of refusal, which was admitted into evidence, confirmed that petitioner refused to submit to the field sobriety tests (see Matter of Peeso v. Fiala, 130 A.D.3d 1442, 1443–1444, 13 N.Y.S.3d 742 [2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 6457395 [2015] ). As to the required warning and petitioner's refusal, the arresting officer testified that he informed petitioner that "[a] refusal to submit to a chemical test ... [would] result in the immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of [his] license or operating privilege" and that such refusal could be introduced as evidence at any subsequent trial, hearing or proceeding.
unlawful under People v De Bour (40 N.Y.2d 210 [1976]). Because petitioner did not advance those contentions at the administrative hearing, however, he failed to preserve them for our review (see generally Matter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 N.Y.2d 879, 880 [2001]; Matter of Reuss v Schroeder, 217 A.D.3d 1083, 1084 [3d Dept 2023]), and we have no discretionary authority to review those contentions in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Khan, 96 N.Y.2d at 880; Matter of Parsons v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 224 A.D.3d 1263, 1264 [4th Dept 2024]). We reject petitioner's further contention that the Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board improperly drew an adverse inference against him based upon his failure to testify at the hearing (see Matter of Vasquez v Egan, 174 A.D.3d 811, 813 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Barr v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 155 A.D.3d 1159, 1161 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 907 [2018]; Matter of Peeso v Fiala, 130 A.D.3d 1442, 1443-1444 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 910 [2015]).
The subject report set forth the specific warnings read to petitioner on the morning in question, indicated that petitioner was advised that his refusal to submit to the chemical test or any portion thereof would "result in the immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of [his] license" and documented the occasions upon which petitioner indicated that he understood the warnings as read to him but was refusing to consent to the chemical test. McCabe's testimony and his related report, in our view, establish that petitioner refused to submit to the chemical test—despite being advised, in clear and unequivocal terms, of the consequences (see Matter of Gray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, 742–743, 536 N.Y.S.2d 40, 532 N.E.2d 1268 [1988] ; Matter of Peeso v. Fiala, 130 A.D.3d 1442, 1443, 13 N.Y.S.3d 742 [2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 6457395 [2015] ; Matter of Dykeman v. Jackson, 262 A.D.2d 877, 877–878, 694 N.Y.S.2d 187 [1999] ). To the extent that petitioner faults McCabe for being unable to recall certain details of petitioner's arrest, suffice it to say that the ALJ had ample opportunity to assess McCabe's credibility.
Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 83 A.D.3d 838, 839, 921 N.Y.S.2d 137 ). The evidence adduced at the hearing, including the testimony of two police officers and their written report, demonstrated that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had been driving in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, that the police lawfully arrested the petitioner, that after the petitioner's arrest and at the hospital the police gave the petitioner sufficient warning of the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test, and that the petitioner refused the officer's request to submit to the chemical test three times (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c] ; Matter of Robinson v. Swarts, 82 A.D.3d 986, 919 N.Y.S.2d 34 ; Matter of Sharf v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 74 A.D.3d 978, 901 N.Y.S.2d 865 ). Moreover, the Appeals Board properly relied upon an adverse inference from the petitioner's failure to testify at the hearing (see 15 NYCRR 127.5 [b]; Matter of Peeso v. Fiala, 130 A.D.3d 1442, 1443, 13 N.Y.S.3d 742 ; Matter of Mannino v. Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y.-Traffic Violations Div., 101 A.D.3d at 881, 956 N.Y.S.2d 120 ). Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the fact that a chemical test was eventually performed at the hospital does not “suffice to undo” her prior chemical test refusal (see Matter of Nicol v. Grant, 117 A.D.2d 940, 499 N.Y.S.2d 247 ; Matter of O'Brien v. Melton, 61 A.D.2d 1091, 403 N.Y.S.2d 353 ).