Opinion
No. FST CV 06-4009772 S
November 1, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action is an administrative appeal brought by the plaintiffs under the provisions of General Statutes § 7-147i and § 8-8 from a decision of the defendant, Historical District Commission of the Town of New Canaan to issue a Certificate of Appropriateness to defendants, Michael and Mary Helen Fabachers. That certificate authorizes the Fabachers to make certain changes to their property which is located within the New Canaan Historic District. The action of the Commission was taken pursuant to a stipulated settlement of a prior appeal taken by the Fabachers from an adverse decision of the Commission. In paragraph 12 of their complaint the plaintiffs allege that they "are statutorily aggrieved by the Commission's action on the Motion in that they own and reside at property located within the New Canaan Historic District."
Both the Commission and the Fabachers have flied motions to dismiss the action on the ground that the facts do not support the plaintiffs' claim of statutory aggrievement and that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Commission's actions taken with respect to the stipulated the judgment between the Fabachers and the Commission. The plaintiffs concede that they do not own property which is adjacent to or within one hundred feet of the Fabachers' property. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot establish statutory aggrievement under General Statutes § 8-8(a)(1). However, the plaintiffs argue that they are statutorily aggrieved as the owners of property within the same historic district as the Fabachers property. They claim that chapter 97a of the General Statutes, authorizing the establishment of historic districts, implicitly makes any property owner within a given historic district statutorily aggrieved by any decision of a historic district commission relating to that district. The court disagrees.
"`Aggrieved person' means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, "aggrieved person" includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board."
Chapter 97a does not imply the creation any extraordinary rights in the owners of property located within a duly established historic district. General Statutes § 7-147i defines the right of appeal from decisions of a historic district commission. That statute does not state or imply that concept of aggrievement should have any meaning other than as defined in General Statutes § 8-8. The court finds that the last sentence of General Statutes § 7-147i — "Procedure upon such appeal shall be the same as that defined in section 8-8." — clearly states the legislature's intent to incorporate the statutory aggrievement standards of General Statutes § 8-8 and makes them applicable to appeals from the actions of historic district commissions.
"Any person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of the historic district commission or of any officer thereof may within fifteen days from the date when such decision was rendered, take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which such municipality is located, which appeal shall be made returnable to such court in the same manner as that prescribed for other civil actions brought to such court. Notice of such appeal shall be given by leaving a true an attested copy thereof in the hands of or at the usual place of abode of the chairman or clerk of the commission within twelve days before the return day to which such appeal has been taken. Procedure upon such appeal shall be the same as that defined in section 8-8.
The plaintiffs' complaint does not allege that the plaintiff are classically aggrieved by the Commission's decision. In their brief responding to the defendants' motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs do not urge that the court treat the motion to dismiss as a motion to strike, thereby giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to find substitute pleading under Practice Book § 10-44 alleging either classical aggrievement or statutory aggrievement under General Statutes § 8-8. Under these circumstances the court concludes that the plaintiffs cannot establish their aggrievement and therefore their standing to pursue this appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants are granted.