Full explanation and comprehension on the part of Defendant Silva is reflected in this record. See Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281 (Fla.App.2d 1963) and discussion in Roberts v. State, 199 So.2d 340 (Fla.App.2d 1967). We are cognizant of our earlier Smith v. State, 197 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1967), holding that a plea of nolo contendere cannot be accepted in a capital case.
I would simply adopt as my own so much of that decision as deals with this subject matter. 150 So.2d 281 (Fla.2d DCA 1963), appeal dismissed, 168 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965). 194 So.2d 652 (Fla.3d DCA 1967).
The defense of former jeopardy can be waived. Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), appeal dismissed, 168 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965); Davis v. State, 392 So.2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). A court's subject matter jurisdiction is unaffected by acts which may be illegal, i.e., the imposition of a sentence which violates the constitutional proscription against twice being placed in jeopardy, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931), or the imposition of a sentence which exceeds that which is statutorily permissible, King v. State, 373 So.2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
See United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 50 S.Ct. 424, 74 L.Ed. 1076 (1930); Chesebrough v. State (Fla. 1971), 255 So.2d 675; Peel v. State (Fla.App.2d 1963), 150 So.2d 281, and the numerous cases cited therein. The Florida case of State v. Febre (1945), 156 Fla. 149, 23 So.2d 270, may appear to be contra; and if so, it stands alone.
"The withdrawal of the plea of not guilty and the entry of a plea of nolo contendere was done upon the provision, agreed to in advance by the State and agreed to in advance by the Court, that the sentence imposed upon the appellant would be a life sentence, and such a sentence was imposed by the Court pursuant to this agreement. (See Peel v. State of Florida, 150 So.2d 281, decided by this Second District Court of Appeal of Florida in 1963.)"
The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1965 upon his plea of nolo contendere in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida. Under Florida law the plea of nolo contendere, when accepted by the court, has the same effect as a plea of guilty. Peel v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 150 So.2d 281, cert. den., 380 U.S. 986, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279. The appellant did not allege in his habeas corpus petition that there was any vice in his plea of nolo contendere, which he entered upon advice of his court-appointed counsel.
See Jones v. State, 647 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Koenig v. State, 597 So.2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1992) ("Although [defense] counsel stipulated that there was a factual basis for the [no contest] plea, a stipulation with no factual basis in the record is insufficient."). A nolo plea "does not admit the allegations of the charge in a technical sense," Vinson v. State, 345 So.2d 711, 715 (Fla. 1977), however, once "accepted by the court, it becomes an implied confession of guilt and . . . admits for the purposes of the case all facts which are well pleaded," Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281, 291-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). See also Beverly v. State, 322 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
The court may accept it without first satisfying itself that the defendant committed the crime charged as it must do on a plea of guilty. Issues of fact do not remain, and, if accepted by the court, the court must enter judgment on the plea. 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal, § 177 (1969); Qureshi v. Immigration Naturalization Service of Department of Justice of United States, 5 Cir. 1975, 519 F.2d 1174; Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 81 S.Ct. 1563, 6 L.Ed.2d 940 (1961); Tempo Trucking and Transfer Corporation v. Dickson, D.C.N.Y., 405 F. Supp. 506 (1975); United States v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary Corporation, D.C.Pa., 288 F. Supp. 696 (1968); Peel v. State, Fla.App., 150 So.2d 281 (1963); United States v. DeGregory, D.C.Pa., 220 F. Supp. 249 (1963), affirmed 3 Cir. 1965, 341 F.2d 277, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 850, 86 S.Ct. 96, 15 L.Ed.2d 89 (1965); United States v. Lair, 8 Cir. 1912, 195 F. 47, cert. denied 229 U.S. 609, 33 S.Ct. 464, 57 L.Ed. 1350 (1913); Singleton v. Clemmer, D.C. Cir. 1948, 166 F.2d 963; Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §§ 497 through 502. In a criminal case, the defendant's plea formulates the issues for trial. The entry of a plea is essential to a valid conviction.
A plea of nolo contendere has been determined to be equivalent to a guilty plea only insofar as it gives the court the power to punish. Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281 (Fla.2d DCA, 1963), State v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 196, 72 S.E.2d 525 (1952). An annotation on the effect of the plea of nolo contendere as an admission and waiver of defects, 152 A.L.R. 277, explains:
Except where a criminal defendant reserves the right to appeal a question of law in accordance with our decision in State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971), a plea of no contest (or nolo contendere) bars the appeal of any issue other than the facial sufficiency of the charging instrument. Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281 (Fla. App.2d 1963), appeal dismissed, 168 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965). Whether phencyclidine is or is not a barbiturate is a question of fact, and by entering the plea of no contest Hand relieved the state of its burden to prove that it was. Hand's argument here that phencyclidine is not a barbiturate, which was not passed on in either Camil or Hoagland, cannot now be considered.