Opinion
A120372
8-29-2008
LINDA PEDRONI et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF AMERICAN CANYON et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Not to be Published
Plaintiffs Linda Pedroni and George Louie (plaintiffs) brought this action against defendant municipalities for violation of the rights of the disabled to access public walkways and facilities. Having failed to present claims under the Government Claims Act (the Act) before filing suit, they sought to cure this deficiency with claims presented several months later. The trial court concluded that these claims did not satisfy the Act and, on this ground, sustained the demurrers of the City of American Canyon, the City of Calistoga, and the Town of Yountville (collectively, the Cities) without leave to amend. Plaintiffs appeal from the ensuing orders dismissing all causes of action against these defendants. We affirm, as plaintiffs did not comply with the Act and, hence, cannot establish a condition precedent to their causes of action.
Because of the broad scope of the claim requirements, the California Supreme Court now refers to the "Tort Claims Act" as the "Government Claims Act," adopting the latter term as a more appropriate short title for this statutory scheme (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). (See City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 734, 741-742 & fn. 7 (City of Stockton).)
The City of Napa and the City of St. Helena, defendants below, are not parties to this appeal. Henceforth, for clarity and ease of reference, we omit the words "City of" and "Town of" in referring to the defendants individually.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2007, plaintiffs Linda Pedroni (Pedroni) and George Louie (Louie) filed suit against five municipalities, asserting their rights of full and equal access to public walkways and facilities under sections 54 and 54.1 of the Disabled Persons Act (Civ. Code, § 54 et seq.). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that particular sidewalks in American Canyon, Calistoga, Yountville, Napa, and St. Helena were inaccessible to wheelchairs, scooters, and walkers. Proceeding individually and "on behalf of all physically disabled individuals who have attempted to use [these] sidewalks and walkways," plaintiffs sought monetary damages (Civ. Code, § 54.3) and permanent injunctive relief (Civ. Code, § 55), as well as an order certifying a class. The initial complaint contains no allegation of compliance with the Act. This complaint was never served.
On June 18, 2007, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC), which includes one cause of action by Pedroni against Calistoga and one cause of action by Louie against each of the Cities and supplements the class allegations. The prayer for relief seeks statutory damages of $1,000 for each violation of Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1 and a permanent injunction "requiring [the Cities] to adopt and enforce a policy to make their sidewalks accessible to the mobility-impaired . . . ."
Each individual cause of action in the FAC contains an allegation that "[the plaintiff] is required to comply with a claims statute and has complied therewith." Each cause of action refers to attached exhibits that set out the locations of inaccessible crosswalks and the dates plaintiffs were "unable to traverse sidewalks thereat." The attachments to which these allegations refer are claims plaintiffs presented to the Cities several months after filing suit, each of which asserts a lack of ramps or curb-cuts at crosswalks, corners, and intersections, making the sidewalks inaccessible. These claims include: (1) Louies claim against American Canyon for $103,000, dated March 3, 2007 and received April 16, 2007; (2) Pedronis claim against Calistoga filed May 11, 2007, seeking $1,000 for each violation; (3) Louies claim against Calistoga for $18,000, dated May 30, 2007; and (4) Louies claim against Yountville for $30,000, dated May 30, 2007.
Pedronis claim alleges 130 incidents each week and 30 each month during the preceding six months when she encountered conditions preventing access to the sidewalks at 27 locations.
American Canyon demurred to the FAC, arguing, inter alia, that neither Louie nor the proposed class had complied with the Act, as the class never filed a claim and Louie had presented his claim months after filing suit. Louie contended his claim satisfied the Act on behalf of the proposed class, but his response did not address the sufficiency of a claim presented after suit is filed. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to provide facts adequately stating a cause of action against American Canyon, as they had not alleged compliance with the Act. Noting that plaintiffs had not strictly complied with the Act, the trial court allowed them 15 days to amend their pleadings to allege substantial compliance.
On September 26, 2007, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (SAC), which differed from the FAC only with regard to the claim compliance allegations. Each cause of action contained an allegation that the individual plaintiff had complied with the Act by filing a claim for damages with the respective city. The SAC identified the date each claim was presented and attached it as an exhibit. Each cause of action further alleged either that the respective city had rejected the claim or that the claim had been denied by operation of law when the city failed to respond. The SAC does not include an allegation that the proposed class complied with the claim presentation requirement.
American Canyon demurred to the SAC on the grounds advanced in its first demurrer, arguing, in addition, that plaintiffs had not pleaded facts showing substantial compliance and could not do so. Plaintiffs defended the timing of Louies claim with a single paragraph concluding that Louie had "clearly presented his Tort Claim prior to the initiation of his lawsuit," arguing that the SAC filing date was "the operative date that is determinative" because the amended complaint superseded their initial pleading. Plaintiffs maintained that this claim covered the proposed class.
Rejecting plaintiffs argument that claim presentation before the SAC satisfied the Act, the trial court sustained American Canyons demurrer to the SAC. The trial court noted plaintiffs failure to support their position with any authority and stated that it did not "make any logical sense" to allow a party to satisfy the Act simply by amending the initial complaint, as this would thwart the whole purpose of the claim presentation requirement—to provide notice and sufficient information to public entities to allow them to investigate and settle claims without the expense of litigation. Concluding that plaintiffs could not allege even substantial compliance with the Act, the trial court denied leave to amend.
Shortly thereafter, Calistoga and Yountville filed demurrers to the SAC on all the grounds advanced by American Canyon and attached the trial courts earlier ruling. In response, plaintiffs argued that the claim requirements were procedural, and not part of the cause of action, so their failure to present a claim before filing suit did not nullify their action, and their later claims and amendment cured the defect. Asserting that strict compliance was not required, plaintiffs emphasized that no prejudice resulted from the premature filing because the initial complaint was never served, and the Cities had received claims by the time they were forced to litigate the matter. As to the proposed class, plaintiffs attempted to rely on their individual claims. Finally, plaintiffs asserted that the claim presentation requirement did not apply to the extent they sought injunctive relief.
The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to amend, concluding that the postlawsuit claims did not substantially comply with the Act. The trial court noted that the Act expressly requires a claim before a complaint is filed and contains no exception because it was not served. The trial court also explained that the authority plaintiffs cited in support of their injunctive relief argument, Government Code section 814, applies to governmental liability and immunity in general, and does not affect the claim requirements.
Following these rulings on demurrer, the trial court entered orders dismissing all causes of action against American Canyon, Calistoga, and Yountville with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from these dismissal orders.
DISCUSSION
Government liability is confined "to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the [A]ct are satisfied." (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243 (Bodde).) Claim presentation is a condition precedent to every cause of action against a public entity "for money or damages." (Id. at pp. 1239-1240; see Gov. Code, § 945.4 ["[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . ."].) Plaintiffs bringing such a cause of action must affirmatively plead either compliance with this requirement or circumstances excusing their noncompliance. (Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)
Plaintiffs assert that they have satisfied this requirement, as the SAC alleges compliance with the Act. We disagree. The SAC contains no allegation that plaintiffs presented claims to the Cities before bringing this action, as Government Code section 945.4 expressly requires. Although plaintiffs allege generally that they complied with the Act, the exhibits attached to the SAC demonstrate that they presented their claims several months after filing suit. In such circumstances, we disregard the complaints conclusory allegations and assume the truth of the facts shown by the exhibits. (See Barnett v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)
Plaintiffs contend nonetheless that the SAC sufficiently alleges compliance with the Act because it shows the presentation of a claim to each entity. Specifically, they argue that "prematurely filing the complaint is not fatal, as long as [the litigant] takes steps to see that the claim is later presented and rejected." The plain language of the statute belies such an interpretation. Government Code section 945.4 expressly provides that "no suit . . . may be brought . . . until" such a claim is made and rejected. (Italics added.)
Moreover, the "more liberal view" plaintiffs advocate would contravene the purposes of the Act and render claim presentation a meaningless formality. The claim requirements are designed to give prompt notice to public entities: (1) to encourage early investigation of the facts; (2) to enable them to incorporate potential liabilities into their fiscal planning; (3) to evaluate the possibility of settlement to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation; and (4) to take remedial steps to avoid future liability. (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 709; Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 298, 303.) To allow plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of postlawsuit claims would directly contravene these policy objectives. There is no indication the Cities had notice of the alleged dispute until several months after being named as defendants in this action. They therefore had no opportunity to explore the possibility of settlement before litigation and could not anticipate potential liability and litigation expenses in allocating their fiscal resources. Nor could the Cities limit their future liability by correcting the alleged conditions. This factor is particularly significant here, as the claims on which plaintiffs rely are based largely on allegations occurring after the initial complaint was filed. In other words, plaintiffs claims arise from injuries the Cities could have prevented if they had received proper notice in the first instance.
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on January 5, 2007. Louies claims allege incidents on December 29, 2006, January 16, 2007, and April 16, 2007. Pedronis claim generally alleges incidents between November 11, 2006 and May 11, 2007.
For the same reason, we reject substantial compliance, as courts generally apply this doctrine "when the underlying purposes of the [Act] have been satisfied." (See Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 729, 732-733 (Nguyen).) In light of our conclusion in this regard, we need not address the additional grounds urged by the Cities for rejecting substantial compliance.
The cases on which plaintiffs rely do not call for a different result. In Savage v. State of California (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793 (Savage), Cory v. City of Huntington Beach (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 131 (Cory), and Bahten v. County of Merced (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 101 (Bahten ), the plaintiffs either had presented a claim before filing suit or had obtained relief from the obligation to do so. (See Cory, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d 131 [claim presented two days before suit filed]; Savage, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 793 [petition under Gov. Code, § 946.6 granting relief from claim presentation]; Bahten, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 101 [same].) Plaintiffs did neither in this case. Additionally, these cases turn largely on the courts characterization of the claim requirement as a procedural issue rather than an element of the cause of action. (See Cory, supra, at pp. 135-136; Savage, supra, at pp. 796-797; Bahten, supra, at pp. 107-111.) The California Supreme Court squarely rejected this analysis in Bodde. (See Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1244 [confirming substantive nature of claim requirement and recognizing it as an essential element of this cause of action].)
Indeed, Bodde specifically disapproved Bahten, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 101 to the extent it turned on this reasoning. (See Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)
The remaining case plaintiffs cite also is inapposite, as failure to present a claim before filing suit was not at issue in Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 870-871.
When required, failure to present a timely claim bars a plaintiff from filing suit. (See City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738; see Nguyen, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 729, 732 [claim presentation and rejection are prerequisites to suit].) Plaintiffs failure to comply with the Act therefore bars both their individual causes of action and that of the proposed class, to which the claim requirements apply equally. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454.)
Plaintiffs assert that their "claims for injunctive relief" survive demurrer nonetheless because the Act applies only to "claims for money or damages." We disagree. As the trial court correctly recognized, Government Code section 814, the statute on which plaintiffs rely, "pertains only to immunity from liability, and has no effect on the claims requirements." (See City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 740.) Nor does the exception recognized in Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113 (Minsky) apply here. In Minsky, the plaintiff sought the return of money local police had taken from him when he was arrested. (See id. at p. 117.) The court characterized the action as "[a] claim for the specific recovery of property," which it concluded was not a claim "for money or damages." (See id. at pp. 121, 123.) Subsequent cases have limited this holding to situations where the defendant has a duty to return seized property, enforceable by mandamus. (City of Stockton, supra, at pp. 742-743.)
Likewise, plaintiffs reliance on Harris v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 639 (Harris) and Eureka Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 469 (Eureka) is misplaced. In each of these cases, the trial court had granted a writ of mandamus requiring reinstatement of a public employee, but had denied backpay because the employee had not presented a claim. (See Harris, supra, at p. 643; Eureka, supra, at p. 475.) The appellate courts disagreed, concluding that the claim presentation requirement was inapplicable because the monetary relief sought by the employee was incidental to the reinstatement request and therefore was not a claim "for money or damages" within the scope of the Act. (See Harris, supra, at p. 643; Eureka, supra, at p. 476.)
Harris was disapproved in part by Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102 on other grounds. (See id. at p. 1123, fn. 8.)
In this case, by contrast, the monetary damages plaintiffs seek cannot be deemed incidental to their request for injunctive relief. The SAC is "for Damages and Injunctive Relief." It contains a prayer for "statutory damages of $1,000 for each violation of Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1 . . . ." (See Civ. Code, § 54.3.) Indeed, Louies claims allege a total of $151,000 in damages from the Cities (and an additional $93,000 from St. Helena and Napa). Pedronis claim seeks $1,000 per violation, alleging 130 incidents of inaccessibility per week and 30 incidents per month over a six-month period based on sidewalks at 27 locations.
Although plaintiffs refer to these amounts as "penalties," they constitute claims for "money or damages," as Civil Code section 54.3 is compensatory in nature. (See Civ. Code, § 54.3 [allowing actual damages and "any amount as may be determined by a jury, or the court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages but in no case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000)"].)
Although the SAC alleges that the permanent injunction is the "primary relief" sought by the proposed class, we are not bound by this conclusory allegation. Indeed, the class allegations include a prayer for "the minimum statutory damages of $1,000 per violation of Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1"—no incidental amount for a potential class of at least 151,000 "non-institutionalized people sixteen years of age or older in California who use wheelchairs."
In short, we conclude that plaintiffs failure to present claims to the Cities before filing the instant action is fatal to the entire SAC, including both its claims for damages and its claims for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the Cities demurrers without leave to amend as to all causes of action.
As we affirm the orders of dismissal on other grounds, we need not reach the Citys challenge to class certification. We also do not address plaintiffs arguments regarding their ability to amend their pleadings to allege the dates the sidewalks were constructed, in apparent response to the Cities argument that the allegations in the SAC do not establish a duty on their part. In light of our decision regarding the Acts application and effect in this case, we conclude that such an amendment would be futile.
DISPOSITION
The dismissal orders are affirmed, with costs to the Cities.
We concur:
SWAGER, J.
MARGULIES, J.