Where the trial court awards attorney fees without holding a hearing and without making specific findings pursuant to section 13-17-103(1), C.R.S. 2007, the court abuses its discretion. Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo. 1989). Here, in its written findings of fact and conclusions of law entered after the bench trial, the trial court concluded that defendants were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section 13-17-102(4). At trial, the court heard evidence from all parties regarding the grounds on which plaintiffs' claims were based and the merits of those claims.

Most of Ms. Shell's arguments are irrelevant, complaining about various decisions by the Court in the administration of the case that she considers to have been unfair. She raises one specific legal argument: that the Magistrate Judge should have afforded her a hearing on the matter, citing Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989). The Court reviews the objected-to portions of a Magistrate Judge's Recommendation de novo, and the remaining portion under whatever standard of review it deems appropriate.

Absent findings on this issue, we do not have an adequate record to review the district court's determination. See Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Colo. 1989) (district court must make findings supporting an award of attorney fees under section 13-17-102); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1987) (same); In re Marriage of Gomez, 728 P.2d 747, 750 (Colo. App. 1986) (same).

This argument also fails. Though Colorado state courts are generally required to conduct a reasonableness hearing when awarding attorney fees, see Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 385-86 (Colo. 1989), no such requirement exists in arbitration. To the contrary, the "Supreme Court has stated quite plainly that matters of procedure lie solely within the discretion of the arbitrator."

To award the attorney fees Gomez requested would require a hearing, findings, and entry of an order specifically setting forth reasons for finding Archuleta's defense of his legal interests to be frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. See§ 13–17–103(1), C.R.S. (2012) (requiring the court to consider factors and specifically set forth the reasons for awarding attorney fees); City of Aurora ex rel. Util. Enter. v. Colo. State Eng'r, 105 P.3d 595, 618 (Colo.2005); Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo.1989) (requiring the court to hold a hearing pursuant to section 13–17–103(1)). The water court made no such findings, nor do we. We agree with the water court that the ordinary rule—each party is responsible for its own attorney fees—should prevail in this case.

Contrary to our prior holdings, the probate court granted fees without permitting Vinton an opportunity to respond, without conducting a requested hearing, and without any findings or explanation whatsoever. See Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 385 (Colo.1989). In addition, although we need not here resolve the merits of Vinton's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we note that Vinton advanced a rational argument based on statutory authority concerning jurisdiction over fiduciaries, as well as the underlying rationale and authorities from other jurisdictions, if not the ultimate holding, of published Colorado Court of Appeals case law.

Neither section 14-10-119 nor section 13-17-102 requires the district court to conduct a hearing on the reasonableness of the award of attorney fees and costs in every case. If a party requests a hearing concerning the award of fees and costs under either statute, then the district court must hold a hearing. See Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 385-86 (Colo. 1989); Board of County Comm'rs v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1987); cf. Tower v. Tower, 147 Colo. 480, 484, 364 P.2d 565, 567-68 (1961); In re Marriage of Kiefer, 738 P.2d 54, 56 (Colo.App. 1987).

¶ 29 While C.R.C.P. 107 does not impose an express requirement of a hearing on the amount of an attorney fee award, we nevertheless conclude that, upon request of a party, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the issue of reasonableness. See Pedlow v. Stamp , 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo. 1989) (construing sections 13-17-101 to - 203, C.R.S. 2016, as requiring an evidentiary hearing).¶ 30 We thus remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of reasonableness of the award imposed as a contempt sanction.

On remand, the trial court must conduct a hearing, if husband requests one, to determine whether an attorney fees award is appropriate under section 13–17–102, and consider the relevant section 13–17–103(1) factors. See, e.g., Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo.1989); SaBell's, Inc., 832 P.2d at 979. We are not persuaded otherwise by wife's contention that husband received sufficient due process because the court held a reasonableness hearing on her fees.

1982); In re Marriage of Atencio, 47 P.3d 718, 722 (Colo.App. 2002). Wife's attorney also contends, based on Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989), that the magistrate abused his discretion by not holding a hearing on Bollenbaugh's request for attorney fees. But a trial court need not hold a hearing sua sponte on a motion for attorney fees, and a party who fails to make a timely request for such a hearing waives the right to a hearing.