Therefore, Worthington cannot rely on the McDonald elements to escape liability and Worthington's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied. Additionally, in reasoning Patton should be a statutory employee, Worthington also relies on a plurality decision by our Supreme Court in Peck v. Delaware County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 572 Pa. 249, 814 A.2d 185 (2002). Worthington's Brief at 17, 19–20.
Id. at 370, 243 A.2d at 392 (quoting Stepp v. Renn, 184 Pa. Super. 634, 637, 135 A.2d 794, 796 (1957)).Additionally, in reasoning Patton should be a statutory employee, Worthington also relies on a plurality decision by our Supreme Court in Peck v. Delaware County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2002). Worthington's Brief at 17, 19-20.
Specifically, Plaintiffs state that, as RLI "admitted" in its motion, a "statutory employer" under Pennsylvania law is not an actual employer or a common law employer. Id. (citing Peck v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Prisoner Inspectors, 572 Pa. 249, 253, 814 A.2d 185, 187-88 (Pa. 2002) ("A statutory employer is a master who is not a contractual or common-law one, but is made one by the Act)); see ECF Dkt. #13 at 9. However, a statutory employer stands in the same position as a direct employer, and may claim the defense of workers' compensation immunity.
Under Pennsylvania law, a statutory employer must show: (1) the employer must be under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner; (2) the premises were occupied by or under the control of the employer; (3) the employer must have entered into a subcontract; (4) part of the employer's regular business must be entrusted to the subcontractor; and (5) the injured party must be an employee of the subcontractor. McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 295, 153 A. 424, 426 ( Pa. 1930); Peck v. Del. County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 572 Pa. 249, 255, 814 A.2d 185, 190 (Pa. 2002); Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1991). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the statutory employer test some 74 years ago, just two years ago the court stated: "In determining whether a party is a statutory employer, courts should construe the elements of the McDonald test strictly and find statutory employer status only when the facts clearly warrant it."
"`A statutory employer is a master who is not a contractual or common-law one, but is made one by Act.'" Peck v. Delaware County Bd. of Prison Inspectors (2002), 572 Pa. 249, 253, 814 A.2d 185, 187-188, quoting McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co. (1930), 302 Pa. 287, 292, 153 A. 424, 425. 77 P.S. 52 provides immunity from suit to a statutory employer. {¶ 55} "An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe [sic] or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the employer's regular business entrusted to such employe [sic] or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employe [sic]."
A statutory employer "is a master who is not a contractual or common-law one, but is made one by" unique provisions in the statute. Peck v. Del. Cnty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors , 572 Pa. 249, 814 A.2d 185, 187–88 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Ordinary employers generally must obtain workers’ compensation insurance, and statutory employers must do so if the ordinary employers do not.
The Act also immunizes so-called "statutory" employers, which are treated as employers under the Workers' Compensation Act but are not otherwise contractual or common-law employers of the injured employee. Peck v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185, 187-88 (Pa. 2002). A statutory employer helps "to ensure the payment of compensation benefits" by serving as a "reserve" from which to pay benefits if the employee's direct employer does not.
It further provides that the “workers' compensation system [is] the exclusive remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.” See Peck v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa. 2002) (emphasis added). The Act's exclusivity provisions apply to the employee as well as the employee's “legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined” under the Act.
Although McDonald has been the seminal case for determining whether a contractor qualifies as a statutory employer for the past eight decades, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fairly recently clarified that "[i]n determining whether a party is a statutory employer, courts should construe the elements of the McDonald test strictly and find statutory employer status only when the facts clearly warrant it." Peck v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2002). In applying a strict interpretation of the McDonald test here, it is clear that Epelboym does not meet all the elements needed to qualify as a statutory employer.
This section makes the Workers' Compensation Act "the exclusive remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury." Peck v. Del. County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 814 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa. 2002). In the present case, it is undisputed that the injury is an on-the-job injury as defined by the Act.