Here, by contrast, the court reporter was not required to "exactly and truly record or take stenographic notes of" nor transcribe the material complained of. OCGA § 17-8-5 (a). See also Pearson v. State , 311 Ga. 26, 32 (4), 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021). That subsection provides:

In two recent cases, we have noted that there is tension between the "level-of-certainty" aspect of the due process test for determining the likelihood of misidentification and our holding in Brodesv. State, 279 Ga. 435, 614 S.E.2d 766 (2005), that trial courts should "refrain from informing jurors [that] they may consider a witness’s level of certainty when instructing them on the factors that may be considered in deciding the reliability of that identification." Id. at 442, 614 S.E.2d 766. See State v. Harris, 316 Ga, 272, 281 n.12, 888 S.E.2d 50 (2023); Pearsonv. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 n.5, 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021). In Harris, we explained that

Having failed to show that an objection to Tramal’s identification of Howard would have been successful, Howard has failed to establish deficient performance by his trial counsel for not filing a motion to suppress, so Howard’s claim fails on the first prong of the ineffective assistance test. See Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29-31 (2), 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021) (no deficient performance in failing to secure ruling on motion to suppress identifications where totality of the circumstances did not show that the trial court would have found a substantial likelihood of misidentification); see also Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693 (3), 763 S.E.2d 704 (2014) (equating the admissibility of in-court identification with whether suggestive out-of-court identification leads to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification). [23] 3. Finally, Howard argues that the trial court erred in striking a prospective juror for cause.

Rather, we must "faithfully apply" Dobbs, which is now the controlling "decision[ ] of the United States Supreme Court as to the meaning of [the United States Constitution]." Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C). See also Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 (2) n.5 (855 S.E.2d 606) (2021) ("Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on matters of federal constitutional law, to follow [a] holding of the United States Supreme Court ...."). Doing so "is not an act of judgment on our part" but rather a simple "act of obedience," which is required of us by virtue of our position in the constitutional order. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C).

While it seems incompatible that a trial judge should consider the witness's level of certainty when determining the likelihood of misidentification but the jury may not be instructed to consider the witness's level of certainty when determining the reliability of the identification, no one has asked us to reconsider our decision in Brodes , and the trial court's consideration of this factor is expressly sanctioned under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see Neil v. Biggers , 409 U. S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 1972. See Pearson v. State , 311 Ga. 26, 29 (2) n.5 (2), 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021) (noting that despite our holding in Brodes , "Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on matters of federal constitutional law, to follow the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Neil "). Additionally, because no one has asked us to consider this issue as a matter of due process under the Georgia Constitution, we decline to do so today.

While it seems incompatible that a trial judge should consider the witness's level of certainty when determining the likelihood of misidentification but the jury may not be instructed to consider the witness's level of certainty when determining the reliability of the identification, no one has asked us to reconsider our decision in Brodes, and the trial court's consideration of this factor is expressly sanctioned under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (III) (93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401) (1972). See Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 n.5 (2) (855 S.E.2d 606) (2021) (noting that despite our holding in Brodes, "Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on matters of federal constitutional law, to follow the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Neil"). Additionally, because no one has asked us to consider this issue as a matter of due process under the Georgia Constitution, we decline to do so today.

Specifically, Lewis has failed to show that, even if the show-up was impermissibly suggestive, there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Pearson v. State , 311 Ga. 26, 29, 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021) (explaining that "evidence of an identification made during such a show[-]up is inadmissible only if the show[-]up procedure was impermissibly suggestive and there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification," and that there is therefore no need to decide whether a show-up is impermissibly suggestive if there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification) (emphasis in original). We consider several factors in evaluating the likelihood of irreparable misidentification, including:

Moreover, an eyewitness to the events depicted in the recording testified that it was a fair and accurate representation of the events it depicted; therefore, any objection would have been meritless. See Pearson v. State , 311 Ga. 26, 31 (3) (a), 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021) (a video recording is generally admissible where "one who personally witnessed the events recorded[ ] testifies that the [recording] accurately portrayed what the witness saw take place at the time the events occurred") (citation and punctuation omitted).