Pearson v. Pearson

9 Citing cases

  1. Lee v. Lee

    2005 N.D. 129 (N.D. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    This Court has held "N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 provides the trial court with authority to award attorney fees to a party in modification proceedings." Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 24, 606 N.W.2d 128. A trial court's award of attorney fees will be reversed if the court abused its discretion. Id. at ¶ 25. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable manner."

  2. Campbell v. BNSF Railway Co.

    753 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D.N.D. 2010)

    Id. (quoting Hastings, 246 N.W.2d at 749-50). Although individuals cannot enter into a common law marriage in North Dakota, the state recognizes valid common law marriages of other states.Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 128 (citing N.D.C.C. § 14-03-08; Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, ¶¶ 7, 9, 569 N.W.2d 280). "The proponent of the common law marriage bears the burden of establishing its validity under the law of the foreign jurisdiction." Id. (citing Brissett v. Sykes, 855 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Ark. 1993); In re Peterson's Estate, 134 N.W. 751, 759 (N.D. 1912); Milburn v. Milburn, 694 N.E.2d 738, 739-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).

  3. Glass v. Glass

    889 N.W.2d 885 (N.D. 2017)   Cited 2 times
    Holding the district court has discretion in deciding what date to terminate spousal support based on receiving spouse’s remarriage

    1 are silent regarding remarriage, we have held numerous times that remarriage creates a prima facie case to terminate permanent spousal support unless extraordinary circumstances exist to justify its continuance. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 7, 606 N.W.2d 128 ; Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, ¶ 6 n.1, 569 N.W.2d 280 ("Even without a specific provision in the divorce decree, permanent spousal support may terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse unless the recipient shows extraordinary circumstances."); Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1994) ; Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d 522, 524 (N.D. 1990) ; Roen v. Roen, 438 N.W.2d 170, 173 (N.D. 1989) ; Rustand v. Rustand, 379 N.W.2d 806, 807 (N.D. 1986) ; Bauer v. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. 1984) ; Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1984) ; Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 490 (N.D. 1978) ; Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464, 468 (N.D. 1976) ; Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 324 (N.D. 1967).[¶ 9] This Court first held that remarriage creates a prima facie case to terminate permanent spousal support in Nugent, 152 N.W.2d at 327.

  4. Schmidt v. Schmidt

    2003 N.D. 55 (N.D. 2003)   Cited 28 times
    Discussing child custody and the clearly erroneous standard in the divorce context

    Harger v. Harger, 2002 ND 76, ¶ 16, 644 N.W.2d 182. The key factors in determining the propriety of an attorney fee award in a divorce action are one parties' needs and the other's ability to pay. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 25, 606 N.W.2d 128. We ordinarily prefer the trial court to make the initial determination of an attorney fee award on appeal, because it is in a "better position to consider special factors relevant under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 relating to the financial status of the parties and the need for and ability to pay attorney's fees."

  5. Quamme v. Bellino

    2002 N.D. 159 (N.D. 2002)   Cited 10 times
    Using the term "temporary" to describe rehabilitative spousal support award for a period of four years

    We have stated that the remarriage of the payee spouse creates a prima facie case for termination of spousal support, unless there are extraordinary circumstances justifying the continuance of support. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 7, 606 N.W.2d 128. The death of the payor spouse should be similarly treated. The obligation to pay spousal support would presumably terminate on the death of the obligor, absent a clear expression of intent to the contrary.

  6. Meyer v. Hawkinson

    2001 N.D. 78 (N.D. 2001)   Cited 8 times

    For example, this Court recently held that although common-law marriages cannot be lawfully entered in this State, we may still recognize a common-law marriage validly entered in Canada. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 128. We did not exalt our public policy against common-law marriages in Pearson.

  7. Lohstreter v. Lohstreter

    2001 N.D. 45 (N.D. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining current income is not indicative of a party's ability to earn income when the paying spouse has the ability to hold a higher paying job

    Spousal support payments may be modified only upon a showing of a material change of circumstances which justifies a modification. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 12, 606 N.W.2d 128. A "material change" is something which substantially affects a party's financial abilities or needs, and the reason for changes in income must be examined as well as the extent the changes were originally contemplated by the parties. Id. Not every financial change in circumstances justifies a modification, and when the change is self-induced no modification is warranted. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1999 ND 126, ¶ 16, 596 N.W.2d 317.

  8. Schmitz v. Schmitz

    2001 N.D. 19 (N.D. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Illustrating a trial court's authority to amend spousal support awards

    Ketelsen v. Ketelsen, 1999 ND 148, ¶ 11, 598 N.W.2d 185. A "material change" is something substantially affecting the financial abilities or needs of a party. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 12, 606 N.W.2d 128. Not every financial change in circumstances justifies a modification, and when the change is self-induced no modification is warranted. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 548 N.W.2d 27, 31 (N.D. 1996). [¶ 9] At the time of the December 17, 1997, amended judgment, Ann had obtained recertification to teach home economics and had made a good faith effort to find employment.

  9. Johnson v. Johnson

    2000 N.D. 170 (N.D. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Concluding the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over third party's contract claim in a divorce proceeding

    This state will recognize a valid adoption of another jurisdiction as long as the rendering court had jurisdiction and afforded the parties due process protections. N.D.C.C. § 14-15-17; cf Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 128 (a common law marriage validly entered into in another jurisdiction would be recognized in North Dakota even though our statutes do not allow common law marriage). [¶ 122] Under our choice of law analysis for contracts, we use a significant contacts approach coupled with "choice influencing considerations."