Opinion
3:97-CV-1068 (EBB)
August 11, 2000
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Anthony Pearson ("Pearson" or "Plaintiff") brings a four-count Complaint, alleging in the First Count a multitude of constitutional violations against him, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983; in the Second Count, the negligent infliction of emotional distress; in the Third Count, the intentional infliction of emotional distress and in the fourth, tortious interference with contractual relations.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alios, of qualified immunity. The Motion is now ready for decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Court sets forth only those facts deemed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised in, and decision rendered on, the Motion.
In the Fall of 1994, Pearson appeared at the office of Defendant Phillips, seeking an application form to operate a business in New Haven. Pearson wanted to operate a business at 790 Congress Avenue, which business would serve a juice bar and music for persons over the age of twenty-one.
On February 15, 1995, Plaintiff received a Certificate of Use and Occupancy for premises to be operated as a "Cafe/Restaurant", with a maximum of seventeen seats. The cafe/restaurant, known as "Club Flava", also received a Live Entertainment Permit and a Food Service License. An application for a liquor license for Club Flava was rejected.
At no time did Plaintiff apply to use Club Flava as an over-twenty-one dance club, yet the evidence is irrefutable that he used the premises in this manner. Complaint upon complaint came from the neighbors in this mostly residential area of the huge crowds, the loud noise and the imposition of patrons parking cars at their premises. One complaint reported that the patrons used the residents' front porches for purposes ranging from the smoking of marijuana to vomiting and urinating thereon.
The police had a comparatively regular presence at Club Flava, in order to, inter alios, direct the heavy traffic, investigate drug use and investigate regular fights which occurred on the premises, and at least one shooting therein.
On July 7, 1995, The City issued a Cease and Desist Order, but the dance hall continued to exist thereafter. The City then sued Pearson and obtained a temporary injunction against the continued use of his premises as a dance hall of any kind. Pearson testified in that case — that he does herein — that he was the victim of selective enforcement of the New Haven zoning ordinances, which violated his rights to equal protection. The State Court held that he had not met his burden of proving that he was singled out from other persons or businesses in New Haven. Accordingly, his rights to equal protection had not been violated. Plaintiff never appealed this state court judgment.
Under the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. IV. 5 § 1, federal courts must accord state court judgments the same preclusive effect as other courts within that state. See Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Here, the State Court held that Plaintiff was not subjected to discriminatory treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, first, because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was treated unequally and, second, that he failed to demonstrate that the alleged unequal treatment was based on selective, impermissible considerations such as race. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1981 and 1983 claims may not be litigated again herein. See also In re Karen-Marie Lund, 187 B.R. 245, 247 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (state court findings against debtor embodied in temporary restraining order are entitled to full faith and credit.)
Following the state court decision, Plaintiff filed the present suit.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. The Standard of Review
In a motion for summary judgment the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment)
If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23. Accord,Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d. Cir. 1995) (movant's burden satisfied if it can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party's claim)
The court is mandated to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. . . ." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991). If the nonmoving party submits evidence which is "merely colorable", or is not "significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
"Indeed the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive, and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases . . .", such as is the present Complaint. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985). Accord, McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 38 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1997) (summary judgment available for dismissal of discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact).
II. The Standard As Applied
The first issue to be determined is whether an unconstitutional municipal policy was the cause of the cease and desist order issued to Plaintiff, and if his own constitutional rights were violated thereby.
As to his race, the Court has already held that the State court ruling on that claim is subject to res judicata. See, footnote 1.
To hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations, "a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Pembaur v. City of Cinncinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1986); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Zahra v. Town of Southhold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995); Ricciuti v. New York Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1991). The inference that a policy existed may be drawn from circumstantial proof which displays a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those within its jurisdiction. See, e.g. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989)Ricciuti, 941 F.2d at 123. Even viewing Plaintiff's Complaint and moving papers in their best light, no such inference may be drawn herein. It was Plaintiff himself who willingly determined to flaunt the occupancy and use certificate which he had been issued. It was again Plaintiff himself who determined to ignore a valid cease and desist letter once it had been determined that he was continuing to use his property in an unallowable, non-conforming use. It was, again, Plaintiff's personal decision to continue to use the Property illegally following the state-court Order.
Further, it was within the absolute jurisdiction of the police to monitor the activities of Plaintiff's club, as traffic congestion, drug use physical altercations, and shootings quite obviously fall within their duties. It is crucial, too, in examining such an inference, that the police never arrested one individual inside Plaintiff's club. These actions were most assuredly not violative of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff's claims of violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights must also fail. Substantive due process is reserved not for merely unwise or erroneous governmental decisions, but for egregious abuses of governmental power shocking to the judicial conscience. The other touchstone of due process is that it may not be "arbitrary or capricious".Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 262-23 (2d Cir. 1999). See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) ("[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense"). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prevail under his substantive due process claim as this Court finds that the conduct of the Defendants was not arbitrary, capricious, or "shocking to its conscience" in any manner.
As to Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, this Court holds that he was given full procedural due process by the State Court, which decision is binding on this Court.
Qualified or "good faith" immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability to the extent their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982). The doctrine protects public officials from the risk of potentially ruinous monetary liability which would deter qualified people from public service and safeguards the public interest in having government employees act with independence and without fear of consequences. Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 895 (2d Cir. 1988). Qualified immunity accommodates the community's interest in the proper discharge of the officer's duties and an individual's right to redress for a government official's unconstitutional conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, (1987). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, (1986).
An official can establish his entitlement to qualified immunity in three ways. Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988). First, "the defense should be sustained if the court finds that it was not clear at the time of the official acts that the interest asserted by the plaintiff was protected by a federal statute or the Constitution." Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1987). Second, "even if the interest asserted by the plaintiff was clearly of a type generally protected by federal law, the defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law if it was not clear at the time of the acts at issue that an exception did not permit those acts." Id. at 921. Third, "even if the contours of the plaintiff's federal rights and the official's permissible actions were clearly delineated at the time of the acts complained of, the defendant[s] may enjoy qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for [them] to believe [their] acts did not violate those rights." Id.
Again, giving Plaintiff's claim the widest of inferences, the Court finds that the only test applicable to the present case is the three: was it objectively reasonable for the Defendants, and each of them, to believe their actions did not violate constitutional rights? As each of Plaintiff's claims have been examined herein, the answer simply must be answered in the affirmative. Thus, Defendants enjoy qualified immunity. First, the state court decision, Defendants' moving papers, and exhibits thereto, clearly show that the City of New Haven has no custom or policy of any constitutionally impermissible enforcement of its zoning regulations or the enforcement of the laws of New Haven by the New Haven Police. Second, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, his moving papers, and exhibits thereto, utterly fail to overcome the doctrine of qualified immunity as examined herein.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as no resonable jury could find on any constitutional allegation set forth in the Amended Complaint, upon which Plaintiff would bear the burden at trial, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 36] is hereby GRANTED.
Further, as the federal claims are now foreclosed, the Court will not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the three remaining state-Court claims.
The Clerk is hereby directed to close this file.
SO ORDERED