See Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 188 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. (Miss.) 1951); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Campbell, 164 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1947); Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1932); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Prevost, 358 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976); Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940); Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938); Smith v. Gypsy Oil, 130 Okla. 135, 265 P. 647 (1928); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540 (1920); State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940); Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 449, 76 P.2d 779 (1938); Cowman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P.2d 988 (1935); McCammon v. Texas Co., 137 F. Supp. 256 (D.C.Kan. 1955); Cameron v. Lebow, 366 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1962); Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960); Wilson v. Purnell, 199 Ky.218, 250 S.W. 850 (1923). In Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in words that this Court believes appropriate in this case, stated:
(citations omitted)); Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (holding that there was production under the entire lease, including 720 acres that the lessee had assigned, even though there was no effort to produce on the 720-acre tract for fifteen years, because the lease was "a unity"); Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075, 1079 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ) ("The limitation in the lease that it should continue in force as long as any of the minerals were produced from same was in no manner modified or restricted by the assignment."); see also Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1932) (recognizing that a lease is indivisible even after an assignment of part of the working interest for purposes of "the requirement for the fixing of the primary term by obtaining production"); Hillegust v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 282 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding production from any one of the tracts described in a lease perpetuated it and "[t]he fact that when the deeds were given in the case at bar determinable fee estates in the minerals were already vested in two different persons as a result of the leases" does not distinguish this from the usual lease situation in which "production from any one of the tracts of land described in it serves to perpetuate the lease as to all"). Ridge, howev
Given that it is personalty, its ownership does not necessarily follow ownership of the easement. See Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075, 1079 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ) (discussed below). Homeowners did not conclusively prove ownership of the pipeline.
"Abandonment" involves a relinquishment of possession. See Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075, 1079 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ). The wells had not been abandoned within the ordinary and customary meaning of the term because the wells continued to be utilized on a daily basis for the purpose of water injection.
Merely ceasing to use the premises, Tenant contends, is not sufficient to show abandonment unless such non-use is prolonged and unexplained. See City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1938, no writ). Moreover, leaving does not constitute abandonment of the lease, Tenant says, as long as the tenant continues to pay rent. See M.L.C. Loan Corp. v. P.K. Foods, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1976, no writ); Lucky v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 339 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1960, no writ). Tenant contends that there is no evidence, or at least insufficient evidence, that it ever intended to forsake altogether the premises and its lease obligations.
Both reason and authority support the conclusion that the commencement of the well by defendant's assignee on the 505.3-acre tract had the effect of continuing the lease in force not only as to such 505.3 acres but also as to the remaining 65.4 acres retained by defendant without payment of delay rental. Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd); Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075, 1079 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1938, no writ; Duke v. Stewart, 230 S.W. 485, 488 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont 1921, no writ); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Campbell, 164 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1947); Meacham v. Halley, 103 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1939); Carrothers v. Stanolind Oil Gas Co., 134 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.Tex. 1955); 2 Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 407.2 (1975); 3 Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas § 512 (Perm.Ed. 1958); Junz, Oil and Gas § 3.54 (1964). Plaintiffs assert that the authorities on which we rely involved not merely the commencement of drilling operations but also completion of, and production from, a well.
The case of City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), held that non-use for a period of 6 years, without more, did not raise a fact issue as to abandonment. It was held in Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1938, no writ) that non-use of oilfield equipment for a period of 5 1/2 years, as a matter of law, was not evidence of abandonment. Furthermore, even if defendants' summary judgment evidence had raised a fact issue for determination with respect to abandonment of the oilfield equipment, there is no pleading or proof that either defendants or their predecessors in title to the land ever reduced such equipment to possession after its abandonment, if any.