The present suit is not upon the judgment; it was alleged merely by way of inducement. By sub-section (e), title 11, § 110, U.S.C.A. the trustee is authorized to avoid any transfer which a creditor of the bankrupt might have avoided. Such recovery is for the estate: 4 Remington on Bankruptcy (3d Ed.), § 1539; Peacock v. Fairbairn, 45 Idaho 628 ( 264 P. 231); Van Riper v. Davenport, 121 Or. 474, 476 ( 245 P. 316, 256 P. 193). The allegations with respect to the order of the bankruptcy court were not essential to the validity of the complaint, but were matters of inducement not within the scope of Or. Laws, § 87.
Campbell v. Calcasieu Nat. Bank, 12 Fed. (2d Ser.) 981 (C.C.A. 5th Cir., 1926). See, also, Campbell v. Dalbey, 23 Fed. (2d Ser.) 229 (C.C.A. 5th Cir., 1928); Peacock v. Fairbairn, 45 Ida. 628 ( 264 P. 231). Several of the other states have adopted the same rule.
Therefore, it stands on an equal footing with a claim reduced to judgment. Hence, constitutes an exception to the general rule (that exceptions to the general rule have been heretofore recognized, see Peacock v. Fairbairn, 45 Idaho 628, 264 P. 231). The claim of a minor child against his father for support, before being reduced to judgment, being statutory, is such as to bring it within the provisions of Section 54-906, supra.
In April, 1928, the supreme court affirmed the district court decrees. ( 45 Idaho 628, 264 P. 231.) On the first day of September, 1928, this action was instituted by the trustee against R.U. Bradshaw to recover as for conversion, what was designated as the landlord's portion of crops grown upon the land and severed between the date of the district court's decree and the date of its affirmance in the supreme court.
Gering v. Leyda, 186 F. 110; Nieters v. Brockman, 11 Mo. App. 599; Riggs v. Price, 277 Mo. 333, 210 S.W. 420; Booth v. Bates (Ala.), 117 So. 209; Lester v. Barclay (Ala.), 105 So. 808; Clements v. Eggleston (Ala.), 114 So. 2. Proof of adjudication of bankruptcy and the admission of the bankrupt's schedules is sufficient, especially when the bankrupts admit that the creditors listed in their schedules were in existence at the time of the transfers. Peacock v. Fairbairn (Ida.), 264 P. 231. (2) A trustee in bankruptcy may set aside any fraudulent conveyance that a creditor could under the state law, regardless of whether the transfer was within four months of bankruptcy. Riggs v. Price, 277 Mo. 333, 210 S.W. 420; May v. Bibler (Mo.), 4 S.W.2d 769; Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 614, 62 L.Ed. 511; Baldwin v. Kingston, 247 F. 163; In re McMullen, 101 F. 413; Bush v. Expert Storage Co., 163 F. 918. (3) Every conveyance made to hinder, delay or defraud creditors is void, and may be set aside by creditors whether they are prior or subsequent to the conveyance.